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The Authoritarian Personality in the 21st century.

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The Authoritarian Personality in the 21st Century.

Gareth Norris

This thesis is submitted to Bond University in fulfilment of the requirement for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

This thesis represents my own work and contains no material which has previously been submitted for a degree or diploma at this or any other institution, except where due acknowledgement is made.

Signed:...Gareth Norris.....

Date:...28/07/2005.....

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Introduction.

This thesis began largely as an exploration into right-wing political ideology and its relationship to *The Authoritarian Personality* proposed by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford (1950). It had initially been envisaged that contemporary examples would manifest themselves within many neo-Fascist or ‘White Pride’ style organisations and as an adage to their supposed historical underpinnings, would therefore be representative of modern day authoritarianism. As previously discovered by Eysenck and Coulter (1974) in their examination of British Fascists and Communists, the authoritarian syndrome is somewhat more complex to explain by way of reference to a number of radical semi-political organisations. Subsequently, the thesis was to take on a deeper and more philosophical direction as various parts of the literature were analysed and critiqued. And indeed to some extent the original proposal was abandoned in favour of a richer and more conceptual approach to our understanding of authoritarianism. This was discovered to be distinctly missing from the majority of the current literature in the field.

From the outset the reliance on political ideology is apparent. However the concept is not merely a discussion on the psychology of political persuasion. One of the main arguments concerning political ideology and authoritarianism is concerned with whether there is an authoritarian of the ‘left’. Many dispute this fact and insist that authoritarianism is exclusively a right-wing phenomenon (see Christie, 1990; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996). Original measures of authoritarianism have often made specific reference to political groups and are used to differentiate subjects in relation to their political persuasion. It has therefore been assumed that the notion of the authoritarian extends beyond that of personality and is also deeply rooted in ones

political affiliation, with those of the right being significantly more authoritarian than those of the left. The differences between these two schools of thought sees the conservative right at one end and the liberal left at the other. Therefore the traditional and rigid nature of the former being regarded as more authoritarian than the tolerant and open-minded views of the latter.

Despite these apparently taken for granted assumptions, there have been attempts to identify the authoritarian in a less value-laden manner, and in particular, Rokeach's Dogmatism scale was an early attempt to address this bias (Rokeach, 1960). Others have also challenged the widely accepted notion of right-wing authoritarianism and constructed scales with reversed scored and 'value free' items. These have been met with limited success and none have been able to establish to any acceptable degree that there is a universal concept of authoritarian behaviour that is present regardless of the political climate in which it is nurtured. It is still regarded by many that the authoritarian personality is best defined with reference to the Fascist regime advocated by Hitler in the early Twentieth Century. For some, the understanding of how this doctrine was able to engulf nearly an entire nation provides the support for their argument as to the authoritarian personality being distinctly right-wing in orientation.

It should be recalled however, that the first main theories developed around authoritarianism were constructed in response to the emergence of Fascism throughout many parts of Europe and Germany in particular. Seldom before had such destructive regimes achieved such seemingly universal acceptance amongst the masses. It was partly assumed that it could be some personality defect in the German

race that allowed the Nazi party to rise to power. Even before the end of WWII, social scientists had begun to utilise newly developed psychometric instruments in the race to identify and quantitatively measure the Fascist personality (see Stagner, 1936; Maslow, 1943). However these somewhat crude attempts lacked any real theoretical underpinning, and it wasn't until a group of psychologists were assembled at the University of California that our understanding of the Fascist character took on a new direction. As part of a series of studies into the nature of prejudice, *The Authoritarian Personality* was to become both a controversial and much referenced text even some five decades later.

It would be seemingly difficult for the authors of *The Authoritarian Personality* to ignore the political climate under which they were working, and indeed two of the four contributors were refugees from the holocaust. In addition, support from a grant by the American Jewish Council explicitly sought answers as to what basis the atrocities in Europe had been founded upon and in particular, was it possible that there could be a re-surfacing of Fascism in other western countries. The book was to be the third volume in a five part series that intended to provide a complete picture of the nature of prejudice, encompassing what they regarded as the whole spectrum of antecedents, such as economic and historical issues. Aside from the Adorno et al. text, seldom is reference made to the remaining monographs indicating the entire project may have unsuccessfully fulfilled its ambitious aim. *The Authoritarian Personality* has endured some years of intense scrutiny and criticism, and aside from the competing theories that have developed in its wake, but so original was this study that it is still a feature in many psychology texts published today. Meloen (1993) has

documented there to be over 2,000 studies on authoritarianism and its related constructs in the period 1950-1990.

Careful examination of the thousand pages that constitute *The Authoritarian Personality* indicates that the basis for their examination relies distinctly on the notion that the authoritarian *is* the Nazi Fascist. This archetypal individual has distinct features that make the acceptance of the ideology particularly attractive and it was hypothesised that early childhood was of particular importance in nurturing these tendencies. The German family structure was regarded to be a breeding ground for authoritarian personalities that could be later mobilized by the Third Reich. *Chapter One* is concerned with detailing just how this concept emerged. In particular the development of the F-scale (anti-Democratic or Fascism) is often cited as a measure of authoritarianism despite the fact that it constitutes but a small part of the whole examination. Nevertheless it is the logical outcome to the empirical section of the study and is therefore deserved of much of the theoretical and methodological criticism directed at it. The original endeavours into anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism also serve to highlight just how their ideas of what constitute the authoritarian personality actually developed.

It is difficult to deny that there does appear to be an element of authoritarian style behaviour in the leaders and followers of the Nazi party, however it would be to simplistic to presuppose that this is the only solitary example of it. The authors seemingly ignored a huge portion of the literature that already existed on the concept of authoritarianism, which becomes apparent when a meticulous review of the methodology they employed is pursued. In addition, the scant bibliography is

glaringly deficient for such a detailed text. It is possible to identify this bias in their study and years later the original authors were to concede this point along with the fact that the books title was not decided until just before publication.

Disagreement amongst scholars as to the validity of the concept of authoritarianism proposed by Adorno et al. and even greater dismay with the methods employed to uncover and test it, would overshadow many of its strengths. An entire edited volume was devoted to this (Christie and Jahoda, 1954) and despite some early praise by others (Smith, 1950), the debate over the existence of an authoritarian personality would seemingly only just begin with its publication. *Chapter Two* highlights the main alternatives that have been proposed as definitions and measures of the authoritarian personality, and in particular those of Eysenck (1954), Rokeach (1960) and Altemeyer (1981). In addition, newly emerging schools of thought such as the less theoretically reliant in-group/out-group theories of Duckitt (1989) and Feldman (2003) provide some understanding as to how the concept of authoritarianism is still progressing over fifty years since its formal publication.

But whilst developments in psychometrics and computerised analysis have allowed vast methodological improvements, there is still some disparity between many of the major proponents of authoritarian research as to what accurately defines the concept. To some extent many have adopted the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996) as the most psychometrically and theoretically sound version of measurement to date. However, this is not to promote the RWA-scale as having the final word in authoritarianism research. Analysis of the main authoritarian studies of the last forty years by Meloen (1993) indicated that the original F-scale

(Adorno et al., 1950) was equally efficient in differentiating between potential authoritarian subjects. This is perhaps an artefact of the influence that the original Adorno et al. study had and still does have on authoritarian research. Many of the alternatives are seemingly still tied to this original concept both theoretically and methodologically to some degree.

Regardless of which scale that has been employed by researchers in the quest to uncover correlates of authoritarianism, there have been a number of significant studies that have uncovered a wealth of illustrations of such behaviour. Whilst many are experimental and suffer from some level of methodological critique, there are also other examples that serve to highlight how and why the authoritarian acts as they do. *Chapter Three* concerns itself with synthesising these into a logical and coherent argument that draws together much of the research on authoritarianism to hypothesise a revised understanding of the concept.

In particular, explanation is extended to addressing the ideological basis of authoritarianism. The initial proposal of Adorno et al. was distinctly right-wing in stature, and attempts to provide a logical alternative of the left-wing authoritarian have met with mixed results. Specific reference to the Communist regime of Stalin has been heralded as the obvious counterpart of Nazi authoritarianism, and indeed recent trials of the RWA-scale in the former USSR have indicated that a comparable level of authoritarianism exists within this society. It will be argued that it is not the specific ideology that is important in determining authoritarian behaviour, but rather the extent to which the group cohesion is enforced that defines such regimes. The ideas of group behaviour are not new to social psychologists, but providing a link to

the concept of authoritarianism has seldom been made explicit despite numerous references to it in much of the literature.

Whilst this concept is relatively original, it is still a fusion of a number of separate theories further combined with evidence gleaned from experimental research and empirical examples. Many theories have been based upon the creation of new measures, which often use some dubious methodological steps with which to provide evidence for their conclusions. In particular the use of newly created but un-validated scales. *Chapter Four* will present the statistical analysis of a number of measures that have been selected to provide evidence for the current theory. Importantly, the use of existing instruments that were developed independently of authoritarian research provide some validation for the model proposed rather than risk the potential bias in constructing new ones.

Where the majority of studies have been criticised for using unrepresentative samples, effort has been made to investigate groups that may experience some level of authoritarianism in accordance with the theory being discussed. Analysis of these subjects is not only statistical in nature, but also includes some observations in ascertaining the nature of authoritarianism in these groups. In addition, use was made of a larger heterogeneous student sample with which to test the theories basic assumptions. The aim was to replicate to some degree the methodology of the original study, which made use of a number of specific groups for in-depth analysis and illustration as well as larger samples for statistical validation.

Returning to the title of the thesis itself, the question that is addressed in *Chapter Five* concerns the relevance of the concept of authoritarianism today. Over sixty years have passed since the Nazi invasion of Europe and over a decade since the fall of Communism in the USSR. Issues such as human rights legislation and multiculturalism have created a much more tolerant world where the individual's rights are often now seen as more important than that of the state. Democracy is now the leading political doctrine in the western world and there would seemingly be no place for the totalitarian, one party state. Despite this more tolerant view of man's relation to society, there are certain factors that indicate this thinking may not be universal. One such area concerns the occurrence of hate crimes and the emergence of neo-Fascist organisations that advocate the oppression of particular groups.

Perpetuated by this are fears over terrorist activities that serve to rationalise reservations over the continued liberalisation of society. Specific laws enacted in the wake of September 11, make the rights of the citizen once again under the control of the authorities. For example, over 85% of US citizens approved sanctions overriding the right to privacy and allowing the authorities to monitor electronic communications. Altemeyer (1988) uses a similar analogy in rationalising his concept of authoritarianism with an example of the implementation of emergency wartime legislation following a diplomatic incident in Canada. The use of propaganda and censorship also provide a link between authoritarianism of both left and the right and the restrictive nature of either of these ideologies. Whilst Fascism and Communism are no longer be the threat to liberty that they may have once posed, permutations of these may still have the potential to materialise even within openly democratic societies. The implications of this for the study of authoritarianism are paramount,

particularly as levels of authoritarianism have been seen to rise in times of threat. Such thought may easily be discarded as irrational paranoia, but had such warnings been adhered to in the historical context, then many atrocities could have been avoided. The re-emergence of many nationalist parties in many European states is illustrative of how support can gather for such movements.

With the added value of hindsight there is the possibility to critically re-examine the early theory that has progressed the area. For example, the threat of Communism in the late 1940's was not as significant to the stability of a nation as the recently deposed Fascist movement. Nor were the horrors of these regimes fully identified in their totality or in relation to authoritarianism. Other examples of one-party dictatorships have also come to the fore in recent history and have given highly graphic examples of how these movements not only come to power, but also just how they maintain their control over their citizen's. And it is the presence of authoritarian style behaviour that is frequently the prominent feature. It is the task of social scientists to identify how these associations between the individual and the group develop and how the dangerous elements of the equation can be controlled.

Chapter One – *The Authoritarian Personality*.

1.1 Introduction.

In late 1950, a group of psychologists from the University of California at Berkeley – Theodore W. Adorno, Else Frenkel-Brunswik, Daniel J. Levinson and R. Nevitt Sanford – published *The Authoritarian Personality*. The political climate preceding its publication was particularly volatile, coming some five years since the cessation of the Second World War. Fascist regimes in Mussolini's Italy and, more crucially, Hitler's Germany had led to the seemingly mass support for the totalitarian rule that was and still is difficult and disturbing to comprehend. Equally as critical was the advent of the Cold War and the resurgence in Communism that had largely been dormant during this period. These events had the combined effect of stirring people's interest towards such strict political doctrines around the time of the books' publication. Fear of contemporary Fascism becoming prominent in mainland America was by far the greatest concern to many.

Witnessing the brutality and in-humane actions during the war in Europe, raised the question as to just how such destructive ideologies could historically attract such enormous followings. The Fascist or potentially Fascist individual, whose personality lends them to be attracted to antidemocratic doctrines, soon became a relative fascination among many social scientists. One particular avenue of inquiry in the search for such answers was *The Authoritarian Personality* (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950)¹. Whilst the title of the book implies a generalised character trait, the ideological basis of its guiding theory is less apparent.

¹ Throughout this chapter all citations will refer to this text, unless stated otherwise.

There has since been considerable interest in the nature of authoritarianism, although considerable disagreement still exists as to its actual definition. Hence any discussion in the area must thoroughly address the historical antecedents that have driven the development of this construct. Although researchers are continually revising these theories, it is still necessary to re-visit the evolution of authoritarianism in order to appreciate its progression as an area of psychological investigation.

1.2 Early Psychological Studies in Relation to Political Ideology.

One of the first researchers to attempt to quantify political ideology was Stagner (1936), who published an exploratory study into the nature of Fascist attitudes. Reviewing historical literature from the German and Italian movements of this kind and constructing a number of statements relating to them, the ensuing scale was administered to a sample of 224 college students. Results indicated that by using a simple basis of socio-economic status (which was assigned according to institution range, i.e. the different working-class, liberal, and, conservative colleges), the upper class and largely conservative university sample exhibited a significantly higher 'Fascism' score than the other socio-economic groups. Defining the aims of the fascist movement as to "prevent working-class revolutions and secure for the middle-class some measure of security from monopoly capital" (Stagner, 1936, p.315), this apparent indiscretion was explained through the basis of 'class-superiority' of the latter group – in both an economic and racial sense. Stagner acknowledges a number of methodological limitations, namely the investigators actual understanding of the concept and the subject's willingness to respond sincerely. He believed that by improving scaling techniques and analysis procedures, the study of attitudes in this way was viable.

Following from these early explorations into the measurement of agreement with a given political ideology, Edwards (1941) conducted a more sophisticated analysis of essentially the same concept. Responding to the apprehension of subjects to honestly and accurately respond to openly fascist statements they may have privately agreed with, he was to construct a 26-item questionnaire using previous research and historical literature. In order to overcome these *social desirability* issues (as they are now referred to²), the Likert-style instrument was disguised as a general public opinion questionnaire. Analysis of the *Unlabelled Fascist Attitudes Scale* would identify those who supported the 'Independent' political party, possessing significantly lower mean scores than either the 'Democrats' or 'Republicans' from the sample. The reasons for such a difference were implicated in the methodological origins of the scale, however "if the independent group regards democracy as a positive value and if these principles were critically analysed in terms of this value, then the tendency towards a low mean is perhaps understood" (Edwards, 1941, p.581). Edwards was more alarmed however, over the apparent inconsistencies in the analysis of the scale, and concluded that they were probably due to the fact that,

Subjects simply aren't capable of recognizing certain principles for what they are – fascist – unless someone helps them out by labelling them. And in the second instance, it would seem that the subjects' frames of reference with respect to democracy were inadequate for the task of evaluating the principles. (Edwards, 1941, p.581).

² Edwards was to later publish a book on the personality variable of socially desirable responding (Edwards, 1957).

As the sample consisted of college students, Edwards also voiced his concern over the educational process in establishing democratic principles. Nevertheless, there were some encouraging results emerging for the study of individual differences in relation to political ideology, and in addition, an *overall* understanding of these values and their actual meaning in the wider sense.

Continuing on from his earlier explorations into measuring fascist attitudes, Edwards was to further attempt to interpret these findings with regards to identifying *The Signs of Incipient Fascism* (Edwards, 1944). As the title implies, the overt concern within contemporary society at this point in time, related to the likely susceptibility of the adoption of fascist ideology within other Western cultures, and in particular North America. Edwards makes it explicit in his definition of what he constitutes as Fascism that this does not rely heavily on any one doctrine such as the Nazi party. Instead it identifies many of the *features* of Fascism; for example, rule by force, being a dictatorship, the persecution of minorities, curtailment of certain freedoms, and the belief of the welfare of the state as being above that of the individual. The concern arises that, although many American citizens are adept at recognizing such characteristics within the dictatorships in Italy and Germany, they are somewhat less proficient in appreciating these very same behaviours within their own country. This leads to what Edwards defines as the “development of an American brand of fascism” (p.302).

Along with the important thoughts and theories of Stagner, Edwards and others (e.g. Katz & Cantrill, 1944) on the potential rise of Fascism, it was the psychologist Abraham Maslow who was to then interpret such political ideology into a basic

structure of authoritarianism. With particular reference to the concepts raised by Fromm (1941) in *Escape From Freedom*, Maslow's "World View" identifies a number of situations in which the authoritarian character manifests itself. Of more importance for Maslow is the "intersection of psychological and sociological concepts" (p.402). The authoritarian thus views the world as a 'jungle' with a tendency to classify others as rivals who are perceived as either inferior or superior. Differences between themselves and others are interpreted in line with those that fit into this hierarchical structure. The democratic person by contrast, merely sees such discrepancies in a more literal fashion, and is unlikely to infer them as being either better or worse. The desire for power and prestige is witnessed as being a central feature of the authoritarian structure and interpretation of behaviours such as kindness, sympathy and generosity being linked with the weak and inferior. Alternatively, the traits of cruelty, selfishness and hardness are aligned with superiority.

This is of particular importance in the creation of roles within a social hierarchy, whereby the authoritarian is said to display both sadistic and masochistic tendencies. Maslow identifies these two character features as being at the core of the authoritarian group structure and therefore in identification and acceptance of the leader and follower roles. However, a note of caution is expressed in the interpretation of *all* submissive behaviour as stemming from authoritarian attitudes. Rather there are to be a distinct number of "passive followers, who are however, not basically authoritarian, but must constitute a sizeable percentage of the population in both the 'fascist' and 'democratic' countries" (p.409). It is therefore not passivity as such that is symptomatic of the authoritarian, but the interplay between these two opposing poles

of behaviour. Maslow concludes that the authoritarian is essentially akin to the more clinical definition of the psychopath, due to their display of ruthless and selfish behaviour enacted without conscience.

During the same period as Stagner, Edwards, and Maslow were measuring the public's affinity to Fascist attitudes, *The Institute for Social Research* also published prolifically on the subject of anti-Semitism. Commencing in 1941, with the *Research Project on anti-Semitism*, it laid some tenuous but comprehensive foundations for the causes and nature of such behaviour. Following from this project looking at German factory workers (Institute of Social Research, 1941), the authors of the project were concerned with the casual manner in which anti-Semitism was being viewed. In particular, the lack of understanding of its psychological roots - these being perceived as being both social and psychological - was examined. The authors paint a sombre picture of modern culture and its relationship with the Jewish people, although probably not altogether without justification during the period in which it was constructed. In particular, there is a primary concern with susceptibility to anti-Semitic propaganda, and how this is manifested in the unconscious.

Of specific relevance is the second section of this report, which concerns itself with 'anti-Semitism and Mass Movements' (p.126-129). It is here that the fusion of social forces and psychological character is used to explain the historical movements that have been characterised by the persecution of the Jews. Referring to Twelfth and Thirteenth Century England, the authors hypothesise connections between a "special type of leader cult, mass fraternizing, and pogroms and is one of the most important socio-psychological subjects for investigation" (p.128). This outlines the intention to

further examine the psychology of mass movements, in line with the general theory of authoritarianism. Also of particular importance to the later concept of authoritarianism is the fourth section of the paper, in which there is an attempt to provide a profile of the different 'types' of anti-Semite. Nine separate forms of anti-Semite are presented, although the authors concede that there will be deviations and combinations from these 'ideal possibilities' as well as differing levels of intensity. The paper also includes some important thoughts and insights into the perceived relationship between anti-Semitism and the *National Socialist* movement in Germany. The legacy of this earlier research would resonate through much of the associations published literature.

The Marxist background of the authors is evident in their analysis of the persecution of the Jews; in this instance through the abolishment of the free market economy into the planned economy of the totalitarian state. The economic recession witnessed after the First World War is cited as being a driving force behind the adoption of a planned economy, with the German Jews becoming redundant as private entrepreneurs in the liberal system that had previously allowed them to flourish. In particular, within the liberal market style of economy,

...the unfit are eliminated by the effectiveness of the mechanism of competition, no matter what their names are or what personal qualities they have. In the totalitarian system, however, individuals or entire groups can be sent to the gallows at any moment for political or other reasons. (p.141)

The persecution of the Jews by the Third Reich was therefore primarily perceived by Horkheimer and the Institute to be economic in nature, and resulted from the reduction of the power of financial capital in the political sphere. Although issues being labelled as authoritarian were emerging in the various fields of inquiry that were being established at this time, there is also an apparent link with the study of anti-Semitism. This link was to become influential in later publications, and in particular those emanating from the Institute for Social Research.

The overall concept of *an* authoritarian personality as opposed to *The Authoritarian Personality* published by Adorno et al., did not materialise in a vacuum. The work of Thurstone, Stagner, Maslow, and others provided the initial steps towards the quantification of various political attitudes. Reference to them in the Adorno et al. text is testament to their influence and inspiration. As with later studies in authoritarianism, an understanding of the historical development of the concept is vital in order to appreciate the complexities in its definition and measurement. *The Authoritarian Personality* was published as the third volume of a five part series entitled *Studies in Prejudice* in 1949-1950, under the leadership of Max Horkheimer. Horkheimer himself had become Director of Scientific Research at the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research in 1944. According to Horkheimer's introduction to the series in the Adorno et al. text, the five publications were essentially to be viewed as one component of a wider trend; "the initial five volumes constitute one unit, an integrated whole, each part of which illuminates one or another facet of the phenomena we call prejudice" (in Adorno et al., 1950, p.viii). An ambitious project by anyone's standards, the aim appeared to relate the newly developing methods of scientific psychological inquiry with the more established disciplines of sociology and

philosophy. In particular, the reference to anti-Semitism and Fascist ideology of the Nazi party would appear to have a profound influence on the actual *type* of prejudice being examined. This can be inferred from the titles of the other manuscripts published in this series by the Institute.

The remaining four volumes, although not as widely referenced as *The Authoritarian Personality*, have equally provocative titles alluding to their field of inquiry. *Anti-Semitism and Emotional Disorder: A Psychoanalytical Interpretation* (Ackerman & Jahoda³, 1950) included a monograph of case studies of individuals who had undergone psychoanalysis, to amongst other things, correlate the internal and external forces that were important to the investigation of the authoritarian personality. *Dynamics of Prejudice: A Psychological and Sociological Study of War Veterans* (Bettelheim & Janowitz, 1950) uses a multi-disciplinary approach to assess the impact of experience of conflict in relation to personality and its implications with prejudice. These two texts were however authored by non-Institute members, and it could be suggested that they were in fact running out of time and funding to finish and publish these ‘in house.’

The other two volumes which preceded the above and *The Authoritarian Personality*, were less psychological in approach and attempted to lay the foundations for the aims of the Institute’s program of research. Historical analysis of the economic depression before the turn of the century and its association with the formation of anti-Semitism in Germany, formed the basis of *Rehearsal for Destruction* (Massing, 1949). Finally, *Prophets of Deceit* (Lowenthal & Guterman, 1949) examined the techniques

³ Marie Jahoda was to later co-author the edited text – *Studies in the Scope and Method of The Authoritarian Personality* (1954), and contribute significantly to the critique of the study.

employed by ‘demagogic agitators’ and their mediation between the individual and society as a function of the mechanism of persuasion and influence. This particular publication was personally overseen by Horkheimer, stating in his introduction that this was because “men at present were denied significant political choices, the people themselves did not suffice as an object of study” (Jay, 1980, p.141). The implications of such pragmatic influence, as relayed by Horkheimer in the preface to the initial volume, provide an indication of the theoretical and philosophical stance of this influential character within the general framework of social research conducted by the Institute. This can be further illustrated through his own work published either side of the *Studies in Prejudice* series.

Some fourteen years before the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*, Horkheimer and his colleagues had published a compilation of essays under the collective heading *Studien über Autorität Familie* (Studies of Authority and the Family) in 1936⁴. The underlying focus of this publication was to relate how the “patriarchal family of the period produced an ‘authoritarian character’ as well as strengthening the belief that there must always be a superior and inferior and that obedience is necessary” (Horkheimer, 1936; cited in Lewis, 1990, p.143). Indeed, prior to publication of the full text, the four authors themselves had all published articles on the topic of some description. In particular, the collaboration between Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford on an early article examining the A-S scale in female undergraduates published in 1945 was to add a significant structural emphasis that can be observed in the complete text.

⁴ No English translation available.

1.3 Adorno et al's Approach.

The Authoritarian Personality is a fairly detailed and technical text. It therefore relegates itself somewhat to the interests of only the most arduous academics with a particular interest in its concepts, rather than the more casual reader in psychology. The original publication ran to some 23 chapters, totalling 999 pages and an abridged version was published in 1982. This original manuscript also included interviews and analysis of projective testing. Comment was made in one methodological critique, that “its thousand pages, loaded with tables and statistics, and replete with technical terminology, are formidable – so formidable, indeed, that they may discourage all but the most stout-hearted from any careful scrutiny of the material” (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954, p50-51). More a collection of individual and collaborated monographs than an integrated text, *The Authoritarian Personality* became the third contribution to the *Studies in Prejudice* series edited by Horkheimer and Samuel Flowerman, also from the American Jewish Committee. Despite its apparent lack of user-friendly recital, no one could particularly point a sceptical finger at the authors for not conducting an extremely thorough piece of research. Nor for attempting to define a concept, that until 1950, had been largely a jumble of individual suppositions and deeply philosophical writings. The manner in which *The Authoritarian Personality* was to gather and focus ideas, as well as incorporating new techniques of personality measurement within existing psychoanalytical theory, was to earn it the prestigious honour of being named as one of 62 major advances in the social sciences from 1900-1965 (Deutsch, Platt, & Senghass, 1971).

Representing the synthesis of psychoanalytic theory with the recently developed projective methodologies, and further coupled with the thematic emphasis on its links

with anti-Semitism, the concept was to be firmly entrenched into the realms of critical debate. It is common amongst many researchers to refer to *The Authoritarian Personality* quite simply as the F-scale, and to largely focus on this as *the* product of the research. Although by far the most cited measure developed from the project, it largely ignores the processes that lead to its inception and also largely oversimplifies the phenomena under examination. The F-scale itself utilises a multi-faceted structure in its construction, each element being the product of various research endeavours. To refer to it merely as authoritarianism would be to ignore the complex theory behind its development. This was most certainly a concern that was acknowledged by the original authors, especially as they were venturing into unfamiliar territory both technically and ideologically. Viewing personality as consisting of many 'layers', their primary aim was to develop a methodology that would allow the recognition of various surface traits and attitudes, especially those that would reveal the more inhibited, deeper, unconscious patterns of dynamically related factors. By employing a number of techniques, the plan was to also partially serve the purpose of validating the various measures against each other, whilst also uncovering the 'deeper' layers of personality believed to be characteristic of the authoritarian.

To address these various theoretical complexities that were emerging, the procedure was separated into two main elements; the *Questionnaire Method* and the *Clinical Techniques*. Each of the questionnaire's also contained three separate components; the *factual questions*, the *opinion-attitude scales*, and a number of *projective questions*. The factual questions were simply to establish any past and present group membership; including religious and political orientation. Subject's demographic variables were based upon the need to establish basic sociological correlates of

ideology. Preliminary examination of the authoritarian concept began using the newly developed opinion-attitude scales, hoping to identify surface traits regarding anti-Semitism, ethnocentrism, politico-economic conservatism, and later, the broader anti-democratic disposition. The further inclusion of a set of projective questions was to “allow a maximum of variation in response from one subject to another and to provide channels through which relatively deep personality processes may be expressed” (p.16). Presenting subjects with emotionally loaded stimuli was hoped to solicit deeper level feelings, compared to the opinion-attitude scales.

The clinical part of the investigation utilised two separate techniques, being the clinical style *interview*, and a slightly modified version of the *Thematic Apperception Test* (TAT)⁵. A clinical interview in this instance took on the form of two sections, the first concentrating on *ideological concerns*, allowing the respondent to liberally and impulsively express their opinions on such matters. The other half of the interview, referred to as *clinical-genetic*, intended to gather information concerning the subjects past and current situation, particularly childhood experiences and parental upbringing. The overall aim of the interview was to solicit enough material to permit inferences about the deeper layers of personality, and hence followed a similar format to those developed with psychiatric assessment procedures. The second clinical technique that supported the aims of the interview, were the unique insights offered by the TAT. These were analysed quantitatively to relate to established psychological variables. Whilst these different methodological designs expose distinctive personality and attitudinal qualities, they combine together to effectively allow “quantification and

⁵ The Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) was developed by Morgan and Murray (1938). Its original form consisted of 31 stimuli cards which subjects are to respond to using their imagination in giving an account of the thoughts, feelings and actions of the people on the cards. These stories are then used to explore the subject's personality.

interpretation in terms of variables which fall within a unified theoretical system” (p.18).

Of equal significance in a study as large and relatively unique as this, was the question of access to a representative sample. The Berkeley group acknowledged concerns when justifying their preliminary use of largely a student sample, stating that “a study which used only college students as subjects would be seriously limited in its general significance” (p.19). The use of college and university participants has since been heavily criticised in social science research (e.g. Sears, 1986). There were a number of university subjects at the advent of the project in early 1945, but they were only to total less than half of the entire sample. There was significant hope to be able to include a variety of different populations to substantiate the “wide variability of opinion and attitude and adequate coverage of the factors supposed to influence ideology” (p.20). Hence, the sample is not essentially random either, as comparisons as to the larger community for representativeness were not conducted. Rather the aim was to, at a later stage be able to generalize from the findings to a greater population, and enhance their understanding of the “key” groups that were demonstrative of the issue at hand.

1.4 Early beginnings - Anti-Semitism

As can be distinguished from the historical foundations of the Berkeley Group, the links with the Institute of Social Research and funding from the American Jewish Committee, the initial focus of the study was predominantly concerned with uncovering the reasons behind anti-Semitism. The persecution of the Jewish community during WWII also supplemented this emphasis, even though the study

was to offer a more general account of prejudice in this sense. Chapter three of *The Authoritarian Personality* details the procedure that the authors adopted for studying such phenomena, and develops on the concepts of the original articles on the subject by Levinson and Sanford (1945) and Frenkel-Brunswick and Sanford (1945).

The initial rationale for the study of prejudice using this particular facet of the wider syndrome is justified through the supposition that what many psychologists “have already written about anti-Semitism and about fascism suggests that the deeper psychological sources of these ideologies is very similar” (Adorno et al., 1950, p.57). The irrational nature of anti-Semitism, which covers all socio-economic backgrounds and assumes a heterogeneous quality concerning all Jewish people, is also understood to have an emotional source. This is particularly so in relation to economic power. These sources are regarded as being an organised system of “negative opinions”, “hostile attitudes”, and “moral values which permeate the opinions and justify the actions” (p.58).

This suggestion that anti-Semitism is a distinctive example of prejudice is not new however, with many historians, philosophers and anthropologists stating their often opposing and contradictory views on the subject. One proponent of the historical significance of anti-Semitism as a distinct form of prejudice was Bernard Lazare (1894,1995). Lazare believed that the transient nature of the Jewish people who were traditionally nomadic resulted in them being excluded from many of the societies in which they had settled. The stereotypical reference to the financial prosperity of the

Jew has its roots in the role they played in financing many ventures⁶. This perceived prosperity resulted in some resentment from the middle-classes and hence the business activities of the Jews were labelled as deceptive and oppressive. Likewise, an entire section from the *Origins of Totalitarianism* is devoted to the topic of the perceived financial prosperity of the Jews (Arendt, 1950). What is particularly important about prejudice towards Jewish people are that such experiences “cannot be classified exclusively as racial, ethnic, national, religious, or as any other single sociological type” (Allport, 1954, p.119). They have also virtually without exception, suffered from persecution wherever they may ascend upon.

In order to examine these assumptions, the Berkeley authors embarked on generating a set of statements that would reflect anti-Semitic attitudes. They were to reject the Thurstone scaling method due to its poor reliability, and instead adopt the simpler Likert technique. The generally accepted procedure of testing and analysing a large number of items was forsaken for the adoption of fifty-two statements that were to be used throughout the initial formulation of the final scale. Another unique aspect of the development of this scale compared to the established techniques of this newly developing method of psychological inquiry was that the authors deemed the use of *negative* items only to be included in the scale⁷. Whilst the authors acknowledge the propensity of some people to simply agree or disagree with certain items regardless of content, they justify their choice as believing positively worded items to be more

⁶ Lazare’s early writings to some extent displayed what is referred to as benign prejudice, whereby the inequality experienced by a group is defined as actually a characteristic of the group itself and that they are therefore deserved of the ills afforded them. He was later to modify his view, instead seeing that the prejudice experienced by the Jews was the result of the only position that they were allowed to adopt within the society in which they assembled rather than a conscious decision to adopt these roles.

⁷ A negatively worded item has no bearing on the subject under examination, but rather it relates to the *direction* of the statement – in this instance a *positively* worded item indicated a *negative* attitude towards Jews.

discriminating. Thus such a technique makes it easier to phrase subtle hostility without causing offence. In addition, the scale contains no neutral response, only three degrees of agreement or disagreement each. Judging from previous research that this is often the most frequent choice in scales, the desire to have respondents elect one way or the other therefore outweighs any psychometric shortcomings of the ‘forced choice’ approach. They therefore deem there to be a “greater psychological gap” (p.72) between the two midpoints. Hyman and Sheatsley further suggested that there is no provision to those with an “expression of a qualified opinion or an ambivalent opinion” (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954, p.71). Nevertheless, the authors conclude these methodological notes with the belief that there will be at the very least, a significant difference between extreme high and extreme low scorers to enable the examination of such meaningful characteristics. Such a distinction was to assist both in establishing validity and reliability in the scale itself, and to select participants for further clinical assessment.

Whilst also hoping to verify the usefulness of items in relation to general trends in anti-Semitism, the secondary aim of the preliminary testing of the scale was to identify possible sub-scales that would indicate various facets of the overall syndrome. Assuming that the majority of prejudice to be *pseudo-democratic* as opposed to *openly antidemocratic*, this distinction is important to distinguish what the investigators are hoping to uncover. It is understood that beliefs can be judged to be,

...openly antidemocratic when it refers to active hatred, or to violence which has the direct aim of wiping out a minority group or of putting it in a permanently subordinate position. A pseudo-democratic idea, on

the other hand, is one in which hostility toward a group is somewhat tempered and disguised by means of a compromise with democratic ideals. (Adorno et al., 1950, p.60)

The aim of this would appear to be to highlight the psychological distinction between holding democratic values and the individual's resistance to values that are simply antidemocratic.

The content of the scale itself, or rather the amalgamation of the several subscales, was constructed in such a fashion as to ensure that there was “systematic coverage of the various aspects conceived” (p.62). However, this was not to be regarded as identifying actual components of anti-Semitism or at least in the strict statistical sense. The subscales were in fact “convenient ways of grouping items together” (p.62) and were labelled, *Offensive*, *Threatening*, *Attitudes*, *Seclusive*, and *Intrusive*. Each was devised to reflect opinions held about Jewish people, but is somewhat arbitrary in their subjective opinions regarding such beliefs. They are also without reference to any specific theory.

Levinson and Sanford had published results from the preliminary A-S-scale analysis in 1944, and the current examination relates to the second administration of the test to an introductory psychology class that same year. The scale is separated into two components that were dispensed a week apart and the final sample being 144 women students⁸. The reliability achieved with this measure was in the region of .92⁹. As for distribution of scores, the authors report a relatively low mean (i.e. below the

⁸ There were a limited number of men available for testing due to the wartime policy.

⁹ Using the ‘Spearman-Brown’ formula.

theoretical neutral point), including some exceptionally low scorers. Interestingly there were not any significant high scorers recorded. Although this overall distribution was slightly positively skewed and the overall reliability and inter-scale reliability indicated that at the least, individuals did appear to be consistent in their judgements and expression of anti-Semitic ideology. Relatively high correlations were recorded for each of the separate sub-scales (*Threatening*, *Attitudes*, and *Seclusive*), also supporting the uniformity of their theory of anti-Semitism and allowing relatively accurate prediction from the score on one scale to the others. The correlation between the subscales, *Seclusive* and *Intrusive* (.74) is interpreted to imply,

...a deep contradiction in anti-Semitic ideology. As a matter of simple logic, it is impossible for most Jews to be both extremely seclusive and aloof and at the same time too intrusive and prying. (p.75).

When interpreted psychologically, this is further taken to suggest an 'irrational hostility' on behalf of the individual, based presumably on stereotypical imagery. Concern is expressed that assumptions such as these,

...flies in the face of most accepted social psychological thinking about the near universality of stereotypes and their recognized 'economical' function for the human being....it suggest to the casual reader that anti-Semitism is an aberrant pathological phenomena which has no relation to reality. (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954, p.103)

However, the correlations and reliabilities of the scale are sufficient for the authors to assert their belief that high scorers are ‘different in their psychological functioning’ from those who have recorded low scores.

With the intention of shortening and improving the scale, statistical analysis was performed to establish the discriminatory value of each individual item. It was found that “since few high scorers agree with all items, and since some low scorers agree with several items, a statistical technique is necessary to determine the closeness of the relationship between item score and scale score” (p.77). The authors concede that although *factor analysis* would provide the most comprehensive breakdown of these relationships, the statistically limited ‘Likert Discriminatory Power’ technique would instead be employed, for its timesaving advantage¹⁰. To obtain the Discriminatory Power (DP) for each item, it is necessary to select from the sample the highest and lowest 25% of scorers and calculate the mean score of each item for these two groups. Subsequently, the “greater the difference between the item mean for the high scorers and that for the low scorers, the greater DP of that item” (p.77). This therefore represents its superior ability to measure anti-Semitism. Somewhat surprisingly, each item’s DP was found to be statistically significant, and a subset of 26 was further described as being ‘statistically very satisfactory’. In addition to this, it was discovered that “items with low DP’s were, in almost every case, statements with which the high quartile tended predominantly to disagree” (p.81). This last point suggests that the authors were more inclined to identify people with anti-Semitic ideas, rather than measuring all respondents on a continuum that would include for

¹⁰ It should be remembered however, that even complex mathematical calculations such as factor analysis, were performed by hand at this time. Whereas modern computers allow such calculations to be performed in minutes, it could often take days to produce similar results.

example, 'Jewish sympathisers' or rather Gentiles without specific anti-Semitic prejudices.

The one sided ideology underpinning the scale is evident from this distinction and implies that the psychological basis upon which anti-Semitism permeates from wasn't sufficiently considered. Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) voice their dismay over a similarly related point. It appears surprising to them that in a study that took over five years to complete and covers some 1000 pages, should contain so few references. Indeed the reference section consists of only 121 publications; 21 of which are by the Berkeley authors, and a further 11 by Institute members. Hence only 90 previous works are consulted to cover both the theoretical and methodological basis for anti-Semitism *and* the overall study of authoritarianism.

This desire to produce a shortened version of this scale primarily for 'field' use was to also highlight the constrictive basis upon which the scale itself was based. Ten of these items were selected to be used in this abridged scale, although once again the authors own considerations were to influence this preference, as they were included on the basis of,

Both statistical and theoretical considerations...since statistical adequacy (Discriminatory Power) was a necessary - *but not sufficient* - condition for inclusion...[but] should cover most of the subscales and most of the areas of accusation and discrimination (p.83)¹¹

¹¹ Emphasis added.

It would appear that the authors didn't follow the theory building process through to its logical and scientific conclusion. Although they state that they were trying to be 'rich in meaning' this was somewhat flawed and may have realistically required the removal or unification of some of the subscales. Nevertheless, the reliability of, and correlation with the full scale was satisfactory (.89-.94), and led to the conclusion that "how an individual assimilates and interprets social reality is to a large extent determined by his pre-existing ideology" (p.89). The study was now beginning to extend beyond the primary notions of anti-Semitism and to include some wider implications for the understanding of social interaction.

The chapter detailing anti-Semitism ends with an examination of the case studies of 'Mack' and 'Larry', with the intention of validating the scale. This was rather a self-confirmatory exercise as many of the scale items themselves were constructed with reference to these two individuals. Although the Berkeley authors were satisfied that they had produced some reasonable findings in relation to anti-Semitism, it was also clear that the question of the roots of authoritarianism had not been fully addressed. Subsequently, the next chapter in *The Authoritarian Personality* would broaden the enquiry into prejudice to include the more general theory of *ethnocentrism*.

1.5 Ethnocentric Ideology

The examination of ethnocentrism followed on directly from the explorations into anti-Semitism, both theoretically and methodologically. As the authors attempted to broaden the spectrum to include general prejudice of a non-specific racial nature, they hypothesised that people who were anti-Semitic would also probably hold prejudicial attitudes towards members of other minority groups. A correlation with the A-S-scale

would therefore indicate that anti-Semitism was a feature of the more general notion of ethnocentrism and that there would therefore be some wider implications for the nature of this behaviour. In addition, the identification of prejudice in this way would be less apparent to those who were being tested and more likely to produce higher scores. The voicing of derogatory statements about Jewish people was becoming somewhat of a taboo following the atrocities committed during the war.

As it was deemed unsatisfactory to be referring to prejudice in the general sense, the authors instead saw the broader term of *ethnocentrism* to form the basis of their analysis; being defined as “the general meaning of provincialism or cultural narrowness; it meant a tendency in the individual to be ‘ethnically centred’, to be rigid in his acceptance of the culturally ‘alike’ and in his rejection of the ‘unlike’” (from Sumner 1906; p.102). Rather than looking to the individual who may for explicit reasons harbour feelings towards one particular group of people, the ethnocentrist was more likely to conform to what is regarded as the in-group/out-group concept of collective relations. These people were seen as favouring the former and largely and somewhat irrationally, rejecting the latter. Attempting to avoid the concept of race, this generally more flexible term encompasses the cultural aspects of discrimination due to national origin (e.g. Italian) or religious orientation (e.g. Catholic), and also the commonly held beliefs about these groups. Therefore, rather than trying to account for the prejudices against each and every out-group, the theory behind ethnocentrism concerns itself with the study of how the individual actually perceives group relations.

The major hypothesis and rationale behind the construction of the *E(ethnocentrism)-Scale*, was to observe the “inclusiveness of ideas regarding a given group, the

generality of out-group rejection, the content of ideas about in-groups and out-groups, and the amount of stereotypy in thinking about groups generally” (p.104). In providing justification for adopting this viewpoint, the authors cite a number of examples from anthropological studies, for example that “Fascistic social movements have shown consistent tendencies to oppose a variety of minority groups” (p.104), and following from their earlier explorations with anti-Semitism, that increasing levels of this have been correlated with opposition to labour unions and racial equality.

Following the method of construction of the A-S-scale, the quest to uncover the ethnocentric personality was divided into a number of subscales “in order to insure broad coverage of the total field and to permit statistical analysis of certain relationships with ethnocentric ideology” (p.105). Each of these was designed to capture specific aspects of in-group/out-group relations. Intriguingly for a study on non-specific forms of prejudice (i.e. not related to a specific race), the authors include a battery of twelve-items relating specifically to African-Americans; the *Negro* sub-scale. The second sub-scale, *Minorities*, again uses 12-items to look at dealings with minority groups other than Jews and African-Americans, who are stated to be the subject of segregation and subordination. The collection of statements intends to incorporate,

Organized groups such as minor political parties and religious sects...labour unions ‘containing many foreigners’...ethnic minorities such as Japanese-Americans...Filipinos...criminals, the insane, ‘inherently incapable people’ and ‘undesirable elements’ which constitute *moral* minorities. (p.107)

Women were also to be regarded as a target for ethnocentrism, which extends the concept beyond the title of minority groups to include what is termed ‘contempt for the masses’. Again the inclusion of certain specific groups may negate the argument that the E-scale is a value free form of measurement, and that there may be some level of subjective experience that could influence a respondents score. The third subscale designed to capture the final facet of this hypothesised syndrome of ethnocentrism, relates to *Patriotism*. In this instance, the adherence to the superordinate national in-group of the U.S. was the basis for the rejection of other nations and their cultural influences. In particular the ten-item scale intends to evaluate discipline subjected to disobedient citizens, hierarchical arrangements of nations, and glorification of the nation as the dominant in-group.

Again the scale was scored in relation to a six point, forced choice Likert format, with each statement stated in the positive, i.e. agreement was seen as indicating ethnocentrism. Testing of the E-scale wasn’t conducted in isolation however, but was instead intertwined within the 52-items from the A-S-scale when administered to the same 144 women psychology students. The whole scale had a split-half reliability of .91, and each sub-scale was found to correlate with the total scale to a similar degree. This indicated the good overall statistical reliability of the instrument and subsequent accurate predictive capacity from each. Each individual subscale was also found to correlate significantly, although somewhat less than the total, ranging from .74 to .83. It is therefore assumed that a respondents reflections towards Negro’s as a group, also indicates their stance towards other groups and larger group issues. The authors further state that this preliminary analysis signifies that “ethnocentric hostility toward

outgroups is highly correlated with ethnocentric idealization of ingroups” (p.113). Whilst the results provide a high level of support for their hypotheses, they do fail to acknowledge the possibility that they may have inadvertently tailored their questions about the various groups to the subjects in question. With such a small and homogenous sample, this could feasibly be a real possibility and would require at the least an acknowledgement or else clarification and replication.

Once again mirroring the development of the A-S-scale, each individual item is subjected to statistical analysis to determine its Discriminatory Power (DP). The majority were found to have ‘admirable’ DP’s, with each subscale contributing equal numbers of items to the high DP bracket, with high and low scorers clearly differentiated on most items. From this initial exploration into measuring the ethnocentric individual, the authors conclude that,

...it is as if the ingroup-outgroup distinction, and the intergroup hostility underlying it, are woven into the fabric of ethnocentric thinking; given a conflict with no conceivable possibility of resolution, there is nothing to do but make sure that the ingroup is on top and prepared to maintain itself. (p.116)

These results provide support for the notion of ethnocentrism, but once again the small and homogenous sample limits the extent that the theory can be extended to the general population.

The shortened E-scale (*Form 78*) was prepared using the items identified through the analysis of the initial E-scale. In a similar fashion to the anti-Semitism items, selection rules were to follow a comparable criterion, where “statistical adequacy was again a necessary but not sufficient condition for retention of an item” (p.117). Rather the ‘broadness of coverage’ seemingly playing just as in important role. Statistical analysis of items in the traditional sense would usually have the desired effect of raising the reliability of a combined set of items that form a scale. However the somewhat arbitrary and subjective manner in which the authors in this instance include statements for the shorter scale, has the undesirable effect of significantly reducing its reliability coefficient from .91 to .80. Although satisfactory and to some extent characteristic of shorter scales in general, it indicates that possibly a lower level of validity, rather than reliability was the primary aim.

The A-S-scale, being administered at the same time to the same sample as the E-scale, was then correlated with it and its subscales and the total alpha reliability being .80; the subscales ranging from .69-.76. As the E-scale contained no items relating to Jewish people, it was assumed that “anti-Semitism is best regarded, it would seem, as one aspect of this broader frame of mind”(p.122), and more importantly “it is the total ethnocentric ideology, rather than prejudice against any single group, which required explanation” (p.122). Explaining that the lower correlations of the A-S-scale may be due to the range of scores obtained from the shortened version, the authors somewhat contradict themselves by still advocating that anti-Semitism has “specific determinants...apart for those which hold for general ethnocentrism” (p.122). It would appear more likely that the lack of statistical rigour in determining the items for the shorter scale not only reduced the internal reliability, but also affected its

correlational powers with other concepts. Rather than interpret the diminished power of each scale as an arithmetical anomaly, it is instead construed to infer that anti-Semitism has unique properties in the examination of ethnocentrism and prejudice. Whilst there could be some truth in such an argument, this line of inquiry was not sufficient to establish such.

A thorough examination of E-scale items led to various revisions, including a short version consisting of 12-items. This culminates in the more desirable 20-item scale, which was refined to be both more reliable and to cover the important aspects of the proposed ethnocentric ideology. Whilst this is believed to be the most representative in the present domain of examination, the authors conclude it necessary “to have further data in the internal structure of ethnocentric ideology...and on the social and psychological structures with which this ideology is based” (p.141). Analysis of the clinical interviews with Mack and Larry, enable some qualitative light to be shed on the concept of ethnocentrism advocated in their present examination. In conclusion, the authors offer a general statement that describes ethnocentrism being based on,

A pervasive and rigid ingroup-outgroup distinction; it involves stereotyped negative imagery and hostile attitudes regarding outgroups, stereotyped positive imagery and submissive attitudes regarding ingroups, and a hierarchical, authoritarian view of group interaction in which ingroups are rightly dominant, outgroup subordinate. (p.150)

Whilst elements of in-group/out-group relations figure strongly within the study of ethnocentrism beyond those of the Berkeley group (see *Chapter Two*), a number of

equally important facets also emerge. Regardless, it is to be this in-group/out-group analysis that is to be seen as the panacea for understanding individual relations with regards to group relations.

Importantly for the development of the subsequent measurement technique that focuses on anti-democratic values, three items from sub-scale *N* were found to have low DP's; probably due to the fact that they express 'particularly violent and repressive' sentiments. Justification for the adoption of the 'forced choice' format is rewarded at this point, as examination of the high scorers responses to this trio of proclamations reveals that, when forced to express an opinion one way or the other, they opt for the positive and consequently "reveal a subtle receptiveness...to openly antidemocratic programs" (p.114). Clearly, not all high scorers on the total E-scale possess this intensity/style of judgment, rather an element of what has now been translated by the authors to denote '*violent* anti-democracy' with 'fascist' overtones. There remained the task to determine the "deeper psychological forces which make for potential receptiveness or opposition to fascism – the ultimate in ethnocentrism – is one which follows the first task of measuring ethnocentrism in its purely existing form" (p.114). This somewhat tenuous rationale forms the basis for the development of the final scale, the measure of implicit antidemocratic trends, or otherwise known as the *F-Scale*.

1.6 Antidemocratic Trends

Throughout the discussions and experimental discourse concerning *The Authoritarian Personality*, there is a predominant trend towards defining the entire project in terms of the instrument devised to measure *implicit antidemocratic trends*, or as it is more

commonly referred to, the *F-Scale*. Although in some regards, the logical conclusion to the series of scale developments, the previous sections in this chapter, the research prior to Adorno et al's publication and subsequent debate spanning the half-century of research since, would indicate that it is incorrect to rely on this instrument alone as defining the concept of an authoritarian personality.

Although the E-scale was intended to provide an objective representation of group relations without reference to any specific race, the questions that constitute the scale would somewhat indicate otherwise. For example, the items that refer explicitly to Chinese people are specifically relating to a particular race. To remedy this situation, the aim of the final scale was to “measure prejudice without appearing to have this aim and without mentioning the name of any minority group” (p.151). Whereas the E- and A-S-scales had been too explicit, it was believed that a high correlation would serve to validate it as a measure of prejudice where the highly ideological PEC-scale had disappointed. In the pursuit of items that would not generally be divulged during discourse on political issues, the authors turned their attention to the clinical interviews conducted with the high and low scorers on the E- and A-S-scales for inspiration. It was hypothesised that “anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism were not merely matters of surface opinion, but general tendencies with sources, in part at least, deep within the structure of the person” (p.152). More explicitly, the subsequently named F-scale would signify susceptibility to antidemocratic propaganda and in particular, pre-Fascist tendencies.

Construction of the scale is admittedly flawed from the outset, as the authors concede that in devising the items that they didn't follow the established empirical fashion

whereby it is customary to begin with many items and then proceed to exclude the least discriminatory. Whilst extensive reference was made to such sources as literature on Fascism and answers given to the projective questions and the interview material, it is principally the results from the early studies that are influential in the formation of the F-scale. Although this is a natural progression from within the research domain resulting in a 'value free' form of prejudice in the ideological sense, it is the reference to anti-Semitism that is once again prominent. In particular, there is considerable reliance on the work from the Institute of Social Research, specifically the "content analyses of anti-Semitic agitators and a study on anti-Semitic workers" (p.154), as well as more mainstream literature regarding anti-Semitism and Fascism in general. As a starting point this wouldn't appear to be of major concern, however two important points quickly emerge from the theoretical rationale adopted by Adorno et al.

Firstly, this was the fourth and final study of the series and they would have not appeared to have advanced considerably in trying to obtain a 'value free' measure of the prejudiced or subsequently named anti-democratic individual by adopting this reference to the anti-Semitic individual. And secondly, it is clear that the intention was to examine a particular *type* of potentially fascistic individual, namely the German Nazi. Whilst being the most historically recent example of such a doctrine, it is unclear as to why other forms of Fascism were not expanded upon. These two points were similarly taken up by Lewis (1990), where he perceived the assumption by the Berkeley group that prejudice and ethnocentrism to be central facets of Fascism to be incorrect. Even the relationship between anti-Semitism and Nazi Fascism was not seen to be such a simple issue. In addition, Lewis sees the Berkeley study as more

of an attempt to identify a particular *type* of Fascist, in an almost stereotypical manner.

Nevertheless, the original F-scale was to contain 38-items and for the first time the mention of *authoritarianism* as a variable in the overall study was referred to. Adorno et al. defined a list of nine elements, which they suppose will define the “structure in the person that renders him receptive to antidemocratic propaganda” (p.157). Whereas in modern research utilising factor analysis it is customary to label the factors with reference to the overall theory, the approach adopted in the Authoritarian Personality appears reversed. Rather than examining their data, the statements devised are already assigned into categories beforehand and each labelled according to the traits they suppose they will relate to. The F-scale therefore, purports to be “measure the potentially antidemocratic personality” (p.157).

These nine variables of the antidemocratic individual were as follows (P.157-170):

- 1) *Conventionalism* – Rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values.

Without any real specific reference, the authors offer the ‘universally recognized’ assumption that “susceptibility to fascism is most characteristically a middle-class phenomenon” (p.158). Citing a cultural basis for adopting this hypothesis, they were to discover a small, but positive correlation between conventional values and prejudice, and also that these opposing ‘unconventional’ people tended to be relatively free of this vice. Therefore the task became the discovery of the source of this

traditionalism. Scale items, for example, “I-19: One should avoid doing things in public which appear wrong to others, even though one knows that these things are really all right”, and “I-55: Although leisure is a fine thing, it is good hard work that makes life interesting and worthwhile”. High scores on these individual items were to reveal, “whether or not his adherence to conventional values is of the rigid, absolutist character” (p.159).

- 2) *Authoritarian Submission* – Submissive, uncritical attitude towards idealized moral authorities of the in-group.

The distinct reference to the Nazi doctrine throughout this chapter in particular made the inclusion of conforming to authority and compliance with the state rule an almost natural correlate of prejudice, and therefore an element of the total scale. The difficulty was in being able to express these ideas without reference to any particular ideology, and retain the main emphasis, which was “obedience, respect, rebellion, and relations to authority in general” (p.160). Statements including, “I-50: Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn”, and “I-74: What this country needs is fewer laws and agencies, and more courageous, tireless, devoted leaders whom the people can put there faith in”, anticipated the desire for an almost masochistic personality. The distinction also had to be identified between generally accepted authority, e.g. to a policeman, and the embellished need to yield in the wider more general sense. This tendency to submit was hypothesised to be possibly due

to the “failure in the development of an inner authority, i.e. a conscience...rendering the individual particularly receptive to manipulation by the strongest external powers” (p.161).

- 3) *Authoritarian Aggression* – Tendency to be on the lookout for, and to condemn, reject, and punish people who violate conventional values.

The resentment of living under tight control whereby the individual feels beleaguered is expected to see such individuals seek to displace some of these emotions by way of retribution. If it would be adequate to describe the submission to authority as in the above as a masochistic individual, then the authoritarian aggressor can be seen to occupy the opposite pole along this assumed continuum, by being described as potentially sadistic. It was hypothesised that the “conventionalist who cannot bring himself to utter any real criticism of accepted authority will have a desire to condemn, reject, and punish those who violate these values” (p.161). And further that “once the individual has convinced himself that there are people who ought to be punished, he is provided with a channel through which his deepest aggressive impulses may be expressed, even while he thinks of himself as thoroughly moral” (p.162). The deeply Freudian influences are apparent in the formulation of this section, with issues of conscience, displacement, and projection, being offered to illustrate the apparent “lack of integration between the moral agencies by which the subject lives and the rest of his personality” (p.163). The scale items, “I-47: No insult to your honor should ever go unpunished”, and “I-75: Sex crimes, such as rape and attacks on

children, deserve more than mere imprisonment; such criminals ought to be publicly whipped, or worse”, are examples of how the intention was to evaluate the discrepancies between inner conscience and outer reality.

- 4) *Anti-intracception* – Opposition to the subjective, the imaginative, the tender-minded; resistance to the examination of own motives.

This term, borrowed from Murray (1938), describes “the dominance of feelings, fantasies, speculations, aspirations – an imaginative, subjective human outlook”, whereas anti-intracception represents the “impatience with and opposition to the subjective and tender-minded” (p.164). Due to this assumed sign of a weak ego, the anti-intracceptive individual is deemed to be unable to confront feelings regarding human nature; “he is afraid of genuine feeling because his feelings may get out of control” (p.164). This leads to an overwhelming pre-occupation with the physical, as opposed to the emotional way of life. Statements designed to measure this area include, “I-53: There are some things too intimate or personal to talk about even with one’s closest friends”, and “I-58: What a man does is not so important so long as he does it well”. It should be noted however, that although Adorno et al. included this in their breakdown of the features of the antidemocratic individual, the subject is considered too complex to accurately define within their current discussion.

- 5) *Superstition and Stereotypy* – The belief in mystical determinants of the individual’s fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories.

Although the nine categories that were devised to construct the original F-scale (Form 78), a footnote at the bottom of page 165 indicates that superstition and stereotypy weren't actually an original feature. This section was instead added at a later stage during subsequent revisions of the scale. Nevertheless, the rationale pertains to an individual who thinks in a rigid manner, and is generally related in this instance primarily to intelligence; the more intelligent perhaps being less inclined to accept such possibilities. Relatively simple items such as, "I-2: Although many people may scoff, it may be yet shown that astrology can explain a lot of things", and "I-43: Sciences like chemistry, physics, and medicine have carried men very far, but there are many important things that can never possibly be understood by the human mind", reveal the style of thinking the authors are eager to identify. The authors explain that "superstition and stereotypy embrace, over and above the mere lack of intelligence in the ordinary sense, certain dispositions in thinking which are closely akin to prejudice, even though they might not hamper intelligent performance in the extraceptive sphere" (p.165). Parallels can be drawn here with the reliance or rejection of science in Fascist and Communist regimes that seeks illustration but is relatively confused. It is the almost irrational way of thinking that is important here to differentiate individuals who may be susceptible to superstition and stereotypy.

- 6) *Power and 'toughness'* – Preoccupation with the dominance-submission, strong-weak, leader-follower dimension; identification with power figures; overemphasis

upon the conventionalised attributes of the ego; exaggerated assertion of strength and toughness.

Although this is assumed to be a function of a weak ego, it becomes obvious that the main criterion under scrutiny is the “overemphasis on the power motif in human relationships” (p.166). It is also believed that although this concept is a fundamental feature of people who are high scorers on the F-scale, items that construct this sub-scale, for example, “I-9: Too many people today are living in an unnatural, soft way; we should return to the fundamentals, to a more red-blooded, active way of life”, and “I-70: To a greater extent than most people realize, our lives are governed by plots hatched in secret by politicians” can explicitly measure this. That responses to these statements can be distinguished from other variables on the F-scale indicate reference to the “deeper strata of the individual’s emotional life” (p.166). This provides an almost distinct dimension of the human, in that they are either dominant or submissive, and that this can be in turn be related to their behaviour under such circumstances.

7) *Destructiveness and cynicism* – Generalized hostility; vilification of the human.

Referring back to the original theory that underlies the F-scale, the authors define the anti-democratic individual as harbouring aggression due to the forced acceptance of many “externally imposed restrictions upon the satisfaction of his need”, and although overtly offensive behaviour may be an outlet for this, the opposite is its manifestation through “rationalized,

ego-accepted, nonmoralized aggression” (p.168). Agreement with statements such as “I-30: Reports of atrocities in Europe have been greatly exaggerated for propaganda purposes”, and “I-42: No matter how they act on the surface, men are interested in women for only one reason”, intend to reveal the pessimistic and disparaging temperament of such individuals. This global reference to the contemptuous manner of existence could therefore be witnessed, “by means of propaganda, be directed against minority groups, or against any group the persecution of which was politically profitable” (p.168).

- 8) *Projectivity* – The disposition to believe that wild and dangerous things go on in the world; the projection outwards of unconscious emotional impulses.

The Freudian references that resonate throughout the entire text, manifest themselves in descriptions of distinctly psychodynamic concepts such as projectivity. The ego-defensive function of projecting ones own undesirable qualities onto others is an accepted theory and often referenced in studies concerning aggression (Allport, 1950). The construction of the F-Scale relying in part upon this variable, with items such as “I-56: After the war, we may expect a crime wave; the control of gangsters and ruffians will become a major social problem”, and “I-73: Nowadays when so many different kinds of people move around so much and mix so freely, a person has to be especially careful to protect himself against infection and disease”, is to some extent indicative of the fact that “most of the items on the F-Scale are projective; they involve the assumption judgements and interpretations

of fact are distorted by psychological urges” (p.169). It is this deeply psychological, ego-defensive function that this category was specifically designed to capture.

9) *Sex* – Exaggerated concern with sexual ‘goings-on’

This type of person, who is particularly preoccupied with sexual activity, is again heavily influenced by psychodynamic concepts. The basic impulses of the *id*, the sexual drive being controlled by the *ego* are classical Freudian theory. In particular, the four items that construct this section of the scale, e.g. “I-31: Homosexuality is a particularly rotten form of delinquency and ought to be severely punished”, and “I-42: No matter how they act on the surface, men are interested in women for only one reason”, anticipate the severe punishment of violators of sexual norms by way of reference to the in-group distinction of sexual activity. The four items that constitute this subscale, have however been encountered in the previous descriptions (authoritarian aggression and projectivity), and the statements that represents it are explained through the “close interaction of all the present variables” (p.169). This element was earmarked by the authors for ‘special study’ by way of clinical interviews, but explicitly why this should be so is unclear. It is also ambiguous as to why there are no separate statements developed to test this hypothesis in its own right, rather than include ones from other sub-scales.

Upon preliminary analysis, the original 38-item F-Scale was found to have a relatively poor reliability (.74), but was nevertheless deemed adequate to make group comparisons. This is despite the inclusion of some contrait items (i.e. agreement indicating a *democratic* viewpoint) in response to the concerns over acquiescence raised during the procedural discussions. The debate then surrounded whether the entire concept of an anti-democratic personality could be conceptualised through one instrument such as the F-scale. The same conclusion would be reached with the PEC-scale, in that they were attempting to measure “areas of response in which people are simply not very consistent” (p.172). It was discovered however, that one particular group of respondents, the ‘Professional Women’, had much higher reliability coefficients (.88) that the authors assumed to reflect a “greater consistency of personality” (p.172). Overall, it was concluded that a revised sample of items might improve the discriminatory value of the scale, especially as the actual range of scores had been disappointingly narrow.

Adopting the technique of *Discriminatory Power* of each item again, the authors make a curious decision regarding the validation of the scale and its relation to prejudice. This is done by examining each of the items capacity to discriminate between extreme scorers on the A-S-scale and would appear irregular for two reasons. Firstly, the E-scale was designed to provide a more accurate picture of ‘indirect prejudice’ than the more subjective anti-Semitism scale. And secondly, the original F-scale (Form 78) correlated only .53 with the A-S-scale, compared to .65 with the E-scale. The latter detail implies that there would be a greater task in achieving some uniformity between the various measures by attempting correlation with only the A-S-scale. This perhaps indicates a desire to adopt the anti-Semitic viewpoint when defining their theory of an

antidemocratic individual. Although there were by their own admission, some 'striking exceptions' it was claimed that the items which discriminated F-scale high scorers and A-S-scale high scorers, shared a certain equivalence, and consequently "the greater an item's DP (A-S), *the greater its chances* of being included in the revised scale"¹² (p.173). Similar concerns have also expressed by others, and in particular the examination of this method by Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) and Brown (1965) parallels this discussion. The exclusion of certain items compromises the scales original intention, which was to test a theory. In particular they state that there "were three items which by the logic of internal consistency were very good measures of personality on the F-scale, but because they empirically did not correlate with anti-Semitism, they were discarded" (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954, p.76). It would appear therefore, and as has been stated previously, that the overall measure of authoritarianism was to have a distinctive element of anti-Semitic ideology built into it. This is despite the finding that "the F syndrome is actually more closely related to general authoritarianism than to anti-Semitism" (p.194).

Examination of the revised scale revealed three of the proposed nine categories that had suitably high D.P.'s,; *Sex*, *Authoritarian Aggression* and *Authoritarian Submission*. However, each of the remaining clusters of items had at least one item with a similar D.P. score. The decision was reached that it would be more fruitful to improve the poorer items, rather than reflect on the apparent ineffectual categories that revealed low discriminatory power. This appears to contradict the accustomed method of scale construction. In particular, the scientific method of hypothesis testing and refinement in light of results would not appear to be especially pertinent to the

¹² Emphasis added.

Berkeley group's quest to discover the components of the authoritarian personality. Regardless, the revised F-scale containing 19-items from its predecessor, and 15 new items were formulated that correlated favourably; theoretically rather than statistically. Subsequently, the amended scale achieved the desired effect of improving overall reliability to .87 (compared to .74) and to enhance the range of scores recorded.

The outcome would be two F-scales, Form 40 and the much referred to Form 45. This final instrument has commonly been used in subsequent research to be a measure of authoritarianism. But whilst reference to this scale as *the* measure of authoritarianism is flawed for the methodological reasons outlined above, it is also incorrect to rely on it solely as the conclusion to the study. Although the logical outcome of the research projects, it remained largely untested but was nevertheless adopted by future researchers as a scale for measuring authoritarian personalities.

1.7 Political and Economic Conservatism

One measure from *The Authoritarian Personality* that has received less scholarly attention is the *PEC- (Political-Economic Conservatism) Scale*. Although a precursor to the F-scale, it was not published in the *abridged* version of the Authoritarian Personality from 1982. The authors were dissatisfied with the results of this exploration and largely rejected any implications that it may have disclosed for the study of authoritarianism. Although it preceded the F-scale in the initial publication it is discussed afterwards here, as much of the information it contains is useful in a critique of the F-scale and the Berkeley group's theoretical presumptions surrounding

authoritarianism. The lack of reference to it and its eventual exclusion, perhaps being more illustrative than the concepts it actually portrayed.

Whilst the E and A-S-scales are designed to uncover some essentially concrete psychological mechanisms such as prejudice, Chapter Five of the Berkeley publication diverges somewhat into the realms of political persuasion. Although similar studies have been conducted others (e.g. Stagner, 1936; Edwards, 1944) and a substantial amount of speculation concerning political affiliation had been mused over in the preceding chapters, Levinson's third individual chapter, *Politico-Economic Ideology and Group Membership in Relationship to Ethnocentrism*, begins to establish links between the overriding concept of authoritarianism and its relationship with ethnocentric behaviour. From the outset, "that political and economic forces play a vital role in the development of ethnocentrism" (p.151) establishes the idea that larger societal and economic variables predominantly outside the psychological constitution of the individual are an important factor in shaping behaviour.

It is at this point that the distinction between *right* and *left* as a classification of political ideology are stated. This is also seen as being profoundly tied to ethnocentrism. Of more importance for the understanding of the basis of anti-democracy and the F-scale, it nevertheless sets forth the authors particular stance on the formation of political establishments, where "fascist and socialist-communist (Marxist) ideologies represent the extreme right and left" (p.152). However, the absence of either doctrine in any great arrangement in mainstream America somewhat negated the justification for investigating its presence. Instead the focus was to be placed upon the slightly diluted, but equally opposing (in the left-right dichotomy)

political views of those espousing to be either liberal or conservative. Whilst these were stated to be the predominant ideologies at that time, the forewarning that close attention must be extended to both to ensure “their potential polarization to the more extreme left and right” (p.152), would not materialise. Despite Fascism and Communism not being regarded as having any real sense of existence in American politics, it is the possible emergence of either that should be closely monitored. Ambitiously an instrument such as the PEC-scale would be able to achieve this and subsequently provide a pre-emptive safeguard against the establishment of either doctrine in the mainstream.

The *Political and Economic Conservatism Scale (PEC)* is the quantitative examination of the hypothesised conservative-liberal dimension. The authors hypothesise that not every aspect of the two doctrines are covered, but rather the ‘underlying’ differences between them. As had been deemed unnecessary for the study of anti-Semitism and Ethnocentrism however, the inclusion of negatively worded items was incorporated into the scale. Four main points were assumed to separate the left-right dimension as defined in this instance, those being:

- 1) *Support of the American Status Quo* – strictly speaking, conservatism is in part an affiliation with the established order and in addition, the conformity and submission to established rule are emphasised. The liberal in contrast is defined in the present discussion as being one who seeks to ‘criticize existing authority’, ranging from small restructuring of social order to what is tantamount to anarchy.

- 2) *Resistance to Social Change* – extending the traditional nature of the conservative and the supposed fact that “psychological man and capitalist social order are suited to each other” (p.154), and where war and domestic social discontent are essentially functions of basic human nature. Attempts to change or limit such behaviour are the bestowment of ‘utopian dreamers’ of the liberal pole.
- 3) *Support of Conservative Values* – a significant objective of the conservative value system is stated to be the concern with “practicality, ambition, and upward class mobility” (p.155). Whilst liberals may denounce such principles, they are perceived however to be ‘soothing’ their conscience for primarily supporting unjust systems, with problems being distinguished between the two on distinct moral grounds.
- 4) *Ideas Regarding the Balance of Power among Business, Labor, and Government* – maintaining the ingredients essential for free trade are described as being a central tenet of the conservative ideology. In particular the role of government in social functioning, even in welfare, is seen as exerting an undesirable influence over the power of business and is discouraged by the true conservative.

Tying these four general features together is the supposition that the two opposing poles are definitive of the political American, varying to degrees along this continuum. Hence,

It was intended that a high score should indicate a high degree of the above mentioned trends: support of the *status quo*¹³ and particularly of business; support of conservative values; desire to maintain a balance of power in which business is dominant, labor subordinate , and the economic functions of government minimized; and resistance to social change. Conversely, a low score was intended to reflect support of trends common to most left-of-center viewpoints: opposition to the *status quo*; a tendency to think in sociological rather than moral-hereditarian terms; a tendency to identify with labor and the ‘common man’ and to oppose the power of business; support for extension of the political and economic functions of government. (p.157)

Of the original 78-items written to distinguish between these high and low scorers on political and economic conservatism, the sum of 11 ‘conservative’ (positive) and 5 ‘liberal’ (negative) statements were administered to 232 students (180 females and 52 males) from the University of California in 1945, and also 63 ‘professional’ women. The initial PEC-scale or *Form 78*, was found to be significantly less reliable than the E and A-S-scales, with an alpha level of .73. This was therefore deemed inadequate for statistical reasoning. Various possible reasons were postulated as to why this should be so; including the absence of extreme scorers and poor guiding hypothesis, but lack of consistency in American political thought was generally held accountable.

Further shortened to 14-items, the second PEC-scale (*Form 60*) saw the removal of some items and the modification of many existing ones. New items were also

¹³ Emphasis in original.

included. The emphasis placed on the number of 'liberal' vs. 'conservative' statements shifts to 9 and 5 respectively. The adjustments that sought to improve the reliability of the scale were not effective, and the average alpha score dropped further to .70. Comparison of group means for the various subjects, yields partial support for varying levels of conservatism, with only the 'Service Club Men' being marginally more so when compared to the student males and females who are relatively homogenous in their beliefs. However, the range of scores in this group is considerably varied, leading the authors to confront the issue of whether group membership can be seen as an indicator of political persuasion; "that such-and-such is a conservative group, in terms of actual policy, is not necessarily to imply that all members are strongly conservative" (p.166). Although at points in the analysis a rudimentary comparison of individuals based upon political affiliation is made, when this is in contradiction of their findings, such an illustration is seemingly redundant.

Careful consideration of these various points, coupled with the statistical data leads to the construction of the third and final PEC-scale. Consisting of only 5-items (although 10-items were earlier stated as being the minimum for an adequate scale measuring Ethnocentrism), the main aim is to identify and make comparison between two opposing groups. The forms were administered in 1945 and 1946, to a total of 15 groups, ranging from females in psychiatric care to incarcerated males. These trials still fail to achieve any great range in the variability of their scores. Nevertheless, the respondents *ranked* scores were divided into three groups according to the intensity of their commitment to conservatism for further comparison.

Of particular interest is that the highest scoring group are the males from San Quentin Correctional Facility. In contrast to them being the hypothesised radicals, they are instead found to be the most conservative. The authors understanding and treatment of ‘criminals’ as a group is somewhat naïve, although chapter twenty-one, authored by William R. Morrow, is devoted to *Criminality and Antidemocratic Trends: A Study of Prison Inmates*. Similar comment is made regarding generalising the findings to a ‘criminal population’ from the study of 110 prisoners (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954; p.56). The study of criminal populations brings with it its own set of methodological challenges, which are seemingly beyond the scope of the Berkeley study. Reference to such a varied sample is desirable, but the inclusion of this sub-set is at odds with the remaining research paradigm and there is no real adequate justification for such a diverse population.

Discussion regarding conservatives and liberals in the samples follows on from the original definitions from page 157, but there is dismay that support for its concepts is decisively lacking. However, rather than conceding that this could in part be a reflection of the poor properties of the scale (recalling that it now consisted of only five items and no reliability scores were even computed), a tentative analysis focuses upon the individual subjects. It is the lack of genuine commitment to any one of the two ideologies that is perceived to account for this disparity between the hypothesised groups. This inconsistency is explained to construe that “it is a vast oversimplification to argue that everything that is not determined by formal group membership must be due to deeper emotional trends” (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954, p.115). For example, many of the liberals are considered to accept such qualitative statements for fear of ‘concentration of social power’ rather than commitment to genuine liberalism. In

contrast the authors concede that whilst “this ‘traditional conservative’ *ideology*¹⁴ is not uncommon today, the actual politico-economic *situation* has changed considerably from the one, of fifty or more years ago, to which the ideology refers” (p.177). Without explicitly conceding this artefact, the net result would appear to be that when constructing items for the scale, the conceptualisation of conservatism used as the guiding apparatus is essentially outdated and therefore has little applicability to the current investigation. No acknowledgement is visible to suggest that there may not be any subjects of either pole in the samples, nor do they appear to recognize neither the complex nature of political views nor the dynamics of actual participation.

Subsequent correlation between the PEC-scale with the E and A-S-scales for validation purposes is performed, the former having marginally the strongest relationship. As expected, it is the conservatives who are discovered to have the strongest propensity to in-group/out-group behaviour, as measured by the E-Scale. This relationship is deemed to be imperfect and the only real generalisation that can be assumed is that the conservatives are on average more ethnocentric than the liberals. However, more detailed comparison consisting of correlations between high, intermediate and low scorers from the PEC-scale, provide a wealth of different scenarios, but mainly that,

Extreme liberals (low scorers on PEC) are for the most part low as well on E. But the ‘middles’ on PEC are extremely diversified with respect to standing on E...high scorers on PEC are more variable on E than are the low scorers (p.181)

¹⁴ Emphasis in original.

This final point contradicts the earlier statement that conservatives have the highest in-group/out-group temperament. This is finally explained through reference to two concepts that are believed to underlie this apparent discrepancy between the theory and the results obtained – the *genuine* conservative and the *pseudo*-conservative. Seemingly there are now two types of conservative, and one would expect also a dualistic explanation of liberals. As was previously argued with reference to inconsistencies between the A-S-scale scores and the driving theory being explained through the ‘irrationality’ of anti-Semitism, a similar parallel can be drawn. Specifically the authors rely on psychodynamic interpretation of virtually any discrepancy to their best advantage. Where the results are in contradiction to the Berkeley group’s explanations, new or adapted theories are used to explain such discrepancies. One would struggle to discover any statements alluding to their being any irregularities or defective theorising in the entire 1000 pages of *The Authoritarian Personality*.

Despite the flawed concepts that emerge from the analysis of the PEC-scale, another interesting line of inquiry emerges in the form of the relationship between this measure and the eventual development of the F-scale. Whilst the overall rationale for the Adorno et al. study of authoritarianism relies heavily on the assumption that all of the scales are essentially linked and will bear out in a logical conclusion within the F-scale, it is in particular the PEC-scale that is seen as a major antecedent to the further study of anti-democratic trends. Where Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) were particularly vocal about the statistical analysis being treated in an ‘unimaginative way’, they are also particularly vehement about the “fact that the PEC scale and the F-scale both

contain questions which are basically similar in content” (p.73). There are a significant number of the PEC-scale items that could be feasibly matched with statements in the F-scale. Whilst this may to some extent be an acceptable evolution of a measuring instrument, it is less so to then use these correlations between the two measures as a means of validation. Subsequently,

When they later demonstrate a positive correlation between authoritarian personality trends and politico-economic conservatism, there is no hint that the relationship may be a spurious one owing to the overlapping content of the scales. (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954, p.75)

If as was argued that there were some questionable methodological preferences in the manner in which the scales were constructed, the correlations between the PEC and F-scales illustrate this explicitly. Whilst there may be theoretical links between ethnocentrism and politico-economic conservatism, between anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism, and/or anti-democracy and anti-Semitism, explanation of these relationships by manipulation of results in favour of the highest correlation between these *different* concepts, is not the approach to be taken in order to demonstrate such a phenomenon.

Returning to the explanation of the correlation between E and PEC-scales with the concept of pseudo-conservatism, the authors then postulate that,

An additional hypothesis may be proposed regarding individuals high on E but middle on PEC. These may well be psuedo-conservatives who

have kept up with changes in the actual politico-economic situation by making changes in traditional (individualistic) conservative ideology. They emphasize competitiveness as a value, yet they support the concentration of economic power in big-business - the greatest single threat at present to the individual competing businessman. They emphasize economic mobility and the 'Horatio Alger' myth, yet they support numerous forms of discrimination that put severe limitations on the mobility of large sections of the population. They may also believe in extending the economic functions of government, not for humanitarian reasons but as a means of limiting the power of labor and other groups. This is not merely 'modern conservatism.' It is, rather, a totally new direction: away from individualism and equality of opportunity, and toward a rigidly stratified society in which there is a minimum of economic mobility and in which the 'right' groups are in power, the outgroups subordinate. Perhaps the term 'reactionary' fits this ideology best. *Ultimately it is fascism* [emphasis added]. While not a *necessary* sequel to laissez-faire conservatism, it can be regarded as a possible (and not uncommon) distortion of conservatism-a distortion which retains certain surface similarities but which changes the basic structure into the antithesis of the original. (p.182)

Careful examination of the above quotation makes explicit the intention of the study to progress beyond the comparison between the conservatives and the liberals (of which there were no real examples of in their sample), and to progress explicitly into the search for Fascism. The above also gives a somewhat better understanding of what

they regard the Fascist person to be. This is much more so than one would find in the chapter where the actual F-scale is developed. Where this link would seem curious is in the fact that, where the PEC-scale was defined by two opposing poles of conservatism and liberalism, and whilst the authors do also concede that these are somewhat diluted forms of the respective Fascist-Communism ideological dichotomy, the F-scale is merely defined only by the singular concept. That is the low-scorer is merely just opposed to Fascism.

It could seemingly be argued that the failings of the PEC-scale to support the hypotheses surrounding authoritarianism, anti-Semitism and prejudice for example, necessitated that the research continues. It is curiously absent from the abridged version of the publication, and little reference is made to it throughout much of the following manuscript.

1.8 Conclusion and Rationale for the Current Study.

The Authoritarian Personality has, almost without exception, been singled out for critical appraisal in nearly all the published material that cites its concepts, on both theoretical and methodological grounds. It is not surprising that the rationale underpinning its conception and the developments in psychometrics, have cast some doubt as to the validity in the overall contribution it makes to appreciate the concept of authoritarianism. However, the impact that it made upon publication and the contribution it still makes in discussions of political ideology are testament to the enduring qualities that it possesses.

It is hard to ignore the strong anti-Semitic influences that resonate through the discussions on prejudice in particular, even though the authors concede that anti-Semitism is more likely to be a facet of a wider syndrome of ethnocentrism. That is not to relegate the study of anti-Semitism into obscurity, but rather it alludes to the political context under which the research began. One could quite easily substitute African-American or Muslim groups in current times and no doubt reach similar conclusions. Our understanding of prejudice has developed considerably since 1950, largely indebted to publications such as *The Authoritarian Personality*. Rather what is evident is the reliance on Fascism as the pinnacle of anti-democracy, and more crucially, the German Fascist from the Third Reich. It is quite understandable that the atrocities of the War were to not only become a driving force behind the need for such research, but also served to influence the explanations. Where answers to an existing issue were required and resulted in this study, other issues of a similar nature would also emerge that expand upon the rhetoric used as a basis for social inquiry. Research, particularly in the social sciences, is continually expanding and new examples of phenomena often emerge that require interpretation-using theories that have already developed. As is often discovered, the continual examination will often illuminate the limitations of such an inquiry, necessitating a revised concept.

Chapter Two – Post Adorno et al.

2.1 Introduction.

It should be stated from the outset that there are two specific issues that have continually separated discourse and research into authoritarianism. Whilst significant attention has been expended upon many of the theoretical and methodological issues involved with the original Adorno et al. (1950) study in the previous chapter, and by other scholars (see Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Brown, 1965; Altemeyer, 1981), a number of more specific points have also arisen that have endured many years of extensive debate. In particular, the ‘response-set’ issues and whether or not there is an authoritarian of the right *and* left continue to divide authoritarian researchers and are not specific to the Berkeley study. In the decade following its publication, considerable critical comment and a number of opposing theories were to emerge to overshadow the influence and originality of the initial study. As with the necessity to appreciate the antecedents of the Berkeley publication, similarly there are important points which make an analysis of these additional theories an important aspect of understanding authoritarianism.

2.2 Post-Adorno et al.

Following the publication of the Authoritarian Personality by Adorno et al. in 1950, an intense debate began concerning the *overall* validity of the study. As was summarized in the previous chapter, the study lent itself to criticism on both *methodological* and *ideological* grounds. Although the authors later conceded that there were significant issues that had been minimised or else ignored (Sanford, 1954,

1973; Levinson, 1972), the initial impact of the publication was to fade to some extent in the following decade as researchers sought to identify and address these matters.

The edited text of Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, *Studies in the Scope and Method of the Authoritarian Personality* (Christie & Jahoda, 1954), consisted of a collection of detailed chapters tending to both these methodological and ideological considerations. The book also includes a chapter by Frenkel-Brunswick on the origins of prejudice in children, entitled *Some Contributions by an Author* (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1954). Many of the findings and suggestions of this critique have already been referred to here in *Chapter One*; however the significance of the authoritarian concept was of such importance that there was to follow much further analysis. Indeed some years later, Roger Brown in his classic publication on social psychology was to remark on the entire concept of authoritarianism, stating,

Do you know him – the Authoritarian, the Antidemocrat, the pre-Fascist? It seems to me that I do. Item after item on the F-Scale is something I have heard or very like something I have heard. Furthermore the people I know who have made one of these statements have usually gone on to make others of them (Brown, 1965, p.489)

This statement encapsulates the persistent and enduring qualities, which despite the somewhat previously argued erroneous label applied to the Adorno et al. (1950) publication, still stimulate intense debate over half a century later.

2.3 Response-set Issues

No discussion on *The Authoritarian Personality* would conceivably be complete without reference to the issues surrounding response sets in psychological tests. Forming a major element of the methodological critique by Hyman and Sheatsley (1954), this phenomenon has been raised by numerous scholars in relation to authoritarianism (Chapman & Bock, 1958; Chapman & Campbell, 1957; Cohn, 1953; Medalia & Jackson, 1957; Peabody, 1966; Rorer, 1965; Schulberg, 1961). Whilst there is still considerable debate surrounding the topic, the endeavours of Altemeyer (1981; 1988; 1996) and his balanced RWA Scale and the analysis of the F scale by Meehan (1993), have somewhat attended to this recurring question. It is not though a phenomenon that is exclusively confined to the measurement of authoritarianism, and dates back to the concerns over questionnaire validity first explicitly defined by Cronbach (1946). Opinion is still largely divided on the issue and whilst reversed-item scales are becoming the norm - in both authoritarian scales and psychological testing in general - there is still validity in uni-directionally constructed tests.

One of the first attempts to utilise attitude measurement scales with regards to political ideology using the Thurstone method, was in attempting to uncover Fascist attitudes (Stagner, 1936). However Stagner was to impose two limitations upon this technique in this instance. The first was simply that researchers should be able to understand the concept they are attempting to measure. More importantly for the current discussion was “subjects taking the attitude scale will be willing to allow their true attitudes to be known” (Stagner, 1936, p.309). Whilst the use of attitude scales has flourished in the social sciences, it was realised from the outset that they might not be measuring exactly what they purport to, largely due to the effects of the

interaction between the subject and the stimuli. This trend has since been labelled ‘response set’ and consists of two main elements – *social desirability* and *acquiescence*.

As a loose definition, a response set is an inclination to agree with statements regardless of content. Specifically, Cronbach identified this as “any tendency causing a person consistently to make different responses to test items than he would have, had the same content been presented in a different form” (Cronbach, 1946, p.476). Lentz (1930) believed that this may be particularly prominent when measuring conservatism. Whilst response sets are arguably not linked exclusively with the F-scale and other measures of authoritarianism, Altemeyer (1981) provides an exhaustive analysis of how they relate to the validity of the Berkeley study. The term ‘acquiescence’ in psychological testing generally refers to a subject’s tendency to agree with statements that are presented to them. In accordance with the more common usage of the term, it implies an individual who follows the dominant trend or unquestionably accepts the social demands of others. Acquiescence is then of major concern in psychometrics as it is believed that many people may simply be agreeing with attitude statements whether they agree with its content or not.

Social desirability is according to Edwards (1957), simply the tendency for subjects to attempt to create a good impression with regards to their test scores. This differs to acquiescence in that there is a conscious deliberation in assessing the most favourable response to any given statement and indicating its agreement/disagreement in accordance *with* this perception. Edwards sees this behaviour as “the tendency of subjects to attribute to themselves, in self-description, personality statements with

socially desirable scale values and to reject those with socially undesirable scale values” (Edwards, 1957, p.vi). Hence an individual’s response to an item on a scale may not be indicative of their actual feelings on the subject, but rather what they *perceive* to be the most socially accepted interpretation. The response set issue has been attended to by many researchers in the field of authoritarianism, usually through the inclusion of reversed items, i.e. the authoritarian response would be to disagree with a statement. One of the first to do so was Bass (1955). However, Bass’ attempts to create a balanced scale were not altogether successful, due to both the low correlation between the negative and positive items and in relation to the actual content of the reversed statements, which were according to Christie, Havel, and Seidenberg (1958), not representative of a true liberal low scorer. Reversing items would therefore appear not to be a simple task, as both the correlation between the two ‘sets’ of scores needs to be carefully assessed, and the soundness of the statement itself also needs to be accurate.

Variations on the authoritarian theme have also been proposed, primarily in reply to the response set concerns of many published scales. Kohn (1972) hypothesised that the authoritarian’s alter-ego would be found in the radical dissenter; hence his *Authoritarian-Rebellion* scale. Whilst the scale may appear to be an extension of the theoretical nature of authoritarianism, the rebellion aspect largely constitutes the reversed-key items. The instrument is constructed of 15 original F-scale items, and 15 reversals of these same statements. For example, the original F-scale items “Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn”, becomes “Obedience and respect for authority aren’t virtues and shouldn’t be taught to children”. Likewise, “People can be divided into two distinct classes: the

weak and the strong”, becomes “The strong and the weak are not inherently different. They are merely the advantaged and disadvantaged members of an unfair society” (p.179-180). Criticism has been levied upon Kohn (see Altemeyer, 1988; Christie, 1991) for the seemingly unrealistic content of some of the reversal items he employs. The statement on obedience in children, for example, becomes not only an unlikely response to most but somewhat of a misnomer in any real theoretical sense. Kohn does succeed in stepping from outside the dichotomous left-right theorising of most, instead conceptualising authoritarianism from within a relatively unique framework.

However the most profound variable in this instance is the specific relationship between acquiescence and authoritarianism:

As other investigators have pointed out, however, that if the F Scale is affected by response acquiescence, it might be a blessing in disguise, for the tendency to agree with a test item might itself be a manifestation of authoritarianism. According to this argument, which is still unresolved, the unidirectional wording of the test would increase the scale’s validity rather than hurt it. (Altemeyer, 1981, p.119)

The conformist character of the authoritarian is evident in their tendency to agree with most statements that are presented to them, yet the low levels of reliability that have been recorded with the many attempts to uncover authoritarians would suggest that their acquiescence is of a more complicated nature. Rokeach (1960) suggested that the lack of unity in many of the balanced scales and what were described as ‘double-

agreements/disagreements' could have been the function of what he termed 'double think' or else were due to just plain deceit.

Response sets are not unique to authoritarianism scales, and are in fact a controversial phenomenon that is incumbent on psychometrics in general. Altemeyer (1981) assumed that much of the variance recorded by the F-scale is thankfully attributable to the authoritarian's tendency to acquiesce. Ray (1970) believed that nearly *all* of the variance was attributable to response sets, and that this was the only tangible difference between authoritarians and non-authoritarians. Reversed scales have somewhat tended to this issue, but debate still continues as to the significance of this trend for the understanding of authoritarianism and indeed if authoritarianism and response set variables are intrinsically linked.

2.4 Alternatives and Related Constructs.

Disagreement by scholars on response-sets and other issues invoked in authoritarian research, has led to considerable discontent as to how to accurately define and measure the concept. The relative 'importance' of a concept such as authoritarianism could be tentatively defined by not only the sheer volume of research that followed its publication, but also the number of alternative theories that have been offered in an attempt to rectify the many problems identified in the initial study. Essentially these can be separated into two separate entities; those that sought to rectify *methodological* problems with the Adorno et al (1950) study, and those which sought to remedy the *ideological* problems. Following the criticisms levelled at the original publication, researchers sought to quickly resolve such problems. It will be seen that there is considerable overlap between *The Authoritarian Personality* and any alternative

proposal; the author seemingly unable to escape the considerable influence of the original text. Regardless, there are several proposals which can be described as alternatives, mostly due to their ideological basis, and although this list is by no means exhaustive, it instead is selected due to the further implications in the present research.

Hans J. Eysenck was to propose in his 1954 book, *The Psychology of Politics*, a dual-factor model of the political being. Rejecting the uni-dimensional proposal in the Authoritarian Personality, Eysenck was to offer a more elaborate model whereby there were *two* competing factors that gave rise to the totality of behaviour in such social interactions. As early as 1941, Eysenck had published in the *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, a monograph entitled “*Social Attitude and Social Class*” (Eysenck, 1941), where he laid the foundations for his ideas on the interaction between these two seemingly independent variables. His insistence of the authoritarian of the ‘left’ was to be later argued in a paper entitled “*General Social Attitudes*” (Eysenck, 1944), making comparison between the dictatorships of Hitler on the right, and the equally authoritarian regime of Stalin on the left. It would be ten years later that Eysenck would publish the all-inclusive text that outlined his theory of “tough-mindedness”, and was perhaps more crucially for Eysenck and the study of authoritarianism, some four years after *The Authoritarian Personality*.

There would appear to be much more to political thought than the simple left-right range, i.e. Socialist to the left of Liberals, Liberals to the left of Conservatives, and these all falling some way in between the to poles of Communism and Fascism. Diagrammatically this can be illustrated as:




Figure 2.1: Range of political ideologies (Adapted from Eysenck, 1954).

In contradiction to this simple graphical representation of political beliefs is the idea that whilst there are distinct differences between Communists and Fascists, there is at the same time some considerable similarities. Specifically this is in relation to democracy and freedom of speech and furthermore in opposition to the democratic outlook of the remaining three. It could be argued further on this basis, that the modern Socialist and Conservative is far less democratic in its outlook than the genuine liberal, as they seek to establish their particular doctrines, for example:



Figure 2.2: Relationship between political ideologies on democratic dimension (Adapted from Eysenck, 1954).

It becomes clear that to be able to diagrammatically represent these co-occurrences in ideology, the image must now become two-dimensional to incorporate the increasing levels of inspection. Although these dimensions are relatively independent of each other, they can be combined to indicate how such co-occurrences within political ideology exist:




Figure 2.3: Two-dimensional representation of political ideologies (Adapted from Eysenck, 1954)

These grammatical representations indicate the hypothesised relationships between the different political parties on the two orthogonal dimensions of *Radical-Conservative* and *Democratic-Authoritarian*. The aim of presenting the information in such a manner was according to Eysenck (1954):

Presenting this two-dimensional pattern merely as a heuristic hypothesis, not a definite fact; it is inserted to indicate the kind of descriptive result which we might obtain from a dimensional study of the structure of opinions and attitudes. (p.110)

There is of course the possibility of adding further dimensions to this model, as different correlates are discovered that bear upon the existing two axes. Detailed factor analysis of a number of statements that constructed this scale was to produce two such distinct factors, which were labelled *Radicalism* and *Tough-Mindedness*; subsequently referred to as the *R*-Factor and the *T*-Factor respectively¹⁵. Eysenck's rationale for the semantic alteration is from a book by philosopher W. James, where he "refers to two opposed types of temperament leading to opposed philosophical beliefs as the 'tender-minded' and the 'tough-minded'" (Eysenck, 1954, p.130).

Eysenck acknowledges for the first time during his discussion on the choice of his dimension labels, the work of the Adorno et al., claiming the "authors set out from a rather different point of departure; their interest lay primarily in trying to account for the emergence of anti-Semitism" (Eysenck, 1954, p.147). He does also acknowledge the similarities between the two scales, albeit only the 'tough-minded' items. This comparison suggests that "the F-Scale is essentially a measure of tough-mindedness" (Eysenck, 1954, p.152) and that subsequent factor analysis indicated a strong, single, general factor, with a tendency for aggressive items to further cluster together. In hindsight, many of the claims made by Eysenck regarding the Berkeley study may have a certain level of validity, but there were to be other considerations in the discussions surrounding Eysenck's theory that would overshadow any utility his ideas may have provided for the study of authoritarianism.

Overall, the publication of *The Psychology of Politics* was to stimulate some intense academic debate and anyone who was an avid reader of the journal, *Psychological*

¹⁵ These correspond to the two dimensions illustrated in the above diagram (*Figure 2.3*), however the Democratic-Authoritarian distinction is replaced with the label Tender-Mindedness/Tough-Mindedness.

Bulletin in 1956, would have witnessed an exchange of opinion described by some as 'remarkable' (Altemeyer, 1981. p.83). The proponents in this case were the singular Richard Christie (Christie, 1956a, b), and the combined efforts of Milton Rokeach and Edward Hanley (Rokeach & Hanley, 1956). The evaluations were to be particularly damaging to the reputation of the devout empiricist Eysenck, and despite his use of the right of reply and the attempted reparation, it would largely lead to his departure from the political psychology field. The product of the debate was to point to numerous spurious methodological and analytical interpretations made by Eysenck. Perhaps the most damaging however would be the discovery that the T-Scale scores for a group of Communists studied (Eysenck and Coulter, 1972), were somewhat different on an item-by-item basis than those quoted by Eysenck (Rokeach & Hanley, 1956). Re-analysis would indicate that Eysenck had either been careless in his arithmetic recordings, or as it would be implied, had deliberately misrepresented his findings.

Whilst Eysenck has promoted the Toughmindedness scale as a measure of general authoritarianism, Barker (1963) found there to be no relationship between it and the various other 'authoritarian' measures he administered, instead finding a negative correlation ($r=-.33$) with the PEC-scale. He suggested there is in fact a negative relationship between tough-mindedness and conservatism. Eysenck believed this result to be intrinsically linked to the intelligence and education level in Barker's subjects, although no further analysis was performed on this scale due to its questionable validity as an authoritarian measure (Barker, 1963). Additional support for the presence of the T-dimension was reported by Defronzo (1972) in an examination of religion and humanitarianism, with those scoring at the tender-minded

end of the scale being more religious and committed to humanitarian policies. Stone and Russ (1976) also report a correlation between tough-mindedness and the concept of Machiavellianism. However reference to the work of Eysenck in the field of authoritarianism is scarce, although the T-dimension is still of importance in the general discussions on personality (Barrett & Kline, 1981).

One of the critics of Eysenck, Milton Rokeach (1918-1988) was – as have many involved in authoritarian research – a graduate of the University of California at Berkeley. Following the connections he forged with esteemed psychologists Abraham Maslow and Solomon Asch, Rokeach was to catch the attention of Frenkel-Brunswick and Stanford where his interest in A.S. Luchin's classic *Einstellung*¹⁶ paradigm of problem solving was encouraged (see Christie, 1993). Although his studies were to be interrupted due to the war effort, Rokeach was to refer back to his earlier studies following a period as a research assistant looking at prejudice in children. This had coincidentally followed on from the work of Frenkel-Brunswick in *The Authoritarian Personality* and Frenkel-Brunswick was herself to publish an article on a related concept of pre-adolescent prejudice (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949). Marrying these two concepts together, Rokeach completed his doctoral dissertation on the “positive relationships between individual differences in ethnocentrism and problem solving” (Christie, 1990, p. 547). His first publication, *Generalized Mental Rigidity as a Factor in Ethnocentrism* (Rokeach, 1948) was followed some years later by his most famous work, *The Open and Closed Mind* (Rokeach, 1960). This was essentially an extension of his work on the concept of dogmatism.

¹⁶ The Einstellung Paradigm describes the experimental situation of problem solving (Christie, 1993).

Disagreeing with the psychoanalytical and ideological basis of *The Authoritarian Personality*, Rokeach was to construct a measure of 'dogmatism', which was intended to measure the rigid thinking proposed by Adorno et al, but without reference to any concrete political position. However, its main focus was to be provide a more general measure of authoritarianism, and has subsequently placed itself only second in volume to the F-scale as a measure in such research. Rationale for the study of 'ideological' dogmatism was to be based on a number of assumptions about the relationship between *beliefs* and *thought*. Dogmatism was to be defined as a,

...closed way of thinking which could be associated with any ideology regardless of content, an authoritarian outlook on life, an intolerance toward those with opposing beliefs, and a sufferance of those with similar beliefs. (Rokeach, 1960, p.4-5)

It was this inability or reluctance to internalise and appreciate the needs, thoughts and desires of others that was according to Rokeach, the basis for authoritarian behaviour. The opposing forces of the *open* and *closed* mind were conceptualised as defining a continuum of which they represent the extremes. This necessitated the operational definition of those who were 'high dogmatic' (closed) and the 'low dogmatic' (open). Although these were not essentially two mutually exclusive groups, they were to be further defined by a two-tier structure curiously explained by Gestalt theory, psychoanalysis *and* behaviourism (p70). The use of different psychological theory seemingly adds a number of dimensions to the concept of dogmatism.

The study becomes more focused in the respect that Rokeach seeks to marry the concepts of cognition and emotion within the dogmatic framework, suggesting, “every emotion has a cognitive counterpart, and every cognition its emotional counterpart” (Rokeach, 1960, p.8). It is however, primarily the cognitive component of belief systems that Rokeach is concerned with – the main emphasis being that by labelling ideas as a cognitive process, they then have a direct influence upon the acceptance and rejection of people in general and the subsystems that they constitute. Such an idea is of prominence in the notion of authority. It is this final point that Rokeach states as the ‘point of departure’ for his present study, citing the works of Fromm (1941), Maslow (1943) and in particular Adorno et al. (1950). The subsequent analysis of Shils (1954) and the authoritarian of the left, appears to influence the direction of the study more so than the previous collection of authors, as Rokeach postulates that,

...we should pursue a more theoretical ahistorical analysis of the properties held in common by all forms of authoritarianism regardless of specific ideological, theological, philosophical, or scientific content.
(Rokeach, 1960, p.14)

It appears reasonable to assume that the theory of *Dogmatism* proposes that the authoritarian is a product of a closed mind in thought and belief, and intolerant of those who disagree with them. Subsequently, their cognitive processes restrict their level of tolerance for ambiguity.

The conclusion to Rokeach's theory seeks to integrate the three concepts of personality, ideology and cognitive functioning into explaining open and closed belief systems. An interesting divergence from the Berkeley study and associated literature is the proposition that "the categorization of people and groups is continuous rather than dichotomous" (p.392). This is in opposition to the generally accepted notion that prejudice is *not* group specific. Highlighted with respect to religious affiliation, Rokeach supposes that this will apply to political parties, philosophical association and even scientific viewpoints. It is this congruence of belief systems that Rokeach presumes "helps us to organize not only the world of people, but also the world of ideas and authority in relation to each other" (p.395). It is concluded that these belief systems are relatively independent of personality; behaviour instead being largely determined by cognitive organisations. This would seemingly be the major distinction to Rokeach's and many other efforts on authoritarianism, highlighted by the comparison of the lowest score on the F-scale and the highest on the Dogmatism and Opinionation scales for a sample of British Communists. The essential difference summed to interpret Dogmatism as being a general measure of authoritarianism, its theory guided by structure as opposed to content, therefore relegating the concept of authoritarianism as a semantic label, and instead assuming that the behaviours seeking explanation have a significant bearing on the open vs. closed mindset.

No realistic appraisal of a theory can be without significant reference to the methodology and it's bearing upon subsequent theory. And Rokeach to his credit does offer a number of his own considerations. Firstly is the familiar response set caveat, and no further explanation need be expanded on here (see 2.3). Rokeach concedes, "whatever objections have been raised with respect to response set in the F-Scale may

also be raised with respect to the present scales” (p.405). It is assumed that there is a likelihood that there is an element of response set present in the analysis, however the results obtained are deemed to indicate that this is not a significant factor in the interpretation of the theory.

The second critical point that is also raised is concerned with the differences relating to those scoring high or low on the Dogmatism Scale, simply being a function of intelligence. As Rokeach’s theory is tied to cognitive functioning, this is an even more pertinent question than the similar one directed at the Adorno et al. study. Correlations between these two variables are reported to be relatively non-existent (similarly the comparisons between extreme scorers), but the instruments used to measure intelligence may be of dubious psychometric quality¹⁷. And why it is such irregular measures are relied upon is equally ambiguous. A case *is* presented that identifies the nature and purpose of intelligence tests, and that the Dogmatism Scale is measuring intelligence also, albeit of a specific kind. But Rokeach would have appeared to have curiously ignored a whole wealth of research on intelligence that would have been quite available in 1960.

Studies conducted with the Dogmatism Scale have steadily grown however, and in some circles all but replaced the F-scale as the benchmark for measuring authoritarianism (Vacchiano, Strauss, & Hochman, 1969). Meloen (1993) reports there to be some 837 dogmatism publications listed in the *Psychological Abstracts* for the period 1950-1989. The number for the F-scale is 1,504 for the same period, although it should be remembered that it was published some years earlier. Many

¹⁷ Intelligence tests used include the American Council on Education Test, the Ohio State Psychological Examination Test, and the Wonderlic Test.

dogmatism studies were conducted with reference to the Vietnam War; in particular there were a number of appraisals of protesters scores at various peace rallies (Karabenick & Wilson, 1969; Bailes & Guller, 1970). Results from these studies were to signify that there was a negative correlation between Dogmatism and 'dovish' (anti-war) attitudes, whereas those who were 'hawks' (pro-military action) were high on Dogmatism.

This indicated that Dogmatism did to varying degrees, measure authoritarian attitudes of the right and left as indicated by participant's views on the Vietnam War. Granberg & Corrigan (1972) discovered that there was indeed the same relationship but that F-scale scores did also measure to a lesser extent the same phenomena, and was therefore unable to provide strong support for Rokeach's ideology free scale. It was assumed from the results that Dogmatism was correlated with conservatism and pro-war attitudes and that although it was not ideology free, it was significantly less so than the F-scale. Although Rokeach did not quite achieve the explicit aims of his research in producing a value-free level of measurement, he did to a degree make a step in the right direction.

Despite a thorough and original approach to the study of authoritarianism, Rokeach and his ideas on Dogmatism were subjected to considerable critical appraisal by his contemporary peers. Despite Rokeach's efforts to obtain an ideologically free measurement of authoritarianism, Brown (1965) was to conclude that Rokeach (and nobody else) had unsuccessfully shown there to be an authoritarian of the left. And that it was also evident from the research that Dogmatism merely followed authoritarianism, rising from left to right and therefore still contained ideological

biases (Parrot & Brown, 1972). Others found that whilst there may still be some ideological content present in the Dogmatism Scale, it is still a useful measure of general authoritarianism (Kerlinger & Rokeach, 1966; Thompson & Michel, 1972). This is despite it being significantly correlated with the F-scale and unable to accurately predict left-wing extremism (Meloan, 1993; Ray, 1970). Further explorations with the Dogmatism scale have shown it to correlate with anxiety (Gaensslen, May, & Woelpert, 1973); student power (La Gaipa, 1969); attitudes towards marijuana (Lorentz, 1972); religiosity and mental health (Richek, Mayo, & Puryear, 1970); and risk taking (Taylor & Dunnette, 1974). Dogmatism can therefore be regarded as a reliable measure of a social attitude, however not one explicitly related to authoritarianism.

2.5 Altemeyer and Right-wing Authoritarianism.

Although Eysenck and Rokeach developed some imposing alternatives to the authoritarian personality proposed by Adorno et al., Canadian psychologist Robert Altemeyer would provide the first major theory to contest the Berkeley study. Altemeyer's first book, *Right-wing Authoritarianism* published in 1981, would simplify the theory and provide a more reliable measuring instrument. Despite some later criticisms, Altemeyer's endeavours have significantly impacted on authoritarianism research. Although it is essentially an extension of the Berkeley work, it deserves an independent analysis and interpretation.

As witnessed with *The Authoritarian Personality* and its connections with anti-Semitism, Altemeyer's introductory chapter quickly identifies his theoretical rationale for the study of authoritarianism. Recounting an incident in Quebec in 1970,

Altemeyer relay's his fears over the practically totalitarian legislation enacted by the Canadian government in response to the kidnapping of a British diplomat. The situation that conspired gave the authorities,

...the power to search and seize property without warrant, to arrest and hold persons without charging them with any crime, to censor the media, and to outlaw any organization considered dangerous to the national welfare¹⁸ (Altemeyer, 1981, p.3).

Although the 'Orwellian nightmare' that use of the War Measures Act failed to materialise, Altemeyer reports that 95% of Canadians found favour with the reactive measures. He believes that "in a crisis nearly everyone will support the government when it suspends its constitutional rights" (p.6). Altemeyer makes a tenuous comparison with the Reichstag fire in 1933, which enabled the Nazi party to consolidate its power in Germany. Although historians would perhaps argue that there were many confounding factors that contributed to the rise of Hitler and his Third Reich beyond any one incident, it is the symbolic nature of a major political event that captures Altemeyer's attention. This logic extends to the main hypothesis of the study of Right Wing Authoritarianism:

Are there individual differences in the support of anti-democratic governmental actions which are general enough across situations that we ignore them at our scientific and social peril? That is, given that everyone submits to established authority to some extent, and certain

¹⁸ Recent parallels can most obviously be witnessed with the new anti-terrorism laws in place in most western states in light of the events of September 11th and further attention will be afforded to this discussion in a *Chapter 5*.

situations will make most of us highly submissive, is it meaningful to talk about 'authoritarian people'? Are there some people who are so generally submissive to established authority that it is scientifically useful to speak of 'authoritarians'? (p.7)

Despite the early fears for the maintenance of democracy forwarded in the introduction, Altemeyer clearly makes his intention to be one of discovery and validation for the concept of authoritarianism.

Over 100 pages are devoted in *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* to a critique of previous studies and substitute theories. In particular, Eysenck and Rokeach (see 2.5 & 2.6); Wilson & Patterson's theory of *Conservatism* (Wilson & Patterson, 1968); Lee & Warr's *Balanced F-Scale* (Lee & Warr, 1969); Kohn's *Authoritarianism and Rebellion* (Kohn, 1972); and naturally the Californian F-scale (Adorno et al, 1950). The exhaustive review is analysed according to Altemeyer's conceptualisation that authoritarianism is fundamentally right-wing in orientation. Nevertheless, there is suitably detailed analysis of each concept to allow the conclusion that the time and money afforded the study of authoritarianism in the preceding three decades has largely gone to waste. Altemeyer highlights four main reasons for this (p.112-115):

- 1) *Conceptualizations have been very casually constructed* – the various pieces of the authoritarian puzzle have been added and deleted at will and for that reason indicates that the various researchers do not have a clear understanding of the problem they are attempting to investigate.

- 2) *Scales have usually been developed very quickly and published long before they were ready for useful scientific investigation* – basically the lack of item analysis studies were either completely lacking or substandard in quality or quantity for the author's to cease the development where they did - usually when they had reached the desired level of reliability, regardless of test length and uni-dimensionality.
- 3) *The research which has been done with these scales has been quite deficient methodologically* - Altemeyer appears somewhat dismayed at the poor reporting of fundamental scientific data, e.g. sample sizes and mean scores, and regards it rather sceptically as a desire to bolster and even disguise poor results, especially when aligned with selective research.
- 4) *The vast majority of papers in this literature report the results of one-shot, unreplicated studies* – the lack of replication and testing of generalizability, is regarded as a symptom of overall poor research and adherence to scientific procedures.

Such is Altemeyer's concern for the fallacy of the scientific validity of many studies that he ponders the question of why many were even accepted for publication in the first place, and discusses a general 'crisis of confidence' in social psychology in general at the time of his writing.

Although rejecting the theories of Adorno et al., Eysenck, Rokeach and others who have also attempted to conceptualise the authoritarian personality (e.g. Wilson & Patterson, 1968; Lee & Warr, 1969; Kohn, 1972), Altemeyer further examines the specific methodological issue which are intrinsically linked with authoritarianism - that of the response set issue. Providing a historical overview of the determinants of response sets from Cronbach and Lentz, a detailed critique of the F-scale emerges from this and sets the scene further for the rationale of Altemeyer's methodological distinction in his analysis of authoritarianism. Unlike the Berkeley investigators, Altemeyer firmly believes that response sets had a distinct bearing on F-scale scores and although they were superficially linked with the concept of authoritarianism, accounted for a significant amount of error in the scale. It can be clearly seen by the first two chapters and the introduction of the theory of right-wing authoritarianism, that Altemeyer's approach should at the very least be methodologically sound, and whilst his theoretical rationale may be brief, will provide a firm foundation to approach such a complicated subject.

It should be recalled that Adorno et al. (1950) hypothesized nine categorical variables that distinguished the authoritarian: *Conventionalism, Authoritarian Aggression, Anti-intraception, Superstition and Stereotypy, Power and 'Toughness', Destructiveness and Cynicism, Projectivity, and Sex* (Adorno et al., 1950, p.157-170). Although it has since been argued that this is at best overcomplicated, Altemeyer adopts a more inductive approach by instead inferring three similar features of the authoritarian from his initial analysis of the F-scale (Adorno et al, 1950), the D-scale (Rokeach, 1960), the balanced F-scale (Lee & Warr, 1969), the Traditional Family Ideology Scale (Levinson and Huffman, 1955) and a sample of 12 of his own items. Simple

correlational analysis produced 10 of the most prominent – five from the F-scale, three from the balanced F-scale and two from the Traditional Family Ideology Scale. Subsequent analysis and refinement over a number of years¹⁹ finally resulted in the initial 24-item RWA-scale. This is theoretically defined by the three independent but co-varying variables of (p.148):

- 1) *Authoritarian Submission* – a high degree of submission to the authorities who are perceived to be established and legitimate in the society in which one lives;
- 2) *Authoritarian Aggression* – a general aggressiveness, directed against various persons, which is perceived to be sanctioned by established authorities; and
- 3) *Conventionalism* – a high degree of adherence to the social conventions, perceived as being endorsed by society and its established authorities.

Altemeyer is distinct in that his theory is not to be regarded as one of personality *per se*, but rather a collection of attitudinal clusters. He rightly acknowledges the presence of situational factors in the study of authoritarianism also. Citing the well-established writings of those who have previously commented on the ability of attitude scales to accurately predict behaviour (e.g. Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; Milgram, 1974), it is concluded that:

...situational factors can ride roughshod over individual differences of almost any kind” and that the “‘bottom-line’ here is whether assessments

¹⁹ Winter 1970 – September 1973.

of right-wing authoritarian attitudes will be predictive of ‘authoritarian behaviours.’ (p.149)

This debate is well established in the social sciences and authoritarian research (Christie, 1952), however Altemeyer believes that those of most concern are related to established authorities in society, usually the actual governing party.

Returning to the reference of the anti-democratic policies of the Canadian government in 1970, it is argued that situational determinants such as the mood of the general public “can create a climate of public opinion which promotes totalitarian movements” (p.151). The element termed authoritarian submission is the main guiding principle in the whole concept of *Right Wing Authoritarianism*. But it is also loosely linked to right-wing political ideology. However this submission could conceivably be applied to many left-wing philosophies. Altemeyer rejects the concept of the ‘authoritarian of the left’ as proposed by Shils (1954), and makes explicit the notion that it is the unquestionable trust and support for the established authority that determines authoritarian behaviour in this instance. Comment has been made that what this compliance with conventionality essentially defines is conservatism, and not *explicitly* right-wing ideology (Ray, 1985).

Consequently, authoritarian aggression follows loosely the accepted definition of general aggression, in that it is a predisposition to harm someone; in this case being sanctioned by the appropriate authority. More precisely, right-wing authoritarians are “predisposed to control the behaviour of others through punishment” (p.153), a predisposing beginning in childhood. Such individuals are therefore strong proponents

of severe penal sanctions and capital punishment. Prejudice, which was a strong feature of the Berkeley study, is instead understood to be directed at ‘unconventional people’ of which race and ethnicity could be categorized as. And it is this threat to social order that justifies this discrimination under the auspicious order of the established authorities.

This established social order is firmly rooted in the traditional social norms of society and is where the right-wing authoritarian finds solace in his conventionality. The right-wing authoritarians conventional attitudes are a “code of how people ought to act, not how they do” (p.155) and goes some way to explaining the perceived rejection of other cultures, as well as the more liberal outlook with its focus on social change. Although the conventionality is profound, it is not understood to be a fixed entity but rather a reduced capacity or willingness for acceptance of, and greater resistance to social change. Again the connections with traditional views of conservatism resonate through such conceptual thought.

Returning to the ten items that guided the emergence of the three attitudinal clusters which conceptualise right-wing authoritarianism, student samples from the University of Manitoba and a number of ‘adults’ recruited through newspaper adverts were to assist in developing a unidimensional, if unreliable scale. Introducing contrait (reversed) items to partial out the effects of the response set problems and by adding a number of his own items, Altemeyer produced a statistically reliable scale consisting of some 20 items (10 portrait and 10 contrait). By September 1973 (some three years since the project began) Altemeyer constructed his first amalgamation of items that

was referred to as the RWA-scale. Despite a lengthy and highly critical evaluation of the F-scale in a previous chapter, Altemeyer concedes that the,

...conceptual roots of the RWA scale trail back to research on the F-Scale reported 30 years ago. As was noted in chapter 1, the items on that test are even more loosely connected empirically than they are theoretically, but there is a psychometric core to the test which has appeared rather consistently across samples and years.” (p.170)

The core is no longer defined by the nine traits proposed by Adorno et al., but by submission, aggression and conventionalism exclusively. This is made all the more uncertain by the fact that although this ‘central core’ is coherently organised, there are only two original F-scale items that remain in the RWA Scale. In fact the 24-item scale finally consists of only 5-items from the original four scales that were used in the preliminary analysis. The remainder are Altemeyer’s own creations and referred to as ‘University of Manitoba’ items. Nevertheless, Altemeyer proclaims at the summary of the chapter on his suggested conceptualisation of right-wing authoritarianism that “there really was ‘something there’ and now I was able to lay my hands upon it” (p.174). However, whether this was a self-fulfilling exercise may be subjected to some debate, for as with the F-scale many years before it, items would appeared to be selected not exclusively for their psychometric qualities.

Altemeyer was to further compare the RWA-scale with the F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950); the Dogmatism scale (Rokeach, 1960); the Conservatism scale (Wilson and Patterson, 1968); Lee and Warr’s (1969) Balanced F-scale; and the Authoritarianism-

Rebellion scale (Kohn, 1972), using the responses of over 1,000 students in the process. The primary aim aside from validating the RWA-scale against its peers was to test both the unidimensionality of each scale, and also their relationships with various behaviours and functioning associated with authoritarianism. In particular the process of factor analysis was influential in Altermeyer's evaluation of the scales internal construction. However it should be recalled that many of the previous studies were unable to profit from the possible benefits of this statistical technique, as microcomputers were not easily available. Subsequently, it is not surprisingly that the RWA-scale is the "most unidimensional of the tests being compared" (p.188). Only one factor was extracted, accounting for 23% of the test's total variance, compared with the Conservatism scale which produced some 5 factors in total; the first two only accounting for 10% of the total variance.

Testing each theory in turn with many relevant variables such as punitiveness, religiosity, and political affiliation, the RWA scale is revealed in this 'pitting experiment' to be an accurate predictor, or rather covariant of (p.212):

- 1) Subjects' acceptance of government injustices;
- 2) Subjects' use of law as a basis of morality;
- 3) Subjects' punitiveness against certain people convicted of crimes;
- 4) Subjects' aggressiveness in a punishment-learning situation.

Political party preference, which would be expected in a test entitled 'Right Wing Authoritarianism' to be a strong predictor of, was insignificant. However this was

assumed to be moderated by subjects' interest in politics in general, rather than party predilection. Despite this anomalous shortcoming, Altemeyer concludes that,

What we have discovered, in a nutshell, is that sentiments of authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism covary appreciably, and that this pattern of covariation is related to a number of seemingly unrelated behaviours in theoretically connectable ways. (p.214)

And in addition that,

Social scientists (and journalists and barbers) have been 'explaining' authoritarian behaviour with 'authoritarianism' for many years, but as long as we lacked a well-defined, independent and operationally viable concept of authoritarianism we were merely restating the data. *Now we can do more*²⁰ (p.214).

Although it can't be refuted that the RWA-scale was constructed with scientific rigour and painstaking analysis, there is also no disguising the fact that the theory is only slightly more objective than that of the Berkeley group. This is made even less appreciable when considering the large pool of theoretical and experimental research that Altemeyer has to draw upon some 25 years later.

²⁰ Emphasis added.

There is no escaping the fact that Altemeyer has a deep distrust of the ‘established authorities’, culminating in an almost paranoid tendency to insist that the totalitarian state is only as far away as the enactment of legislation. It should also be recalled that although Altemeyer’s initial publication was in 1981, his theorising began in or sometime before 1970 and wasn’t concrete until the end of 1973 when his first 24-item scale was finalised. The luxury of hindsight some 20 years later might be unnecessarily harsh in the same manner as the analysis of the F-scale by Altemeyer within a similar time frame. Indeed the RWA-scale set the standard for the study of authoritarianism and is still widely acclaimed today (Christie, 1990; 1993; Duckitt, 1999). This could though only be because a more valid and reliable theory and accompanying measure have yet to be established. It certainly clarified many of the anomalies surrounding response sets, psychodynamic theory, and the acknowledgment of the influence of situational factors. Indeed, Altemeyer’s second publication on the concept of Right Wing Authoritarianism, *Enemies of Freedom* (Altemeyer, 1988) contains an even deeper analysis of the origins of authoritarianism, for example from within the realms of *Social Learning Theory*. Written in a far more humble fashion, it develops on the theory using a seemingly inexhaustible supply of University of Manitoba students and members of the general public, to clarify many of the points raised in *Right Wing Authoritarianism*, for example the correlation between authoritarianism and religion.

Altemeyer’s final contribution to the field was entitled the Authoritarian Spectre (Altemeyer, 1996). Again a comprehensive analysis of authoritarianism is developed, although much of the theorising is lacking compared to *Right-wing Authoritarianism* and *Enemies of Freedom*. This book is more a review of his work and the relevant

studies of others and provides a useful summary of the RWA-scale and authoritarianism in general. Altemeyer does also partly concede some of his earlier hypotheses may not be as definitive as he first assumed, particularly the presence of authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission and conventionalism. But as one of the leading researchers in the field, the study of authoritarianism has advanced considerably through his work.

2.6 In-group/Out-Group Concepts.

Although the antecedents of the Berkeley Groups notion of authoritarianism have been widely criticised here (see *Chapter One*) and others (see Christie and Jahoda, 1954; Brown, 1965; Altemeyer 1981; 1988), there is perhaps one enduring quality or proposition that has re-emerged in the field that has gathered growing acceptance. Recalling Adorno et al's notions of ethnocentrism, the concept of in-group/out-group adherence has materialized through the endeavours of a number of researchers (e.g. Downing & Monaco, 1986; Duckitt, 1989) as a possible explanation for authoritarian behaviour. In particular, the proposition that it is this identification with and commitment to ones chosen in-group that could determine an authoritarian style demeanour has consistently emerged in discourse.

First proposed by Sumner (1906) as an explanation of ethnocentrism and further elaborated upon regarding prejudice (Allport, 1954), the notion of the in-group/out-group distinction as a dimension of authoritarianism has been proposed as a 'new view of an old construct' by Duckitt (1989). The group nature of authoritarianism has been a feature of its theory since its inception and many have proposed understandings of the relationship between the two concepts (Grabb, 1979; Hawthorn,

Couch, Haefner, Langham, & Carter, 1956; Katz & Benjamin, 1960; Louche & Magnier, 1978; McCurdy & Eber, 1953). Nevitt Sanford was later to publish on the topic of authority and leadership (Sanford & Older, 1950). However, these studies and the theoretical implications they pose for understanding authoritarianism have failed to register the influence that Duckitt (1989) has provided in this domain.

Rejecting the original study by Adorno et al. largely on ideological grounds, Duckitt further criticises the research on authoritarianism from a reductionist perspective, believing the conflicting perspectives where,

...the individual has been viewed as a system in his own right governed by internal dynamics, or as an element of a larger social system fundamentally responsible to the properties of that system.
(Duckitt, 1989, p.67)

The considerable work of researchers in this field such as Tajfel (1979), on inter-group relations have served to highlight the shortcomings of attitude and personality scales in predicting behaviour during collective situations. It is this unification of the two concepts that Duckitt implicates as he states,

If the concept of authoritarianism is to be resuscitated as a viable individual difference construct, then it must be conceptualised in a manner pertinent and relevant to collective and intergroup behaviour.
(Duckitt, 1989, p.69)

Achieving such an aim would seek to answer some of the apprehensive analysts in the field (see Christie, 1952; Ray 1976) who focus on the lack of correlation between attitudes and actual behaviour.

In seeking an answer to his question, Duckitt refers to the work of Altemeyer (1981) and his RWA theory and resulting scale. It will be recalled that Altemeyer (1981) proposed three distinct constructs as opposed to the original nine of Adorno et al. (1950); conventionalism, authoritarian submission, and authoritarian aggression. It was the covariance of these that symbolised the authoritarian, determined through detailed factor analysis of the results. Examining these three ideas, Duckitt attempts to unify them into the common theme of inter-group cohesion, believing that each “can be seen as quite directly reflecting the intensity of the individual’s emotional identification within a given social group” (Duckitt, 1989, p70). It is how these three concepts fuse together that provides Duckitt’s novel and innovative approach to the study of authoritarianism.

Expanding the three concepts of conventionalism, authoritarian submission and authoritarian aggression into a more precise interpretation of each, Duckitt proposes six criteria in explanation of authoritarianism as both an “individual difference construct and as a group phenomena” (Duckitt, 1989, p71):

- a) *Conformity to Group Norms and Rules – Conventionalism:*

- 1) How many behaviours and beliefs of individuals are or should be regulated by group norms and rules as opposed to self-regulation by the individuals' needs, beliefs, and inclinations?
- 2) How strictly do or should individuals have to conform to these in-group rules and norms?

b) *Tolerance vs. Intolerance of Nonconformity – Authoritarian Aggression:*

- 1) How severe should be or are punishments and condemnation for non-conformity to group norms and rules?
- 2) How strictly are or should be such punishments and condemnation for non-conformity enforced?

c) *Unconditional vs. Conditional Respect and Obedience – Authoritarian Submission:*

- 1) To what extent should be or are ingroup leaders and authorities accorded respect and deference unconditionally because of their role and status, as opposed to respect and difference conditional upon their actions and role performance?
- 2) To what extent should be or are ingroup leaders and authorities accorded unconditional obedience as opposed to obedience conditional on the dictates of individuals' personal conscience or interests?

Holding this theory together is the assumption of the manner in which the individual views their relationship to any particular group, varying along a singular dimension.

Hence,

At one extreme would be the belief that the purely personal needs, inclinations, and values of group members should be subordinated as completely as possible to the cohesion of the group and its requirements.

At the other extreme would be the belief that the requirements of group cohesion should be subordinated as completely as possible to the autonomy and self-regulation of the individual member. These two extremes positions could be labelled authoritarianism and libertarianism, respectively. (Duckitt, 1989, p.71)

The major point that this would initially appear to answer would be the much-cited ‘authoritarian of the left’ controversy. Or more precisely, if there are left- and right-wing authoritarians in the traditional political view of right-wing and left-wing, then how would one define their opposite.

Essentially, Duckitt proposes that authoritarianism actually *causes* prejudice, and not the other way round as has been traditionally assumed (p.75). It is therefore the reciprocal causality that in-group cohesion forms through prejudice towards out-groups that forms the basis for solidarity. Whilst Duckitt provides theoretical and experimental evidence for such a proposition, the reader is left pondering the question of causality. It is quite conceivable that prejudice can result from the pressure of one’s peers, but it is how this process begins that still remains ambiguous. Insecurity is

forwarded as one possible explanation of why certain groups are authoritarian and hence very prejudicial; group identification has been a well-accepted notion of attraction to certain doctrines.

However, although Duckitt neatly fits his theories about group cohesion into the three categories proposed by Altemeyer, it is clear that he is also somewhat cynical of the overall validity of the concept of Right-wing Authoritarianism. Rather it is seen as “closely in accord with the objectives of the classical approach to authoritarianism” (Duckitt, 1989. p.73-74). More importantly, Duckitt proposes that:

Rather than advocating the wholesale abandonment of a research literature which has been accumulated over more than three decades, it *calls for its reinterpretation, within, of course, the often various psychometric limitations* of the measures which have been used.²¹
(Duckitt, 1989, p.74)

It immediately appears curious exactly why Duckitt should forward a theory on the basis of a concept which he feels is ideologically (in the classical sense), and confirmatory (in its psychometric significance), fundamentally flawed. This contradiction is beyond the mere pragmatic implications, and indeed delves into the practical aspects of its investigation. This forces Duckitt to pose the question of just how the measurement of his proposal should actually be conducted. In overall conclusion, Duckitt rejects the individual difference explanation for prejudice, instead believing that it is almost entirely a group phenomenon.

²¹ Emphasis added.

Duckitt (1998) isn't the first researcher to examine the concept of authoritarianism within the realms of in-group/out-group distinctions. Although Duckitt makes no reference to the particular experiment of Downing and Monaco (1986), it seems curious that he would be unaware of a well-referenced study published in *The Journal of Social Psychology*. Downing and Monaco attempt to marry together the concepts of authoritarianism as measured by the F-scale, and the situational factors that are believed to be precursors to in-group/out-group conflict as identified during the 'Robbers Cave' experiment (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Four hypotheses emerge from within the most likely interactions between situational factors, and three more relating to the theories on authoritarianism. A further two hypothesis emerge as a result of the situational and personality interactions and are guided by existing theories and research. The first is that the "greater bias shown by those high versus low in authoritarianism, will diminish with increased objective separation of in-group from out-group", and the second "increasing objective separation of in-groups and out-groups will increase in in-group/out-group bias more for high than for low authoritarians" (p.447). Initially these two hypotheses may appear similar, but the distinction lies with the differing theoretical causes within the authoritarian's personality that account for in-group/out-group bias. The first hypothesis developed from a cognitive/information processing paradigm, believes that the readiness to adopt each category will be high in those measured as authoritarian, as they "would require fewer situationally created distinctions between groups for a bias to manifest itself" (p.447). Conversely, the second hypothesis related to examining the psychodynamic views of Adorno et al. (1950), and the concepts of denial and projection. It is expected that those high in authoritarianism "would show

the bias throughout a broad range of situations” (p.447) and that this would peak when group separation is at its most intense.

The theories were tested using volunteers at a New England ski resort, the sample of 227 males and females all previously being unacquainted and averaging 30 years of age. Assigning the subjects into three randomly selected groups, they were administered a modified, 20-item version of the F-scale and then further separated into two groups, identified by their green and blue ‘racing ties’. Results indicated that there was a significant bias for rating members of one’s own in-group favourably, and that this was most prominent in those subjects who scored above the mean on the authoritarian measure. The opposite hypothesis also emerged, being that high authoritarians rated out-group members less favourably. The main hypotheses that are of concern are whether there would be an interaction between personality and situational factors, which was not supported. However, there was a significant difference between high and low authoritarians on ratings of in-groups and out-groups as differential contact increased. The authors conclude that the findings suggest that the most “striking finding is that all of these effects occurred for subjects above the mean on authoritarianism” and that “this finding favours personality theory rather than information processing as most basic to an understanding of in-group/out-group bias” (Downing & Monaco, 1986, p.451). They also acknowledge the limitations of the situation under which examination took place, believing that this may not always hold true in more meaningful circumstances.

The theory of Duckitt (1989) and the experimental research of Downing and Monaco (1986), highlight how authoritarianism fits into the in-group/out-group distinction of

collective behaviour. Social psychology has studied the effects of group bias for many years and there have been attempts to integrate it into authoritarian theory, however the obsession with the hypothesised link between authoritarianism and prejudice has somewhat clouded this relatively simple association. Whilst Duckitt's theory is open to critical evaluation, there is considerable validity to his propositions in light of other evidence of authoritarian behaviour.

2.7 Authoritarianism of the left and right.

Where *Chapter One* concluded with explorations into the nature of the low and high scorer on the F-scale, a debate has continued into how this individual may *actually* be defined. It should be recalled that Adorno et al. (1950) were to perceive in their discussion surrounding politico-economic conservatism that the two opposing dimensions of political ideology fall between the Fascist at one end and the Communist at the other. Eventually examining the slightly 'diluted' relations of these two concepts, conservatism and liberalism respectively, the overriding message is that the assessment centres on comparing and contrasting individuals of the left and of the right in both the ideological and political sense.

Considerable emphasis has been placed on the notion that authoritarianism is merely a composite of traditional conservative ideology, albeit in a severe form. In particular, its right-wing 'origins' are of particular prominence in the Adorno et al. (1950) study. Hypothesised conventional behaviour forms the initial category in the nine F-scale traits, being described as "rigid adherence to conventional, middle-class values" (p.184). Subsequently, much emphasis is placed on the concept of the *pseudo-conservative* as opposed to the genuine conservative; the former being more inclined

towards pre-Fascist behaviour. In Altemeyer's (1981) *Right-Wing Authoritarianism*, there are also numerous references to conservative and conventional behaviour and thinking. It is clear from the outset that there is a distinct ideological basis for Altemeyer's conceptualisation of authoritarianism, which is firmly entrenched in the conservative realm. Others (e.g. Ray, 1983) have gone as far to suggest that the RWA scale *is* nothing more than a conservatism scale as it was found to correlate significantly ($r=.81$) with the Ray Conservatism Scale (Ray, 1982). Again a universally accepted definition of either concept hinders any meaningful analysis.

Should one accept that there is an element of conservatism from within the authoritarian paradigm, this then raises important questions as to what authoritarianism actually is – both theoretically and practically. Significant debate has centred on the idea that authoritarianism isn't a distinctly right-wing phenomena and that there are in fact an equal number of authoritarians from within left-wing ideologies. One of the first to acknowledge this point was Shils (1954). Viewing historical definitions of the political spectrum, which was defined by the 'radical' at one end and the 'conservative' at the other, it was assumed that the former signified the 'Left' and the latter the 'Right' and that "every political programme could, it was thought, be placed on this scale and be fairly judged" (p.24). Illustration of this view was to be found in the seating in political meetings for example, which ranged from the extreme Left to the extreme Right. In particular,

Marxist interpretation of Fascism as the penultimate stage in the polarization of all political life into the extreme Right and the extreme Left, prevailed almost universally in the 1930's in many intellectual

circles. Fascism was seen as an accentuation of bourgeois conservatism, a conservatism driven to desperation by the inevitable crisis of capitalism. (p.26).

Whereas many have offered some tentative consideration of the left/right ideology that represents political thought, Shils gives a deeper insight than most into the origins of these two opposing doctrines.

In defining the authoritarian, Shils (1954) notes that in the Adorno et al. study,

The entire team of investigators proceeds as if there were an unilinear scale of political and social attitudes at the extreme right of which stands the Fascist – the product and proponent of monopoly-capitalism and at the other end what the authors call the complete democrat. (p.28)

This simple dichotomous view of political ideology is defective according to Shils, as there is no mention of the possibility that there are authoritarians of the Left. These are accordingly represented by the ‘non-Stalinist Leninist’ and indeed the mention of Communism is distinctly missing altogether from many debates surrounding authoritarianism.

Despite the obvious differences in Fascist and Communist thought in any of their forms, there are according to Shils (1954) some remarkable and distinctive similarities. In particular, the fact that “both aver that a small group has with doubtful legitimacy concentrated the power of the country within their hands” (p.32). This

statement effectively identifies the basic behavioural dispositions of the two regimes, without any specific reference to their ideological underpinnings. In particular, Shils provides a venerable but imaginative analysis of the 'deeper tendencies' that the Berkeley group hypothesised would characterise the Right authoritarian and transposes onto them the central features of the Bolshevik movement. Whilst largely illustrative and by no means comprehensive, it nevertheless provides some validity to the argument that there is considerable overlap between the two opposing concepts. Eysenck's multidimensional diagram of political persuasion is also of worthy mention.

Despite these overwhelming similarities observed as being characteristic of both regimes, Shils does provide an insight into the major differences also. Offering to a certain degree, acceptance of the Berkeley group's assertions concerning the role that the family plays in the creation of the authoritarian, it is the liberal's looser family ties that separate the two ideologies in his argument. Whilst Liberalism and Communism are not identical, it is part of the Communist ethos that the family possesses less importance in the social and economic system. Similarly, the belief in science as a progressive driving force is a significant part of Communist theory, whereby its influence on the Fascist is less so. However, Shils provides perhaps the clearest example of not the similarities, but the organisational disposition of the two ideologies, in that,

The rigid hierarchy of the Communist Party, the very strong feelings about the moral inferiority of various classes, the contempt for the non-Communists – these are hardly the benign equalitarianism which the

Berkeley group think is characteristic of the 'left' sector of the political continuum. (Shils, 1954, p.41)

Where the Berkeley group espoused a theory of anti-democracy that was illustrated by the Fascist, Shils provides evidence that the opposite view of the equalitarian is not to be found in the Communist. To some extent this highlights the point, that whilst the Berkeley group were able to an extent provide a valid measure of 'authoritarianism', they indeed only succeeded in showing a *portion* of it and were therefore unsuccessful in defining or measuring it in its entirety.

For all its objectivity and analysis, Shils (1954) does appear to confuse what could be described as 'classic' Communism or at the very least Communist theory with more contemporary examples, such as Stalin's Soviet Union. Shils was writing from before the revolution in 1989, when the full extent of the horror's of Stalinism and Soviet Communism were uncovered. Either his confusion and/or selective use of the various metaphors he employs, make his argument appear naïve and somewhat unconvincing. His analysis is akin to the Berkeley groups focus on Nazism exclusively as Fascism, largely ignoring other examples and any theoretical underpinnings. However, Shils does conclude with an important point that is often overlooked in the various definitions of authoritarianism that are offered, namely that "a liberal democratic society itself could probably not function satisfactorily with only 'democratic liberal personalities' to fill all its roles" (P.48). Such a statement was to be later echoed by Milgram (1966). The need of society for some level of authority to provide its rule is important when considering what the role of government is in contemporary society. The confusion of some to equate anti-authoritarianism with rebellion (Kohn, 1972) or

even anarchy (Wrightsmann, 1977), is naively considering the belief that even in a fully democratic society there is no desire for established order.

Some support for Shils' theory of Left authoritarianism is provided by Barker (1963), where he expands on this view to include authoritarians of the Right, Left and Centre also. Administering the F-scale with a battery of other personality tests and attitude scales, Barker hypothesised that not only would authoritarians of the political right, centre and left be similar on the various authoritarian measures, but that they would actually differ in the 'direction or content' of their authoritarianism. Essentially this means that whilst authoritarian levels will remain the same, it would be the manner in which they censor – this specifically being related to the concept of opinionation. Results indicated that while the F-scale measured right authoritarianism adequately, it was less convincing in identifying the left authoritarians who were identified using a variety of other measures, such as Rokeach's Dogmatism scale and Eysenck's Toughmindedness scale. Utilising mainly a student sample (some of which were 'political activists') in that they were a small number of 'Rightists' (n=26) and 'Leftists' (n=29), Barker furthered the remit of his study to validate some additional hypotheses. Mainly that there is to be no relationship between political ideology, level of political activity and authoritarianism. No support was reported for either of these two propositions however, and whilst rejecting the ability of the F-scale as a measure of authoritarianism (of the right), he proposes that there *is* an authoritarian of the left. He only concedes at this point that the whole concept of authoritarianism being slightly more compatible with the ideology of the right. Referring back to the notion of 'direction' of authoritarianism, Barker proposes that,

Authoritarian leftists appear to be more selective in their intolerance, e.g., they tend to censor only rightists. The rightists, on the other hand, tend to be less discriminating, e.g., they censor other rightists as well as leftists. In addition, the authoritarian rightists appear to be more submissive to authority, or at least to the usual authority in our society, than the authoritarian leftists. (Barker, 1963, p.73)

The idea of authoritarians of the left does hold up to empirical examination and whilst there are differences between the two, there is still some validity in the concept as well as quantifiable distinctions.

The propositions of Shils (1954), Barker (1963), and others who have espoused a concept of right and left authoritarianism, were questioned by William Stone (1980) in a paper entitled *The Myth of Left-Wing Authoritarianism*. Reviewing past research into left authoritarianism, Stone concedes that whilst “such cases of left-authoritarianism do exist cannot be denied, the idea that authoritarian personalities are equally drawn to communist and fascist movements now seems clearly false” (Stone, 1980, p.12). Stone further believes that the dogmatic insistence of such a phenomena lies in the social scientists belief that any behaviour outside the status quo is pathological in nature, an observation that he terms ‘centrist bias.’ Providing an almost conspiratorial basis for such lack of impartiality, Stone cites the work of Brown (1936) and others (e.g. Sampson, 1977; Billig, 1977, 1978) to demonstrate the self-serving nature of this bias amongst many social scientists²². What Stone is in particular concerned with in his own research however, is the psychological

²² For a more detailed discussion, see Nietzsche, F. (1959). *Use and Abuse of History*. NY-Indianapolis.

differences between conservatives and liberals, or more specifically what he refers to as ‘humanistic’ and ‘normative’ individuals.

In a later review of the same topic by Stone in collaboration with Laurence Smith, the argument is again thoroughly examined (Stone & Smith, 1993). Whereas the previous account by Stone (1980) is reluctant to even acknowledge the notion of left authoritarianism, the author’s make explicit the difference between both the *content* and the *structure* of left and right ideologies. This is consistent with the rationale provided by Rokeach (1960) in his attempt to construct an ideology free measure of authoritarianism in the form of the Dogmatism Scale. Structure according to Rokeach, was a common entity in fascist and communist regimes, as they both embraced the hierarchical authority in pursuit of their goals. They state that although similarities do exist, “there are vast differences between individuals drawn to an ideology that stresses equality above all (communism) and one that stresses hierarchy and the superiority of the master race (fascism)” (Stone & Smith, 1993, p.145). This essentially negates any examination of left and right ideologies in any one format. Whilst the *structure* of the two regimes is similarly authoritarian, the *content* is not so comparable.

In summary, the work of Stone (1980), and concluded in Stone and Smith (1993), centres around three key points in defining what they have now began to term *Left-wing Authoritarianism*. The first of these is seen as primarily a statistical issue, that being,

...those who cite casual evidence in arguing that one can find examples of left-wing authoritarianism just as easily as examples of the right-wing variety are evading the crucial question of whether, statistically speaking, the same rate of authoritarianism is found on the left as on the right. (Stone & Smith, 1993; p.154)

The second is related to the scientific perception that *other things being equal*, the caveat is in fact true. However, they address the dismay that this cannot be simply proved by ‘casually citing examples’ and the need for empirical support of the argument. The final point is more pragmatic; hence “in citing examples of authoritarian leftist regimes, the proponents of the left-wing authoritarianism thesis have implicitly shifted the level of analysis from a psychological to a sociological one” (Stone & Smith, 1993, p.155). In combination, these three points essentially point to the fact that although the concept of authoritarianism of the left may not entirely redundant, there is no hard evidence to support it either. However, as has been proposed in the current discussion, this is more than likely an artefact of the way in which authoritarian research has progressed, beginning with the Berkeley studies reliance on Fascism and Nazism as a panacea for explaining such behaviour. The propositions of Stone and Smith and others appear to be returning the concept of authoritarianism into a philosophical debate, rather than progressing the research domain into one of empirical investigation.

Whereas many advocate that authoritarianism is distinctly a right-wing phenomenon, either theoretically or through the lack of substantiation to prove otherwise, there are a number of studies that provide somewhat contradictory evidence. As many different

scales have been introduced, the assumptions from this evidence become even more complicated. Few studies have actually been conducted on actual members of right or left wing political organisations, particularly communist or fascist, but two of the most prominent are those of DiRenzo (1967b) and Eysenck and Coulter (1972).

Administering Rokeach's Dogmatism scale to members of the Italian House of Deputies, DiRenzo was able to attain a sample of 25 members of the Communist Party, and 24 members of the [neo-fascist] Italian Social Movement. The former were discovered to have the lowest scores on the Dogmatism scale and the latter the highest. Stone (1980) promptly concluded that this indicated that there was therefore no evidence to support the authoritarian of the left syndrome. The lack of ideological bias that was supposed to be a defining feature of Rokeach's scale has since been discredited. However, DiRenzo's study did provide evidence for the notion that there were differences in relation to authoritarianism between Fascists and Communists.

Some three years after the publication of the Authoritarian Personality, British psychologist Thelma Coulter infiltrated a group of Sir Oswald Moseley's supporters and obtained a number of personality scales from them, as well as a comparable group of communist sympathisers (Eysenck and Coulter, 1972). The fact that the fascists recorded one of the highest mean scores on the F-scale recorded (Meloan, 1993) demonstrates the validity of the scale. But despite these encouraging results, a spurious recording of relatively high scoring communists was to also cast doubt upon the validity of the F-scale as a measure of pre-fascist tendencies. The untimely death of Coulter in 1953, plus Eysenck's contentious interpretation of the personality aspects of the various subjects was to also overshadow the impressive research. In

contrast, the lowest scoring group so far, were according to Meloen (1993), a number of academics at the University of California who refused to sign a communist loyalty oath. This bias in relation to *fascist* anti-democracy is evident; the F-scale is not adequately capturing the authoritarian of the left and subsequently only describing a percentage of the whole authoritarian model.

These results from the studies conducted by DiRenzo (1967b), and Eysenck and Coulter (1972) are of little direct comparability, both due to the different scales used to measure authoritarianism. In addition, the possibility of various cultural factors between British and Italian Fascist and Communists could also cloud any meaningful interpretation. However, whilst such a direct comparison may not be prudent, there does exist the possibility of defining these empirical examinations within a broader theoretical proposition. Recalling the ideas that Stone and Smith (1993) proposed with regards to comparing right and left, essentially being that whilst they differed in content, they did possess similarities with regard to structure. The above two studies might usefully provide some clarification of this proposition. Although it has been previously argued that Rokeach's Dogmatism scale is perhaps not as ideologically free as he intended it to be, it can still be argued that it is decisively less ideological than the F-scale, which has also been stated to be measuring predominantly Fascist authoritarianism. The results of DiRenzo using the Dogmatism scale indicated that Communists were low scorers and Fascists high. Therefore, it was argued, Communists are not authoritarian and that left-wing authoritarianism is a myth (Stone, 1980; Stone & Smith, 1993). However the findings of Eysenck and Coulter with two (although not identical) but quite feasibly similar groups negates this argument somewhat, with Communists, although scoring lower, having a significantly high

score in comparison to the (highest scoring) Fascists. Essentially this means that (although as would be expected on a scale that is primarily designed to measure Fascism) that there is an element of this syndrome of authoritarianism that is equally appealing to the left-wing Communists. It could therefore be hypothesised that the Dogmatism scale illustrates the *differences in content*, whereas the F-scale highlights the *similarities in structure*.

If there has been debate and cursory evidence surrounding the existence of left-authoritarianism, the fall of the Soviet Union in 1989 provided the backdrop to examine this hypothesis *in situ*. According to McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalakina (1993), the availability of *The Authoritarian Personality* was restricted to but a few special reserve libraries and examination of it and its related constructs were severely discouraged in the former USSR. Indeed the whole notion of authoritarianism was rejected as being both a Western social condition, and just as importantly, revealing negative traits in the Marxist-Leninist ideology of the ‘New Soviet Man’; subsequently “not one empirical study [of authoritarianism] was conducted” (McFarland et al., 1993, p.199).

This stifling of research into authoritarianism in perhaps one of the few accessible ‘real life’ examples of probable authoritarian government, has been addressed by McFarland and his colleagues and a number of tentative studies have resulted. Following Perestroika and with the restriction of authoritarian research lifted, Ageyev, Abalakina, and McFarland²³ (1989; in McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalakina, 1993, p1005) administered a ‘Russian’ version of Altemeyer’s RWA-scale to 340 adults.

²³ Only written in Russian – no English translation available.

Due to the content of the scale containing distinct Western ideology, five of the items were re-written with 'appropriate Soviet substitutes.' For example, "People should pay less attention to Marxist-Leninism..." for "People should pay less attention to the Bible..." Comparison with a sample of 463 American adults from Kentucky, led Ageyev et al. to conclude that;

Although the cultural authorities and enemies were opposite for the two cultures, support for the authorities and opposition to the enemies were components of authoritarianism in both cultures. Whereas Western authoritarianism intensifies condemnation of communists, Soviet authoritarianism in 1989 intensified commitment to communism and opposition to capitalism. Yet we found that Soviet authoritarianism, like its Western counterpart, also induced opposition to democratic ideals and to civil liberties. (McFarland et al., 1992, p.1005)

In addition, it was discovered that authoritarianism in the Soviet Union correlated with prejudice and general ethnocentrism and that Communist party members recorded higher levels of authoritarianism than other political party members including the National Front. Despite demographic similarities (except age), results correlated similarly between the two countries and the Soviets, somewhat surprisingly, scored lower than the Americans on authoritarianism overall.

The turmoil of the Soviet Union in the early nineties necessitated further examination of this partly political, partly cultural, investigation particularly as by 1991 the Communist party was no longer the only legal political organisation. McFarland et al.,

(1993) hypothesised therefore, that the relationship between Marxist-Leninist ideology and authoritarianism would have fallen considerably in the two years that had lapsed since the first study. In particular, authoritarianism was presupposed to be negatively related to certain reformist political characters, such as Boris Yeltsin, and to other dictatorial events, for example the militarization of Lithuania following its drive for independence. Despite a somewhat unconvincing factorial analysis of the attitudes to political events, the various measures do correlate in the hypothesised direction, with authoritarianism being linked with resistance to non-Russian leaders, support for action against such by the Soviet army, as well as opposition to general reform. The authors define these results as indicating Russian political ideology to be compatible with the left-right systems, and that liberalism negatively correlated with authoritarianism.

Further examination of authoritarianism scores and ideology under the rubric of 'norms of distributive justice' (the way goods and services are apportioned to members of a society), yields by far the most significant support for the notion of left-wing authoritarianism; authoritarianism in Russia correlated positively with equality and negatively with 'laissez-faire' individualism. Authoritarianism in the American sample was a converse image of these relationships. For there to be any validity in the principle of Communism as a left-wing ideology and Conservatism (or Fascism) to be a right-wing philosophy, then following McFaland et al's examination of Russian and American subjects, it can be argued that authoritarianism does exist in both political sphere's. And this is also distinctly related to the prevailing ideology. McFarland and his team are however less interpretive over their findings, instead cautiously

concluding that although authoritarianism is not explicitly related to ideology, it is a function of conventionalism which then forms the basis for this relationship.

In a later review, McFarland, Ageyev, and Abalakina (1993) attempt to offer some explanations for the lack of evidence for their main hypothesis that the more authoritarian political systems would contain higher levels of authoritarian personalities. The first such elucidation is that the changing political atmosphere post-1989, had a profound influence in that the overriding regime being advocated, that of democracy and social change. It is possible that these previously assumed authoritarian characters were in a kind of transient state, whereby the items from the RWA scale had little relevance at that point in time and conformity to the social norm was of a more liberal manner. The second, and more profound being that the previously authoritarian rule, in its removal, allowed the citizens to reject their own tumultuous history. Having lived under this authoritarian rule, the opportunity to reject such doctrines may have now become a longed after luxury and that the Russian people now valued their freedom. The third point relates to the lower levels of authoritarianism in Soviet society, and is what McFarland et al. refer to as the “distinction between the authoritarian personality and ‘totalitarian political thought’” (p.220). McFarland et al., also state that whilst “this mode of thought is not identical to the authoritarian personality, may still be quite strong in the former Soviet Union, and may change only slowly with the long experience of democracy” (p.221).

The word totalitarian itself conjures the idea of Orwellian-style utopia whereby the every move of its citizens is carefully monitored and controlled. The term originates in part of Mussolini's Fascist experiment in 1920's Italy and specifically as

‘everything in the State, nothing outside of the State, nothing against the State’ (Eatwell, 1996, p.36). The realisation of such ‘total’ societies was addressed in relation to the emergence of Communist and Fascist regimes in the early 20th Century, and enjoyed prominence in the 1950’s and 60’s. Mann (1997) describes the word as “contentious” (p.136). It has since diminished as a prominent feature in any real description of political movement since, although there is some re-emergence of the term in relation to religious participation (Whine, 2001).

Little analysis had been made of the theory of totalitarianism until Arendt in 1950. In her examination, totalitarianism was seen as a somewhat recent and intense dictatorship that was not predominantly related to any political ideology. Whilst differences between the only two examples of this concept – Hitler’s Fascist Germany and Stalin’s Communist Soviet Union – were easily identified, in practice these seldom made any convincing distinction between the manners in which each regime organised the masses. This was particularly the case with reference to race or social class. Mann (1997) specifically draws the main similarity between Fascism and Communism as the way in which they are grouped together under the banner of totalitarianism. Diagrammatically they can be seen to be two separate entities (see Figure 2.5 below); they diverge with their emphasis on total control over their citizens. Whereas disagreement over the similarities of the two ideologies is recognizable, the likeness in other respects is too large to ignore:




Figure 2.5: Overlap between Communist, Fascist, Totalitarian Ideology.

The significance of ideology was unimportant as the totalitarian rule only served to provide legitimacy to the physical and psychological domination of any respective party. Structurally, totalitarian regimes were signified by the particular prominence of the 'secret police' and also the seemingly indispensable charismatic leader. Their overlap on these points is readily observable, even if the relationship between their ideologies are poles apart.

Friedrich and Brzezinski (1961) saw significant similarities between the two regimes in terms of totalitarian analysis, and differences in their structure also emerged. In particular the role of the party itself was significantly more prominent in the Communist example, as was the role of the military and the police. Fortunately, the short-lived experiment in Germany that did not enable the evolutionary nature of totalitarianism to emerge. Post-modern totalitarian theorists, and in particular Schapiro (1972) provide more pragmatic visions of such societies. Schapiro to some extent combined the richness in theory of Arendt with the illustrative surmise of

Friedrich and Brzezinski to answer critics who had largely denounced the notion of totalitarianism altogether. Schapiro saw totalitarianism as a style of rule, whereby a leader utilises ideology and pacifistic party members in seeking total control of the state, society, and the individual.

Whether the concept of totalitarianism has passed or whether it was even justifiable to propose such a model, is the centre of much debate amongst political scientists. Mann (1997) hypothesises that although there is less interest in the concept of totalitarianism, it is more the bureaucratic element that is emphasised as not conforming to the model. Defending the choice of example,

We find a smoothly functioning and hierarchical bureaucracy in the pages of Orwell's *1984* or Huxley's *Brave New World*, but not in Nazi or Soviet reality...Nobody ever argued that the Nazi or Stalinist regime constituted a perfectly functioning bureaucracy. (Mann, 1997, p.137)

More specifically however, Mann argues that,

Totalitarian theorists depicted an unreal level of coherence for *any* state. Modern states are a long way short of Hegelian or Weberian rational bureaucracy and they rarely act as singular, coherent actors...Second, we should remember Weber's essential point about bureaucracy: it keeps politics out of administration. Political and moral values ('value rationality') were settled outside of bureaucratic administration, which then limited itself to finding efficient means of implementing those

values ('formal rationality'). Contrary to totalitarian theory, the twentieth-century states most capable of such formally rational bureaucracy were not the dictatorships but the democracies. (Mann, 1997, p.137)

There are many theories of non-democratic government beyond the reliance on Fascism and Communism as archetypal examples. Military dictatorships are one such example of a non-democratic style of government that do not necessitate any specific ideology in which to operate.

Whereas totalitarianism may be too 'rare' to practically be demonstrated, what are known as authoritarian regimes are more widespread. Authoritarian styles of government can be seen as a diluted form of totalitarianism and without the absolutist element that makes them largely unattainable. This also makes them less well defined although many such illustrations of these do exist. One of the first proponents of this term in reference to government was Linz (1970), in his analysis of Franco's Spain as an example of an authoritarian regime. Recognising the similarities with totalitarian theory, authoritarianism was nevertheless distinguished from these by reference to the role of military force in their inception. Whereas totalitarian theorists (e.g. Arendt, 1951; Friedrich & Brzezinski, 1961) had downplayed the role of the military as a feature of such systems, Linz saw the military dictatorship in particular, as exemplifying the authoritarian rule. It was the role of the armed forces in gaining power, such as in a military coup, which characterised this style of government. Many communist regimes where the ideological impetus was no longer the driving force had

therefore passed through their totalitarian phase and had become simply authoritarian in their nature.

The debate over right and left authoritarianism, or rather if there is in fact an authoritarian of the left, is almost as long as the debate into the entire syndrome of the authoritarian personality itself. Whilst Adorno et al. (1950) did acknowledge the existence of various authoritarian governments, it has been argued here and by many others (e.g. Christie, 1954), that the insistence of belief on Nazi fascism as being the primary example of an authoritarian personality was flawed. However, it has also been argued that the Berkeley study was never explicitly intended to be one of authoritarianism, but rather ethnocentrism and more specifically, ethnocentrism in relation to anti-Semitism. The diligent observation by Christie (1954) that the actual word 'authoritarian' only appears a mere handful of times in the 1000 pages of the book, and the later admission by Levinson (1972) that the title was not decided upon until some time after the manuscript had been completed, would also stand testimony to this. And this is without the microscopic methodological and theoretical examinations by many authors, Hyman and Sheatsley (1954) and Altemeyer (1981) in particular.

These assumptions do not answer the question of whether there is an authoritarian of the left, but merely ascertains that there has been a distinct reliance on Nazism as the 'guiding light' for understanding and illustrating the authoritarian personality. Whilst Eysenck and Rokeach were to propose theories that attempted to overcome such bias, they met with distinctly fewer acceptances as explanations and measures of authoritarian personalities than did the original F-scale. And this is despite its well-documented flaws. It wasn't until the proposals of Altemeyer and his various

evolutions of Right-wing Authoritarianism, that debate progressed significantly beyond that of German Fascism. However, despite the glaringly obvious assertion that authoritarianism is a distinctly right-wing phenomenon by Altemeyer (1981, 1988), proposals of authoritarianism as a function of group membership (e.g. Duckitt, 1989) was there any significant shift in the assumption that authoritarianism may indeed be an artefact of the prevailing rule of that moment, and in that particular political setting.

There is little doubt that the similarities between Nazi Fascism and Stalinist Communism for example are too obvious to ignore in this particular realm of debate. What Adorno et al. proposed in their initial examination cantered upon the notion of the pre-Fascist and it was this propensity to adopt such ideology in mainstream America that was of concern to the group. Communism at that time not considered a serious threat to American democracy, despite the later intrusions on this during the Cold War. Adorno et al. set out to discover whether the atrocities experienced under Hitler could conceivably be repeated in their adopted homeland. Through the insistence to place too much emphasis on the theoretical underpinnings of Fascism and Communism, many researchers have failed to acknowledge the fact that these various totalitarian regimes are seldom definable in any simple quantifiable statement. Rather they are permutations of existing ideology, and similarly metamorphosize to the political and social climate in which they take hold. For example, Mussolini has rarely been referred to as the founder of Fascistic ideology. Instead Hitler and Nazism are referred to as the 'blueprint' for such examination, even though Hitler himself developed his own brand of Fascism in *Mein Kampf*. Similarly, Marxist-Leninist theory was advocated to be the driving force behind the dictatorship of Mao in China,

although it remains to be discovered where the majority of the actual policies had any relationship with the 1917 government of the Soviet Union.

One final point that should be elaborated upon concerning *The Authoritarian Personality* is that the concentration upon the F-scale as being *the* authoritarian personality is incorrect. Adorno et al. commenced their study with a much broader remit, and for various reasons already discussed, ended with a measure of pre-Fascist tendencies. This has since been relied upon to now measure authoritarianism. However, despite this erroneous assertion by many, another important point has similarly been overlooked, in that the title of the chapter where the F-scale is depicted – *Chapter VII* (P.222-279) – is actually entitled *The Measurement of Implicit Antidemocratic Trends*, and is also, perhaps coincidentally, the only chapter in the whole book that is written by all four authors.

2.8 Conclusion.

The criticism of *The Authoritarian Personality* is seemingly large enough to allow a number of alternative theories to evolve, rather than merely expand on the original study. However, whilst they all possess their own merits, there yet remains a viable substitute by which authoritarianism can now be defined and measured. Altemeyer's RWA-scale is regarded as the most reliable measure currently available, but its data driven development negates the theoretical richness that made the original study so appealing. Further developments from within the group structure paradigm have advanced our understanding and answered many of the criticisms of the ideological underpinnings of authoritarianism. The task remains to accurately define and measure these concepts.

Chapter Three – Conceptualising the Authoritarian Personality

3.1 Introduction.

In 2000, *The Authoritarian Personality* would be 50 years old. Despite half a century of dedicated scholarly attention, still no adequate or universal agreement has been reached over its definition or measurement. Recent reviews by Lewis (1990), Martin (2001), Rosier and Willig (1995), Smith (1997), Rosier and Willig (2002) critically examine the work on authoritarianism. They all reach the same basic conclusion that it is imperative for researchers to develop an amended concept of authoritarianism, which ignores the historical developments that have underpinned much of this research in the past five decades.

3.2 Defining and Conceptualising the Authoritarian Personality.

The original definition of the authoritarian personality by Adorno et al. (1950) saw it as constituting nine distinct facets, although some interplay *between* these was also hypothesised. Altemeyer (1981) further refined these categories to three, and it was the presence of these in unison that defined the authoritarian. Whilst it is possible to measure how a subject scores on each of the three constructs separately, the overall scale scores are what identify a subject as being authoritarian or not. It is therefore conceivable that a subject could simultaneously score highly on one feature (e.g. authoritarian submission) and low on another (e.g. authoritarian aggression). According to Altemeyer's theory, it is the presence of the three variables of authoritarian aggression, authoritarian submission and conventionality that constitute its whole. However, high scores on two of these sub-scales and a low score on the

remainder could hypothetically still place the respondent in the mid-to-highly authoritarian category²⁴. Similar criticism was directed at the F-scale by Hyman and Sheatsley (1954). Although the RWA-scale is multi-dimensional in theory, it is measured using a uni-dimensional scale.

In attempting to raise the validity of authoritarian research into a unified perspective that would enable the construct to have some identifiable meaning, it requires not only the establishment of a unified theory, but also an accurate measurement instrument be employed. Whilst Altemeyer's RWA-scale has demonstrated worthy reliability, its validity is somewhat questionable. Christie (1990, 1993) believes what gains the RWA-scale made by addressing problems on methodological grounds it lost in the richness of its theory. Neither the Berkeley researchers nor Altemeyer could adequately answer the important question of whether authoritarianism is a feature of personality or whether it is merely an attitude. The theoretical rationales of the two studies (psychodynamic and social-learning respectively) would suggest that Adorno et al. view authoritarianism as a personality construct that is acquired in childhood. The social learning perspective of Altemeyer suggests that authoritarian behaviours are learned, although his interpretation of this theory in line with his own for authoritarianism has been questioned (Martin, 2001). Indeed the reference to theory within any of Altemeyer's (1981, 1988, 1996) extensive reviews of the subject, show significant reference to social learning theory.

The work of Altemeyer (1981) and Duckitt (1989) have been regarded as providing significant steps in addressing this lack of unity, by developing new concepts with

²⁴ It should be remembered that exceptionally high scores on any authoritarian scale have seldom been recorded, with the majority falling in the middle two quartiles. The range of scores is not as varied as one would hope and further adds to the concern over whether the construct is therefore adequately defined.

relatively unique approaches to the definition and study of authoritarianism. Whilst neither is without limitations, it seems prudent to allow such developments to evolve with the hope of creating a tighter and more valid overall understanding. It has been noted by Feldman (2003) that,

...even after fifty years after the publication of *The Authoritarian Personality*, the empirical literature on authoritarianism continues to grow even though there is no widely accepted theory to account for the phenomenon. The absence of a secure theoretical grounding severely limits our understanding of authoritarianism. (p.41)

It is for this reason that Feldman (2003) proposes a revised conceptualisation that places authoritarianism within the realm of the distinction between what he terms ‘social conformity’ and ‘personal autonomy.’

Like Altemeyer (1981), Feldman rejects the Freudian basis of authoritarianism due to the limited support that it has received empirically. He also believes that the majority of analyses that have been conducted are entirely divorced from *any* theory whatsoever (Feldman, 2003). Critical of much published work in the field from the view that “the overwhelmingly data-driven character of much of this literature provides little guidance about the theoretical status of the concept” (p.42). Specifically, and whilst offering some praise for Altemeyer’s RWA-scale, he asserts that “researchers adopting Altemeyer’s new measure have just substituted a psychometrically better grounded scale for a weak one” (p.43). It would appear from Feldman’s viewpoint, that the study of authoritarianism is poorly defined and that

therefore any subsequent measure that may be used to measure it – whilst being reliable and unidirectional in the measurement sense – is by implication therefore invalid. According to Feldman, there are three main issues that have not been addressed in the authoritarianism literature – the relationship of authoritarianism to prejudice and intolerance; the correlation between authoritarianism and conservatism; and the similarity between measures of authoritarianism and the variables we want to explain (Feldman, 2003).

Drawing on the notion that authoritarianism is in part a group phenomena (e.g. Duckitt, 1989), this new concept is identified by “people’s orientations toward society and, in particular, conflicts between individual rights and the well being of the social unit” (Feldman, 2003, p.46) and specifically the assumed trade-off between individual freedom and social control. It is hypothesised that social conformists will in particular value the notion of universal norms of behaviour, whilst those who cherish autonomy will conversely value diverse and unconventional patterns of social behaviour. However the distinction is also drawn between what is termed social order, and whilst an epoch of the social conformist, should simultaneously appeal to the autonomist. This resonates with the similar concerns of Milgram (1974), in that without any kind of social order or structure, society would presumably cease to function effectively. However, it is the threat to social cohesion that is important, and authoritarian behaviour is thus classified “by the interaction between social conformity-autonomy and perceived threat” (Feldman, 2003, p.52).

In order to test this new conceptualisation, Feldman developed a 17-item scale consisting of paired items that contrast the two ends of this conformity-autonomy dimension. The theory is guided by five distinct elements (Feldman, 2003, p.53-55):

1) *Conformity Versus Autonomy* – the basic trade off between the two, e.g.

A) We should admire people who go their own way without worrying what others think;

or,

B) People need to learn to fit in and get along with others.

2) *Freedom Versus Fear of Disorder* – the social consequences of conformity-autonomy, e.g.

A) People can only develop their true potential in a fully permissive society;

or,

B) If we give people too much freedom there will just be more and more disorder in society.

3) *Respect for Common Norms and Values* – the level of commitment to these, e.g.

A) Rules are there for people to follow, not change;

or,

B) Society's basic rules were created by people and so can always be changed by people.

4) *Social Cohesion* – should people accept common norms and values, e.g.

A) Society should aim to protect citizens' right to live any way they choose;

or,

B) It is important to enforce the community's standards of right and wrong.

5) *Socialization and Child-Rearing Values* – those desiring social conformity should want children to be taught to be good and obedient citizens, e.g.

A) It may well be that children who talk back to their parents respect them more in the long run;

or,

B) Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn.

The five elements are constructed to tap a single dimension however, and are subsequently named the *Social Conformity-Autonomy Beliefs* scale (SCA Beliefs). Alpha-reliability is calculated to be in the region of .80, and exploratory factor analysis identifies a dominant first factor (eigenvalue 3.24; second factor eigenvalue .91) and therefore that the scale 'is at least unidimensional' (Feldman, 2003, p.55).

Despite the relative success in constructing a scale of conformity-autonomy in the *SCA Beliefs scale*, a further measure is composed from a multi-dimensional scaling

study of values²⁵. Schwartz's analysis of values believes that human societies possess a myriad of beliefs, but also that a central core is unique to all. A 20-item version of Altemeyer's (1988) RWA-scale is also included, along with two ideological measures designed to tap political affiliation and social/moral conservatism. Results indicated (see *Table 3.1*), that there are significant correlations between the two conformity-autonomy scales and RWA scores.

	<i>SCA Values</i>	<i>SCA Beliefs</i>
<i>SCA Values</i>	-	.64
<i>SCA Beliefs</i>	.64	-
<i>RWA</i>	.68	.71

Table 3.1: Correlations among Social Conformity-Autonomy Measures and Authoritarianism (Adapted from Feldman, 2003, p.57).

Whilst Feldman's initial concept initially surrounds the issue of conformity, it also diverges into an examination of ideology and prejudice. In particular it is hypothesised that "intolerance and prejudice should be the result of an interaction between valuing social conformity and perceiving a threat to common norms" (Feldman, 2003, p.59). Essentially this can be interpreted to indicate that the conservative ideology, which is signified as opposing social change, can become reactionary to the perception of such adjustments. This can subsequently manifest itself in the form of prejudice. This 'threat' to social cohesion is a vital element in the conformity-egalitarian equation; hence a measure was devised to measure agreement through eight items. Furthermore, a scale to measure implicit prejudice was included, consisting of six items. In addition there are also measures of attitudes towards the

²⁵ Schwartz, S. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values. *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology*, 25, 1-65.

‘Ku Klux Klan’ and the ‘Patriotic Front’, conservative-liberal ideological preference, Social Dominance Orientation and Gender.

This simplified and theoretically driven proposal highlights the interaction between the individual and society. Feldman incorporates much of the previous literature on authoritarianism and amalgamates it into a coherent thesis. Devising his own measures to assess authoritarianism is further validated by the inclusion of the RWA-scale to provide a benchmark with which to judge general authoritarianism also. Such an approach should be applauded to some extent in that it doesn’t ignore past research but nevertheless develops a relatively unique concept.

3.3 Authoritarianism – Social Conformity and Obedience.

It becomes evident that through an analysis and critique of the previous literature on authoritarianism, that there is no real collective consensus upon what the authoritarian personality actually is; still less upon how to measure it. Some argue that it is an attitude (Ray, 1976; 1982; Suziedelis & Lorr, 1973), whilst others claim it to be a personality variable (Wells, 1957; Davids & Eriksen, 1957; Davidson & Kruglov, 1953). Some claim it to be a fixed entity (Goertzel, 1987), others see it as determined by situational factors (Christie, 1954; Ezekiel, 1969, Heaven, 1984). Again others see that it is a stable and enduring feature of personality acquired in childhood (Adorno et al., 1950), whereas others firmly believe that it can be changed (Heaven & Bucci, 2000). The task would appear to logically present these differing viewpoints into a logical theoretical framework that will allow the systematic collation of the different aspects to be conceptualised. A brief review of the past literature and significant studies will provide a concise and coherent operational definition to emerge.

To the casual reader in psychology, sociology, or political science, the notion of an authoritarian personality appears to be fairly observable and easily definable concept. Beyond the academic literature, there are also numerous real-life examples and anecdotal evidence; tyrannical heads of state and intrusive regimes have been the trademark of many authoritarian establishments for most of the last century and beyond. However a publication in 1950 would spark some five decades of still unresolved debate on its definition and measurement (Adorno et al., 1950). Utilising recently devised measurement techniques with psychoanalytical theory, the authors painted a character that was conventional, rigid in their thinking, and prone to punitive behaviour.

But despite early praise preceding its publication and on receipt by its initial audience, there was soon to gather a rising momentum of criticism towards the text, both on methodological and ideological grounds. The now almost legendary ‘response set’ controversy, hailed condemnation from those convinced of the acquiescent individual who merely agreed with any statement regardless of content (Couch and Keniston, 1954, Bass, 1955; Leavitt, Hax, & Roche, 1955; Martin, 1964; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988). In particular the nine supposed traits of the authoritarian come under particular scrutiny (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954; Brown, 1965). It is these hypothetical categories in which the authoritarian (or anti-democratic) individual is composed by, despite the process by which these are created appearing somewhat dubious. How well each of the statements from the F-scale relates to each construct is also unclear, as there is some overlap between many of them, with some statements supposedly tapping more than one construct simultaneously. Although these and other methodological criticisms have largely been resolved with the introduction of revised and alternative

instruments, the attention has in the past decade turned towards the ideological and theoretical underpinnings that the original authors used as a point of reference in their original definition. In particular the psychodynamic paradigm upon which the theory was based has been opposed, for example by cognitive ability (Rokeach, 1960) social learning theory (Altemeyer, 1981) and ingroup-outgroup prejudice (Duckitt, 1989). Developments in psychometrics and statistical techniques such as computerised factor analysis have also influenced the development of research in ways that were largely inconceivable in the analysis of the original data.

Somewhat erroneously however, the definition of the authoritarian has also focused almost exclusively on the F-scale. This is despite that when reading the text it appears to be the logical outcome of the previous chapter's explorations into certain aspects of prejudice and personality. Although the F-scale was conceived to determine the anti-democratic personality, even its letter denotation implied that it was in fact an implicit measure of Fascism. Despite the actual remit of the study - to discover the anti-democratic personality - it could be argued that the primary intention was to actually reveal the Fascist, and in particular the Nazi fascist who had been attracted to Hitler's regime only a decade earlier. The authors acknowledged this, stating in the introduction that their "major concern was with the potentially fascistic individual" (Adorno et al., 1950, p.2). Also relying on specific writings, for example Adolf Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, as inspiration when writing items for the scale, it would appear little attention was paid to the many other examples of Fascistic regimes. Virtually no evidence appears that there was consideration made to other forms of autocratic systems such as Communism. In addition, the development of the much-celebrated F-scale is compounded by the early explorations into the study of anti-Semitism initially

conducted by Sanford and Levinson (1945), with careful consideration being directed towards the correlation between the two scales.

If investigative evidence of the bias in the F-scale for measuring the fascist over the anti-democratic personality, then one need look no further than one of the few studies that actually examined such individuals. British psychologist Thelma Coulter was to infiltrate a group of Sir Oswald Moseley's supporters and obtain a number of personality scales from them, as well as a comparable group of communist sympathisers (Eysenck and Coulter, 1972). The fact that the fascists obtained one of the highest mean scores on the F-scale recorded (Meloan, 1993), demonstrates somewhat, the validity of the scale. But despite these encouraging results, a spurious recording of relatively high scoring communists was to also cast doubt upon the validity of the F-Scale as a measure of pre-fascist tendencies. The untimely death of Coulter in 1953, plus Eysenck's contentious interpretation of the personality aspects of the various subjects also overshadows the impressive research. In contrast, the lowest scoring group so far, according to Meloan (1993), were a number of academics at the University of California who refused to sign a communist loyalty oath (Handlon & Squier, 1955). This bias in relation to *Fascist* anti-democracy is evident; the F-scale does not adequately capture the authoritarian of the left. Subsequently it only fulfils a percentage of the whole authoritarian model.

Of course the left-right authoritarian debate has rallied for sometime, beginning with Shils (1954), and as yet no logical conclusion has been achieved as to whether there is such a syndrome of authoritarianism of the left, i.e. the Marxist-Leninist Communist. Considerable confusion also surrounds whether it is indeed possible to classify the

authoritarian or any other political character, on such a simplistic uni-dimensional scale (e.g. Eysenck, 1954; Heaven, 1983; Kline & Cooper, 1984). It would seem prudent to re-examine the labels that are applied to the various concepts, in order to establish what has served to confuse even the most arduous reader on the subject. Leaving aside the texts prior to 1950, the original study proposed that there would be an authoritarian personality – potentially a Fascist and therefore distinctly right wing in their outlook. Recent attempts to examine the concept of the left-wing authoritarian however, have met with mixed and inconclusive results (Heil, Duriez, & Kossowitz, 2000), although research in the former USSR revealed that supposed Communists also score on a comparable level to US subjects (McFarland, 1993).

In addition to the ‘Fascist bias’, the authors paid little attention to those who were ‘middle’ scorers on their various scales, instead opting to contrast the extreme high’s and low’s (Christie, 1993). Returning to the historical observations regarding Fascism and Communism, the actual support for the parties were surprisingly low when measured as a percentage of the total population. Nazi Party membership in 1934 stood at approximately 2.5 million, and had doubled to almost 5 million two years before the advent of WWII. This implies a membership of less than 10% of the population (Brooker, 1995). Similarly, some 24,000 underground party members supported the Bolshevik revolution. The 1.3 million estimated membership of the Communist party in 1928 is surprisingly small compared to the population that exceeded 150 million (Brooker, 1995). Whilst it still remains unclear as to the actual extent that those who were not actually registered supporters of the party also had an active affinity with its ideology, there would appear to be some evidence that there exists a potentially large number of individuals in the centre who are inclined to agree

either way – the acquiescent individual who will follow the dominant trend. This is perhaps surprisingly similar to one of the major criticism levelled at the original F-scale, in not catering for those people who naturally agree with questions in their decision not to use a balanced scale.

Nor were the Berkeley group able to adequately define the authoritarian's alter ego. Adorno et al. do acknowledge the study of the anti-Fascist, however they contend that “we do study trends that stand in opposition to fascism, but we conceive that they do not constitute any single pattern...individuals who show extreme susceptibility to fascist propaganda have a great deal in common” (Adorno et al, 1950, p.1). It could as easily be argued that it is the opposite premise contains the truth - that there is in fact less in common between for example, a Communist or a Fascist, than there is between someone who would oppose either regime. The almost complete ignorance of the middle-scorer in the 1950 text (Christie, 1993) also indicates a lack of coherence in their theory. It would appear too simplistic to generalize about an entire population by merely contrasting the opposing ends of a hypothetical continuum. The exploratory work of two psychologists, Solomon Asch and Stanley Milgram, in the late 1950's and 60's on the interrelated issues of conformity and obedience, provides some experimental evidence of how attitudes and personality relate to behaviour.

3.4 Obedience and authoritarianism.

The question of obedience is a central tenet of the construction of any theory of authoritarianism. This is particularly so for the original Berkeley study, examining the seemingly incomprehensible following of the Nazi regime by what would be regarded as ‘normal’ individuals. To illustrate this point further, the contrasting impulse of

resistance is defined by Frank (1944, p.23) as “refusal to comply with a request, either verbal or behavioural.” Obedience is essentially a social behaviour, “men are not solitary but function within hierarchical structures” (Milgram, 1974, p.123) and the majority of species have evolved into such groupings to maximise their survival. Accordingly there is an advantage to the ‘disciplined militia’ over the ‘tumultuous crowd’, and it is in this organized status controlled through obedience, where success is gained over the unorganised individuals without direction or structure. Generally, obedience is regarded as complying with the requests of another, whether these are reasonable or not. But whilst obedience may be regarded as undesirable, “some system of authority is a requirement of all communal living, and it is only the man living in isolation who is not forced to respond, through defiance or submission, to the commands of others” (Milgram, 1963, p.371). The level of obedience however relies somewhat on the severity of the act one is requested to perform and is reliant on many situational elements. Milgram’s studies were to some degree inspired by the quest to understand how the seemingly ordinary German soldier could become involved in perpetuating the extermination of the Jews during the Holocaust²⁶.

Whilst Milgram’s studies have been criticised on methodological and ethical grounds²⁷, there is still no doubt that he uncovered some significant features of

²⁶ The basic procedure involved a confederate who was supposedly attached to a ‘shock’ machine and upon answering a question incorrectly, would be administered an electric shock to facilitate learning – the guise upon which the experiment was advertised. The confederate who was being shocked was concealed behind a wall out of sight of the subject. The shock machine itself was clearly labeled with the voltage and danger rating. The experiment was controlled by another confederate who’s responsibility it was to instruct the participant to deliver the punishment.

²⁷ The main criticisms of Milgram’s obedience experiments fell under three main forms: 1) the subjects were not typical - follow up studies with different populations replicated the initial results, with others finding even higher levels of obedience (Mantell & Panzarella, 1971). 2), they were aware of the experimental situation and didn’t believe the electric shocks were real – the observation of physical symptoms of anxiety indicated that the subjects believed they were administering real shocks and follow-up interviews confirmed this in the majority of subjects. 3) generalizing from the laboratory to the real world was impractical – this will always be a contentious issue, but Milgram believed that even

compliance in social situations. Summaries of Milgram's obedience experiments highlight how a significant number of subjects could be coerced into administering apparently 'lethal' electric shocks to another participant. Indeed in the first of such experiments, 65% of the volunteers that he recruited from a random sample of respondents from a newspaper advertisement, were willing to dispense the lethal '450 volt' maximum. Practically all subjects would continue up to a '300 volt' shock before refusing to continue. Three subsequent variations on this initial design included the subject being able to hear the objections of the learner to receiving a shock, the subject and victim being in the same room in sight of each other, and the 'close proximity' where at times the subject would have to physically place the respondents hand upon a 'shock plate' to receive their punishment. The percentages of those subjects who would remain totally obedient and administer the maximum shock were 62.5%, 40%, and 30% respectively.

These adaptations on the original experimental procedure served to illustrate that a particularly confounding variable of obedience was the interpersonal nature of punishment – the closer the victim to the subject, the less likely they were to continue to administer dangerous electric penalties. Milgram (1974, p.36-40) believed a number of distinct psychological processes perpetuated this reduction in obedience:

- 1) *Empathic Cues*. The presence of vocal objection serves to reinforce to the subject that his actions have direct and destructive qualities. The

though experimental situations are never exactly replicable in the real world, identifying the prominent principle was the most important aspect. The numerous variations on the initial procedure highlighted the central features of obedience and the situationally specific aspects of it. For a more detailed critique on Milgram's obedience experiments see Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Larsen, Coleman, Forbes, & Johnston, 1972; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Miller, 1995; Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove 1974).

presence of visual stimuli strengthens this knowledge. The empathic response is activated by these cues to the point where many subject become disobedient.

- 2) *Denial and narrowing of the cognitive field.* Whilst there are no visual or auditory cues as to the repercussions of the subject's obedience, the cognitive field is focused upon the task. The increase in diversion resulting from the introduction of auditory, visual, and physical signals, serves to increase the subject's cognitive appraisal away from the task.
- 3) *Reciprocal Fields.* When a victim is able to witness the subject administering punishment, the level of harm that is inflicted may diminish. Feelings of guilt or shame may reduce the desire to impose harm. Milgram likened this to the blindfolding of individuals placed in front of a firing squad, in order to lessen the psychological stress upon the executioner.
- 4) *Experienced unity of act.* Physical separation of the act and its consequences lessens the connection between the effects of behaviour.
- 5) *Incipient group formation.* The closeness of the subject and experimenter relative to the victim facilitates a relationship formed by the task in hand, compared to the isolation of the victim.

- 6) *Acquired behaviour dispositions*. Harming others in close proximity to us may often result in retaliatory behaviour. Removal of this response by physical distance or barrier may initiate this impulse.

The proximity of the victim was for Milgram the most important factor in explaining obedience. The results of his initial experiments supported this hypothesis, as it was observed that the closer the victim came to the subject the less likely they were to obey the experimenter and administer dangerous levels of punishment; “the concrete, visible, and proximal presence of the victim acted as an important way to counteract the experimenter’s power and to generate disobedience” (Milgram, 1974, p. 40). Despite the fact that many of the participants in the experiment continued to submit the victim to the highest voltage(s), they did not apparently do so without some level of tension and nervousness. Following each experiment, subjects responded on a 14-point scale as to their experiences during the procedure. At the point of maximum tension (i.e. just before they terminated the experiment), obedient subjects were shown to be slightly more nervous than their defiant counterparts. Milgram interpreted this presence of tension and nervousness as indicating conflict within the individual. Seemingly, these acts were not committed autonomously, but rather the subject was actively judging the situation and determining their own acceptable levels of participation.

Compliance alone could not reasonably be the only prominent force in the experimental situation, otherwise all subjects would have continued to the end and not experienced any identifiable anxiety. Milgram summarised this as a conflict “between the deeply ingrained disposition not to harm others and the equally compelling

tendency to obey others who are in authority” (Milgram, 1974, p.42). Cessation of this unpleasant state therefore requires some action on behalf of the individual. It must therefore be assumed that obedience is a deeply ingrained personality trait that bears upon one’s natural tendency to acquiesce in situations of moral conflict, for example in the continued infliction of harm upon others. Parallels with the authoritarian’s personality structure can be observed, whereby there is an apparent tendency to be particularly punitive towards lawbreakers and other deviants. It is assumed that maintaining the current stable social order is particularly important for these individuals, and the removal of tension in socially disorganised situations is of paramount importance. Without rules to follow and conduct to embrace, the authoritarian is burdened by psychological conflict.

Whilst it appears that there is more than a casual association between the concepts of obedience and authoritarianism, specific comparison of the two has only been partly explored. In such instances, findings have been interpreted with some apprehension. Elms and Milgram (1966) recorded a number of personality variables of participants during one of the infamous obedience experiments. Of the 160 subjects who had participated in an earlier experiment (Milgram, 1965), a sub-sample of 40 (20 ‘defiant’ and 20 ‘obedient’) was selected to participate in a follow-up study. Each subject was given amongst other instruments, the MMPI and the F-scale. Whilst there was no notable difference reported on the MMPI scales for those scoring high and low on obedience in the experimental situations, those subjects ranked as obedient did report significantly higher mean scores on the F-scale. Concerned with the effect that education may have on these scores, a number of participants who had only high-

school education (or less) were removed from the analysis. Results were still significant, with obedient subjects scoring higher on the F-scale.

The rationale behind Elms and Milgram's (1966) study was not to provide evidence for the existence of the authoritarian personality. Rather the results of the study were analysed in accordance with attempting to uncover a number of personality variables that might signify obedience. Numerous parallels had been drawn between these two concepts however. For example, the developmental nature of highly obedient subjects is interpreted from within a psychoanalytical perspective, with the influence of parental discipline being of major prominence. The lack of closeness to one's father is another common developmental variable between the fields of obedience and authoritarianism. Although a note of caution is expressed, in that "although in a number of instances obedient Ss displayed characteristics similar to those of high scorers in *The Authoritarian Personality*,²⁸ several obedient Ss appeared to have warm relationships with family and associates" (Elms & Milgram, 1966, p.288). As noted by Frenkel-Brunswick (1954), the study of childhood antecedents to behaviours such as obedience, prejudice, and specifically authoritarianism seldom follow a uniform pattern and should therefore be interpreted with diligence and care. It was concluded that the existence of obedience or defiance "does not reveal a single personality pattern which is inevitably expressed in one behaviour or another" (Elms & Milgram, 1966, p.288). There were therefore probably more factors to consider in the constitution of obedient or defiant behaviour, outside of these two simple categories.

²⁸ Italics in original.

Despite the concerns of Milgram & Elms (1966), the results involving the F-scale and obedience do provide a useful relationship to explore, albeit an experimental one from nearly four decades ago. The obvious question that arises from reviewing such literature, is one of *how* such information can be interpreted, in both a historical sense and from within the current research paradigm. Critics of Milgram's obedience studies have been quick to highlight the obvious importance that must be allied to the experimental situation in particular (see Kelman & Hamilton, 1989; Larsen, Coleman, Forbes, & Johnston, 1972; Lerner, Goldberg, & Tetlock, 1998; Miller, 1995; Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove 1974). The limitations of *The Authoritarian Personality* and in particular the F-scale (Adorno et al., 1950) have been previously examined in detail and require no further elaboration. Whilst the validity of the theory and its subsequent instruments have been discredited, others such as Meehan (1993) have been able to convincingly argue that there is a certain level of validity in the F-scale as a *general* measure of authoritarianism. Whilst the F-scale may not be able to accurately identify *the* authoritarian, it is assumed that it does at least measure *some* aspects of authoritarianism. Hence, while any results bearing its involvement must be interpreted with caution, it nevertheless should not be regarded as of being void of any utility entirely.

The above limitations for the adaptability of the results in the current context must be acknowledged, but this does not imply that there is no empirical validity to their usage. At the very least they provide an illustrative example of the various correlates that can emerge in the study of authoritarianism. If the results were taken at face value, one could easily assert that people who are classified as possessing an authoritarian personality are also highly obedient. This would be in accord with the

theoretical underpinnings of the quest to uncover the mainstream appeal of Fascism, and in particular the abhorrent activity of its members in the case of the Third Reich by Adorno et al. (1950). Without apportioning causality, it is a simple step to understanding the behaviour of such individuals within any given coercive situation. Identifying the developmental sources is a further task. What it also provides is a context and highly representative example of just what authoritarianism is, or at the very least, a feature of it. Authoritarian submission is a central component of the Berkeley group's nine traits, and an even more prominent feature in the three facets of Altemeyer's RWA theory. It gives credibility to the claim that the authoritarian personality is constituted in part to an element of submissive or obedient behaviour to a perceived authority figure.

Regrettably for the immediate discussion, experiments such as those conducted by Milgram and his colleagues are no longer ethically acceptable. Hence the possibility of being able to address the limitations and considerations that have been suggested are unrealisable. Altemeyer attempted to replicate the obedience situation in a similar, but less extreme experimental conditions (Altemeyer, 1981). In addition, Altemeyer included an element of prejudice to his study, by making the confederate appear to be Jewish in some variations of the experimental procedure. He was to confirm his earlier assumptions that the right-wing authoritarian was not particularly selective in their choice of minority with which to discriminate against. The measures included a number of authoritarian scales, and there was an overall positive correlation with authoritarianism and desire to punish. The F-scale was found to correlate .33 with all the naïve subjects, and .43 with the RWA-scale. Altemeyer calculated that RWA-scale scores accounted for 17% to 20% of the variance in punishment. Despite the

inclusion of an experimental manipulation by including the confederates who were to be of Jewish appearance, he concluded “authoritarianism is not just related to aggression against minority groups and social deviants, but will be related to that against ‘ordinary people’ as well if it is sanctioned by authority” (Altemeyer, 1981, p.201).

Methodologically, Altemeyer’s experiment is not as sophisticated as Milgram’s (1963) research design. In particular, the visible proximity of the ‘learner’ was shown to significantly affect the willingness to administer a shock. Altemeyer also concedes that not only were 12 members of the subject pool (which were screened out) aware of Milgram’s experiments, but a further 26 were also dropped as they were conscious of the experimental situation. It is feasible that the scientific rigour was somewhat compromised in Altemeyer’s replication and in addition that many of the criticisms directed at Milgram were also valid (see Miller, 1995; Miller, Gillen, Schenker, & Radlove 1974). Nevertheless, the results do provide support for the obedient nature of the authoritarian.

Elms (1972) explains the link between authoritarianism and *actual* obedient behaviour:

The relationship between obedience and some elements of authoritarianism seems fairly strong; and it should be remembered that the measure of obedience is a measure of actual submission to authority, *not just what a person is likely to do*²⁹. Too much research on

²⁹ Emphasis added.

authoritarianism has been on the level of paper-and-pencil responses, which don't necessarily get translated into behaviour. But here we have people either obeying or refusing the demands of authority, in a realistic and highly disturbing situation. (p.133)

It seems reasonable to infer from the studies such as those by Milgram & Elms, that there is some validity in the claim that authoritarian's display obedience to a supposed higher order. In their conclusion, Elms & Milgram (1966) report on some answers to the open-ended questions from one particularly highly obedient subject, that he recalled a statement from his grandfather, which was that "one should take and carry out an order whether one believed it was right or wrong, as long as the person giving it was in authority to give it" (p.288). Such a statement would seem to exemplify the standpoint of the authoritarian with regards to rationalizing the submissive and obedient behaviours they are purported to possess.

3.5 The authoritarian as a conformist.

The study of social influence is deeply indebted to the works of many, but in particular social psychologist Solomon Asch (1907-1996). In 1951, the results of an ingenious experiment designed to measure the pressure of a group situation upon an individual judgement were reported. Some five years later, the much cited journal article appeared in *Psychological Monographs*, which reported many permutations upon these original experiments (Asch, 1956). Asch's general research paradigm was not social influence as many believe, but was more concerned with the independence of judgement. Specifically, it was designed to "create a conflict between personal and social reality and thereby increase the likelihood that participants would respond

independently” (Levine, 1999, p.358). Participants were not under any explicit demand to conform, as they received no physical or verbal coercion to do so. The specific hypotheses centred on the idea of witnessing “directly the interaction between individuals and groups when the paramount issue is that of remaining independent or submitting to social pressure” (Asch, 1956, p.451).

The experiments were quite simple, in that there was a seemingly innocuous task to be performed – namely the estimation of the lengths of a line when compared to two others of different length (See Fig. 3.2).




Fig. 3.1: Judgment lines in Asch’s conformity experiment (Asch, 1956).

When control subjects were asked which of the two lines were of the same length, the majority (over 99%) responded correctly A & D. The experiment wasn’t a test of visual perception and the introduction of other participants to exert group influence upon the experimental subject, served to illustrate this phenomenon. However, the main interest to Asch was whether or not the subject would alter his view in light of disagreement with those others present. Confirmation would be illustrated by subjects

essentially not believing their own eyes and conforming to the group norm in judging the similarity of line length.

Overall, Asch discovered that approximately a quarter of subject's responses were independent, i.e. they judged the line length correctly when the majority did not. Another third of the subjects went along with the majority for most of the trials and never indicated any real independence of judgement. The remaining percentage conformed on some trials and not on others, but the vast majority of participants conformed to the group situation at least once. The results have been interpreted by some as being inconclusive due to this variation in responses (see Friend, Rafferty, and Bramel, 1990). But when compared to the two percent who misjudged the line length outside of the experimental procedure, then the degree of conformity in social situations becomes highly significant.

The tendency to conform was seen as being influenced by many factors, including intelligence and gender. In particular authoritarianism was identified as one psychological variable that could influence subjects tendency to conform. Crutchfield (1955) carried out a variation on Asch's experiment using lights to signify the judgement of others. In contrast to Asch, Crutchfield's subjects were placed in individual booths and pressed a button to respond; also being informed they were the last participants to judge. Differences in intelligence and authoritarianism were recorded; the least intelligent and most authoritarian were likely to incorrectly judge the lengths of the lines. These differences are all the more apparent when the comparison is made between the public and private responses in the two experiments.

Such results indicate the relationship between authoritarianism and conformity as being particularly salient.

In support of the social influence aspect of the presence of others, Milgram (1974) also conducted obedience experiments to test how obedient subjects would behave in attendance with defiant participants. The seventeenth variation on his obedience experiments saw Milgram introduce two confederates to the situation. The naïve subject is seated at the shock machine along with two others who are aware of the circumstances of the test. As the shock levels rise, each of the confederates revokes their participation. When each naïve subject is left alone to continue the experiment, only 10% remain completely obedient and administer the maximum shock. This is in contrast to the 65% who did so without the presence of rebellious peers. Indeed four of the participants directly attributed their defiance to the actions of the others, stating,

...the thought of stopping didn't enter my mind until it was put there by the other two...The reason that I quit was that I did not want to seem callous and cruel in the eyes of the other two men who had already refused to go on with the experiment. (Milgram, 1974, p.120)

Along with instilling the *idea* of defiance, Milgram also identified other influences that the presence of rebellious peers contributed to the situation. Besides not knowing that they could actually refuse, many subjects were unaware of the consequences of their non-cooperation. They were also seen as providing social confirmation that giving electronic shocks was iniquitous, and the continued presence in the laboratory of the confederates re-enforces this disapproval. In addition, the responsibility of the

act is dispersed between the three participants initially and also the very act of defiance diminishes the perceived authority of the experimenter³⁰. The group situation therefore plays an in important part in the likelihood of somebody conforming.

Many further permutations of these experiments could have been conducted, but it would have been perhaps most interesting to observe how the presence of highly obedient confederates would have influenced the behaviour of the naïve subject in a reversal of the procedure in experiment seventeen. Had the confederates continued to administer shocks, it seems likely that the subject would have also. Without the suggestion of defiance, many seemingly continue to obey. The removal of the defiant confederates from the laboratory may have also negated the disapproval effect of their continued presence.

One specific example of conformist behaviour and authoritarianism, is recounted by Chan (1985) in her study of the *Children of Mao*. Interviews with refugees from the Cultural Revolution, displayed the highly authoritarian nature of their personalities in the spirit of Adorno et al. During the revolution itself, this kind of personality structure became dominant amongst Mao's supporters. Rather than the family being the source of such attitudes, Chan believed that the school was the primary product of this "political socialization" (Chan, 1985, p.207). This view also ties in with the social learning aspect of authoritarianism proposed by Altemeyer (1981). However, the most interesting facet of Chan's analysis surrounds the notion that once the individual was removed from the social environment that encouraged such behaviour, the

³⁰ The presence of a distinct authority figure was shown to be a central feature of the obedience situations, and experiment 13 in the series saw this person replaced with an 'ordinary' instructor. The removal of authoritative control served to reduce the obedience effect quite dramatically with not one subject administering the maximum shock (Milgram, 1974).

authoritarian side of their character diminished considerably. Lewis (1990) also identifies this point as being a significant feature of authoritarianism. Specifically,

...when people grow up within a particular system, they learn to assume that the system is the expected norm. Learning through observation and imitation, most people internalize the dominant attitudes of the socio-political culture (or at least the sub-culture they experience). If they happen to grow up in an authoritarian milieu, the learning of authoritarian attitudes does not require any deep-seated emotional needs. This is probably one of the reasons why it is so difficult to change a political system which is authoritarian in its character. (p.163)

Compliance and the pressure to conform are seen as strong bonds that are near universal in most forms of social life and play an important role in regulating our behaviour.

Allport (1954) was one of the first to highlight some of the basic psychology involved in conformity. Whereas some have assumed a biological basis for prejudice (Eaves & Eysenck, 1974), this view has since been largely discredited (see Duckitt, 1992, 1994). Although the universality of prejudicial attitudes in some groups and societies makes this *appear* inherited, according to Allport it is actually learned behaviour. The almost Darwinian nature of conformity in some cultures practically ensures that prejudice is prominent and persistent. The process of *identification* – the emotional attachment to the in-group – necessitates conformity to collective norms and values.

The acquisition of these values and attitudes is facilitated through learning and reinforced through the reward of group membership.

Many theories surrounding social processes and inter/intra group behaviour have developed. In particular, the work of Sherrif (1966) and Tajfel and Turner (1979) has spurred a plethora of research in this field. Similar studies specifically related to the study of social influence, such as the work of Moscovici and Personnaz (2001), extend the exploration into the circumstances involving the majority/minority pressure to conform. Whilst Asch had been able to highlight the power that a majority could exert over a minority, Moscovici and Personnaz were more concerned with the question of minority influence and identified two major reasons for this occurrence³¹. Firstly, the consistency of a judgement by a minority can become overriding in its intensity. In such situations only minimal attention is being placed upon the stimulus itself, hence once the social interaction is over there is little incongruence in judgement. Secondly, the minority can also influence the majority by casting doubt upon their perceptual beliefs and making the agreement with the seemingly mistaken minority appear deviant. In private, the majority members begin to assess the stimulus differently, in line with the minority's atypical response. Moscovici & Personnaz (2001) believe these to be the main reasons why "minorities generally have a greater influence on the private than on the public response" (p.290). Furthermore, they state that,

³¹ Whereas Asch used the judgment of line length to test conformity, Moscovici & Personnaz used what is called a chromatic afterimage projector. The different colour slides are removed to reveal a 'natural' after-image which is always the same. However, the original image remains in the peripheral view and casts some doubt upon the projected shade. It can be seen as a much more subtle method of assessing social influence in the spirit of Asch's original experiments. Whilst this technology may increase the salience of such research, it has also been argued that the increased complexity may simply result in a distortion of judgment.

...minority and majority influence are different processes, the former producing mostly public submissiveness without private acceptance...and the latter producing primarily changes in private responses. These processes called compliance and conversion, are mutually exclusive and to a certain extent, opposite. (p.296)

Conformity is a multi-faceted syndrome and subsequently even the slightest variations in the experimental situation have been shown to impact on results. Hence its definition and measurement can be difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, the issue of conforming is pertinent to the study of social psychological variables and authoritarianism.

In experimental situations of conforming to the majority and obedience to an authority figure, Asch and Milgram demonstrated that there are many people who will behave in a manner that adheres to the hypothesised experimental situation. Asch discovered that in a simple task of judging the length of some lines that 37 of the 50 subjects (approx. 75%), would at least once conform to the majority response (Asch, 1955). Similarly, some 30% of Milgram's subjects were willing to dispense 'lethal' shocks to wrongdoers on the instructions of the authoritative experimenter; this was found to be even higher in some situations (Milgram, 1965). The lack of attention that has been paid to articles such as Elms & Milgram (1965) is perhaps a reflection of *how* to fit such findings into the authoritarian paradigm. The confusion of the existing theory(s) serves to no doubt confound such matters.

3.6 Experimental and Actuarial Evidence.

Allowing for the considerable ethical and social restraints involved in social science research, and in particular those experiments involving the simulated manipulation and coercion of participants, the overall result has been to severely limit the extent of investigation into areas such as authoritarianism. Despite these concerns, the field has continued to grow and perhaps quite sensibly, has also begun to draw upon wider evidence to support the theory. Notwithstanding the tenuous links that some have drawn from social situations, it is again perhaps the lack of a coherent theory that limits their interpretation with regards to authoritarianism and prevents a satisfactory conclusion from being drawn.

For the study of authoritarianism, the notions of morality have a significant role. Whilst behaviour can be adapted and controlled by punishment, it serves little in the way of developing moral thinking. Indeed, those who have been repeatedly exposed to punishment as a behaviour inhibitor will often fail to advance to the post-conventional stage of reasoning. For such individuals, reproach is the accepted form of behaviour control and their behaviour will reflect this and also more importantly, the sanctions upon which they impose on other rule violators will be indicative of this. The punitive nature of the authoritarian could easily stem from this nurtured belief in the role that rules and laws play on members of a society. Hence the conviction that it is not being caught breaking a rule, that is the most significant aspect of regulation. Human rights are of less importance to these individuals than the upholding of the law, as it is seen to only be the principle of detection that differentiates rule-breakers from non-rule breakers. High levels of punitive sanctions imposed upon rule violators

are then justified and any mitigating circumstances are seldom identified or taken into account.

Indeed Smith (1950) in his initial review of *The Authoritarian Personality*, attempted to delineate his own conception of the authoritarian. Alongside the presupposition of a weak and dependent individual, Smith believed that,

His judgements are governed by a punitive conventional moralism, reflecting external standards in which he remains insecure since he has failed to make them really his own. (Smith, 1950, p.776)

The similarity with Kohlberg's lower stages of moral reasoning is glaringly apparent. The democratic processes that man has internalised are according to Lind et al. (1981), a reflection of his capacity to engage in moral behaviour (p.70). As part of an extensive investigation into moral judgement, Ego strength and democratic orientations, Lind et al. hypothesise that,

Conscious adherence to democratic values would correlate with moral-cognitive structure...they would support a reduction of social inequality – even at the expense of material wealth – show less preference for lower stage reasoning. This can be taken as an indicator of higher moral development. (p.96)

Therefore Lind et al. are proposing that those who are more openly democratic in their outlook will be regarded as also attaining a higher and presumable more desirable

level of moral development – as measured through Kohlberg’s six stages. The results of their study did provide some support for their hypothesis, in that those subjects with “humanistic and democratic orientations show the clearest preference order of the six stages of moral orientation” (p.96); with the opposite premise also being accepted in that those disagreeing with democratisation, showing less discrimination between the stages.

However, Lind et al.’s results must be interpreted with some caution. Firstly, his sample consists of 708 German high school graduates and is perhaps therefore not homogenous with the stage development progression as proposed by Kohlberg (1963). Nor would it seemingly be generalizable to other populations. Secondly, the measure of democracy is constructed from a number of questions that had been abstracted from various other measures developed for the measurement of *Egalitarian Values*, *Humanism*, *Democratisation*, and *Participation*. No complete scale is reported in the appendices or notes, but it would appear that the scale consists of only six items. Despite the claim that this scale is a “first step in testing the relation of abstract democratic convictions” (p. 89), no reliability composites are reported and only cursory mention of the work of others in this area in relation to where some of the scale items originated (e.g. Tompkins, 1965; Sandberger, 1979). Despite acknowledging the Adorno et al. concept in the introduction, it seems curious that no such measure of authoritarianism was included; not even a single item from the F-scale. Consequently, Lind et al.’s definition and interpretation of democracy may at best be unreliable and its conclusions necessitate a thorough examination.

A further note of warning must also be extended to Lind et al.'s definition of what constitutes moral behaviour. Whilst adopting the theoretical stance of the six-stage theory of Kohlberg (1963), Lind et al. adopt a slight variation upon this explanation of moral competence, stating that it is the consistency of the judgement that is important rather than the preferred stage. By computing indices to measure this consistency, it is stated that it is largely impossible to be witness to a subject who can 'fake upwards', i.e. select the higher stages of morality with any constancy. Comparison between stage preference and stage consistency have been examined by Rest, Thoma, and Edwards (1997) where they report that the former outperforms the latter, although the stage consistency approach was regarded as being reliable. So while the results of Lind et al. may shed some light on the correlation between morality and authoritarianism, it should not be regarded as providing a concrete relationship.

Whilst the Lind et al. study has received little recognition in the authoritarian literature, another similar study that utilizes the same theoretical field of inquiry has also been largely overlooked. Comparing moral judgement, authoritarianism and ethnocentrism, van Ijzendoorn (1989) discovered significant correlations between the stages of moral judgement and authoritarianism using a sample of 126 Dutch university students. Authoritarianism was however measured in this instance by a revised 14-item version of the F-scale that had been translated into Dutch. The scales had been previously validated and an Alpha reliability of .86 was reported. Kohlberg's six stages were again the basis for judging moral reasoning and are assessed using a test referred to as the *Sociomoral Reflection Objective Measure* (SROM) developed by Gibbs, Arnold, Morgan, Schwartz, Gavaghan, and Tappan (1984). In a similar manner to the Moral Judgement Test (Lind et al., 1981), each

participant has to respond to a number of dilemmas, which are perceived to indicate moral stage preference. A 16-item measure of ethnocentrism constructed by De Jong & Van der Toorn (1984) was also included in the test battery.

It is assumed by van Ijzendoorn (1989) that authoritarianism results from problematic moral development and in particular that the,

...background of stage theory, authoritarian conventionalism, submission, and aggression toward weak elements could be interpreted as a stagnation in the development of moral reasoning. (p.38)

Therefore it is hypothesised that the less authoritarian subjects will reason at a higher level of moral judgement, although it is only the authoritarian elements of conventionalism, submission and aggression which are considered in this analysis. Nevertheless, the results indicate that there is the hypothesised negative correlation between authoritarianism and moral reasoning stage (-.36) and that “lower moral judgement level is related to a more authoritarian attitude, and a higher moral judgement level to a more anti-authoritarian perspective” (p.41). Interestingly, ethnocentrism, whilst still correlating in the expected direction compared to moral reasoning stage, is significantly weaker than authoritarianism (-.19). This suggests that whilst the two concepts may be extrinsically linked, they are not part of the same syndrome or process, despite the ‘significant’ correlation between the two (.52). Replicating the study with 88 Dutch high-school students subsequently discovered higher correlations.

Despite some encouraging results, the interpretation by van Ijzendoorn (1989) is unable to explain in any concrete manner why such a phenomena may exist and tentatively suggests that the link between moral development and authoritarianism may provide a useful alternative to the psychodynamic theory upon which it has traditionally been based. Rather it would appear that as “no proposals have been put forward to revise, or at least supplement, the theoretical foundation of the authoritarian syndrome” (p.44) and therefore that the findings of the study are not in accordance with the theoretical review initially proposed. However, referring to this evaluation of the basis of authoritarian behaviour, van Ijzendoorn (1989) postulates that,

Obedience to powerful individual or groups is a characteristic of the first stages of moral development...authoritarian traits are presumed to correlate to lower stages moral judgement, whereas anti-authoritarian traits would characterize higher stages of moral judgement. (p.38)

Stating that context bound variables across cultures prevents any generalizability of this theory; the explicit link between obedience and authoritarianism is unfortunately not elaborated upon further. Nevertheless, the relationship between authoritarianism and morality shows some distinct similarities, particularly in the developmental processes.

3.7 Authoritarian Model.

Using these documented historical figures, and evidence from the experimental psychological work, a new theoretical model for the understanding and study of the

authoritarian personality can be attempted. Avoiding reference to specific ideological proposals and adopting a less dichotomous definition than the Adorno et al. proposal, serves to further our understanding of the development of authoritarian states. The Berkeley group writing their thesis only a matter of years following the atrocities of WWII could not ignore the cultural and historical climate under which they were attempting to understand and explain. As a result, their concept of the anti-democratic individual was an actor or sympathiser with Nazi Germany and a committed anti-Semite.

The model proposes a relatively uni-dimensional depiction of *authoritarianism*, being defined by the opposite poles of *egalitarianism* versus *totalitarianism*. It is conceivable that neither of these divergent constructs is necessarily attainable, but is instead an imaginable illustration of the archetype situations. Clearly, in a real-life political situation these percentages may be somewhat arbitrary, as well as the overlap between the two experimental concepts. Whilst this model is attempting to provide a relatively unique concept of authoritarianism, it is important to recall that there are a significant number of correlates that aid in its inception.

Essentially where the current model differs from those of Adorno et al., Altemeyer, and others, is that it attempts to take the theoretical notions that characterise authoritarianism and relate them together into a coherent account which can be observed through behavioural correlates. For example, it has been proposed that authoritarians are particularly aggressive, especially against those who deviate from the norm. This has been highlighted in research conducted in the punitive behaviour of authoritarian jurors and suggests that people's ability to adopt their own notions of

acceptable behaviour are significant correlates with this; whether it be labelled morality or otherwise. In addition, the occurrence of authoritarian submission is remarkably easy to illustrate within the conformity paradigm. Conformists are people who conceivably alter their behaviour in line with what they perceive to be the dominant or acceptable notion of that moment. It is accepted that conformity and obedience may have alternative explanations, for example fear, but that they are imperative to the understanding of authoritarianism.

It should also be noted that these concepts are far from being distinct and hypothesised to be interrelated significantly. It is however the emphasis that the two concepts provide that allows the theoretical underpinnings of authoritarianism to emerge. In addition, the basis for arriving at this conceptualisation is not rooted in the abstract notions that guided, for example the Adorno et al. study, with its emphasis on anti-Semitism. In contrast it takes behaviours that were shown to correlate with these previous studies and explain their occurrence as an aspect *of* authoritarianism. In addition, the instruments that are used to measure these occurrences developed independently of instruments that purport to measure authoritarianism. This has a significant implication for the ‘data driven’ theories that have stifled the evolution of the study of authoritarianism (Feldman, 2003). With the luxury of hindsight, it is to some extent possible to learn from the ‘mistakes’ of others, whilst still acknowledging their merits.




Fig 3.2: Egalitarian-Totalitarian Model of Authoritarianism.

1 – Authoritarianism:

The first of the dimensions labelled on the diagram is the concept that we are trying to define, understand, and ultimately measure. Traditionally, the concept of authoritarianism was related with an element of political conservatism (Adorno et al., 1950). This reflected the simplistic view that authoritarianism was linked with conservative ideology; presumably the opposing libertarian viewpoint was non-authoritarian. However, this should not be confused with the 'anti-authoritarian.' Specifically, the anti-authoritarian was to be further argued to be an opposing dimension between left-wing, liberal political views, and right-wing conservative ideology. It has been proposed that there may be authoritarians of the 'left' and 'right' (e.g. Shils, 1954; Eysenck, 1954; Barker, 1963; Stone & Smith, 1993). There is still however intense debate as to whether the opposing ideologies of Fascism and Communism exemplify these distinctions.

3 – Political Ideology:

There are many propositions as to how the differing political doctrines reflect social organisation. By far the most common in the Western political sphere is the liberal-conservative dimension, conceivably separated to a degree (and also dependent on other issues) on their embrace of social change. What is conceived here is that there are those who are committed to social order, whereby the governing body is responsible for all policy regarding the behaviour of its citizens. Conversely, there is still regard for the autonomy of human behaviour within the wider constraints of what is regarded as society. This is however not to be confused with any disposition to rebellion or anarchy, but rather that individual liberty is regarded above all else. The principles of democracy would be regarded as a relative safeguard to liberty.

4 – *Political Involvement:*

The first 25% labelled *Autonomous*, represent those who are committed to liberal, all-encompassing society whereby individual freedom is prized above all. Support for the existence of such a personality comes from the experimental endeavours of Asch (1955), whereby there were a number of people who were unsusceptible to the coercive effects of the experimental situation. How these individuals would fare in a ‘real-life’ situation remains unclear, but it goes some way to answering the criticisms regarding the relationship between attitudes and behaviour (e.g. Brown, 1965; Ray, 1984) and the lack of experimental evidence for authoritarianism.

The opposing 30% constitute primarily those who in Milgram’s (1965) study were willing to adhere to the demands of the experimenter, i.e. the ‘fully’ obedient individual. Amongst this fraction, it is hypothesised there exist approximately 10% who are deemed to be active political actors in the totalitarian regime, as mentioned previously in relation to one-party political movements (Brooker, 1995). It is conceivable that in discussions on authoritarianism, those are the people who are generally being referred to, i.e. the high and low scorers on any given measure.

The remaining 45% are defined in this model as being politically *acquiescent*, abiding by whichever political climate that may be experiencing dominance at any one time. A study of former SS officers and Third Reich soldiers was to indicate that the former were significantly more authoritarian, and this was some twenty years after the war (Steiner & Fahrenberg, 1970a; 1970b). Results such as this indicate that there is significantly more authoritarianism the more people become involved in the process.

4 – Conformity:

Although Asch conducted many variations on his novel test of conformity, and whilst it has been criticised as being too simplistic to accurately represent *true* conformist behaviour (Friend, Rafferty, & Bramel, 1990), his experiment has stood the test of time and examination. In relation to authoritarianism, conformity is argued in this sense as the adherence to social norms, and in particular the social norms of the dominant group or authorities. This corresponds to the rigidity of personality that is characteristic of the authoritarian. Studies have shown that the more conformist subjects in Asch style experiments were also high scorers on the F-scale (Crutchfield, 1950). Christie (1993) has identified the rigidity paradigm as being one of the two major experimental achievements in relation to authoritarianism.

5 – Obedience:

The infamous experiments of Stanley Milgram in the 1960's are more likely to be referenced in relation to the ethical conduct of psychologists than they are in connection to obedience in recent years, but the intuitive and sometimes brutal situations that were manipulated by Milgram provide a valuable insight into the psychology of obedience.

Surprisingly there has been little reference to these notions with regards to *The Authoritarian Personality*, with the exception of Elms & Milgram (1966) and numerous anecdotal citations, perhaps due to some spurious correlations concerning

the two. In the experimental situations, 20 fully obedient and 20 defiant subjects were selected to complete a number of personality inventories. Although there was little discernible difference between the two groups on instruments such as the MMPI, analysis of scores for the F-scale showed a significant difference between the two; with obedient subjects scoring higher and vice versa (Elms & Milgram, 1966). The authors do attempt an elaborate analysis of the varying measures, rather than focusing on such a notable result, however their remit concerned the more general aspect of obedience as opposed to authoritarianism.

6 – In-group/Out-group:

The final supposition concerns the phenomena of ingroup-outgroup involvement, which has been hypothesised and illustrated in social psychology for many years. Adorno et al. (1950) hypothesised such behaviour in relation to prejudice and projection of undesirable attitudes. Recent examination of the area has shown significant correlates with levels of authoritarianism (Duckitt, 1998). The argument proposes that the rigidity of the authoritarian's thinking seeks refuge in the combined actions of the stable in-group; the opposing alternative being the undesirable and stereotypical traits of the out-group. In contrast to the psychodynamic aspects of projection, Duckitt follows Altemeyer's theoretical social and cognitive learning ideas to explain the relevance of the divide.

The Authoritarian Personality provides at best a subjective account towards the definition of such a character, and subsequent researchers have partially inherited this bias in their quest for a more valid definition of the concept. It can be witnessed that

many of the proposals that have sought to undermine this, or else rectify some of the anomalies in the original proposal have (possibly with the exception of Altemeyer), been undermined through the critical focus on minor issues (e.g. Elms & Milgram, 1966; Eysenck & Coulter, 1972). This unwillingness to progress beyond the writings of the Berkeley group would appear some 50 plus years later, to only hinder the development of the field. As one of the original authors concedes some years later, it is “theoretically inappropriate to speak of general authoritarianism as a structure or as a broad continuum along which individuals vary” (O’Neil & Levinson, 1972, p.461). From this reflection, the perspective upon which the authoritarian personality research has been guided for over half a century appears be erroneous.

Whilst the egalitarian-totalitarian distinction may prove to be overly simplistic, it also seems pointless to relegate the concept of authoritarianism into the realms of obscurity. This is despite the somewhat mistaken label that was applied to the original publication and the subsequent failure of contemporary researchers to provide an accurate picture in the 50 years since. Events in very recent times once again point to the need to cement our understanding of the personality of the antidemocratic individual.

To simplify this argument and the previous diagram into a conceptual research question, it can be witnessed that there is there are essentially two main elements that form the authoritarian equation – conformity and obedience. The relevance of these two variables has been expanded upon, but can be summarized as:

- Conformity in this instance is the *adherence to overall majority consensus*,
- Obedience is the *desire to punish these non-conformers*.

It will be illustrated with reference to experimental evidence how these two aspects of authoritarianism fit within the current hypothesised theory.

Conformity was shown by Asch (1955) to be essentially a social phenomenon. In experimental conditions, the presence of a group majority influenced the responses of the minority to a considerable degree. Comparing high and low ‘conformers’ on the F-scale, it was discovered that and as expected, the most authoritarian subjects were also the most conformist (Crutchfield, 1950). Returning to the response set issues that have been a feature of authoritarian research since its inception in 1950, a distinct parallel can easily be identified. There is a tendency to agree regardless of the content of the stimulus is evident in both situations. It appears that conformity is the desire to simply agree or else covet the majority. Whilst some may point to the fact that it is the pressure of the group that distinguishes between the two phenomena, there is a degree of social significance in responding to stimuli, even in apparently anonymous personality inventories.

Authoritarian behaviour has been identified as being a negative trait (Edwards, 1957). Hence there is the requirement to either disguise its existence in the public sense, or else the denial of its existence within oneself. The issue of conformity is akin to the rigidity of thinking that has been proposed during authoritarian research and describes the way in which these kind of people have difficulty in comprehending and

responding to new information (e.g. Rokeach, 1960). Conformity in this sense is synonymous with *social desirability*. And it is this relationship which is suggested to be a major feature of authoritarianism. Whether denial of a trait is internally or externally rejected, is assumed to be high for those with authoritarian dispositions.

Obedience can be conceptualised as the following of others demands or orders. Milgram (1965) was able to command volunteers in a university laboratory to administer – what was in all reality – lethal electric shocks to a third party. To some extent Milgram was able to provide evidence as to why ‘rank-and-file’ Nazi soldiers were compelled to commit genocide. Despite the shortcomings and criticisms surrounding his research, it highlighted that the presence of one or more experimental variables was sufficient to elicit such behaviour. Tests conducted with the volunteers prior to the experimental procedure indicated that highly obedient subjects were the most authoritarian scorers on the F-scale (Elms & Milgram, 1966). But whilst Milgram’s experiments are most commonly referenced with regards to obedience, it can justly be applied to the notion of *punishment of wrongdoers*. It is the adherence to rules and the punitive aspects of personality that characterise this element of authoritarianism. Studies comparing authoritarianism and Kohlberg’s stages of morality have shown that the higher scorers favour the lower, crime-punishment stages and are less likely to consider individual reasons for law breaking (see Lind, 1985).

Marrying these two ideas of social desirability and punishment of wrongdoers together under the banner of authoritarianism, make it possible to show how the two concepts begin to diverge. The in-group/out-group discussion of Duckitt (1989) is

pertinent to understanding the context of how these variables fit together. It was proposed that it is the attachment to the in-group that creates the conflict with the out-group, and hence it *is* this identification with the in-group that causes authoritarian behaviour. This may appear slightly contentious, as it is proposed that it is the actual personality of the individual within this group context that signifies authoritarian behaviour. In order for the group to form a cohesive structure, it is necessary for there to be certain rules and acceptable modes of conduct for the members to adhere to – i.e. a *socially* (in the sense of a group being a social entity) *desirable* way of behaving. It is necessary for members of the particular group to *conform* to these predetermined regulations in order to be part of the collective.

However, there will often be occasion when conformity is not being followed and for it to be necessary to attend to such occurrences. In some groups, the structure will be organised in such a way that mere expulsion will be possible. However in many situations it will be necessary to reprimand such non-conformers. It is here that the obedient nature of the authoritarian will determine what sanctions must be directed at such individuals. With reference to the nature of group structure, there is a hypothesised link between the level of conformity and obedience and how authoritarian the group is, essentially being a function of these two variables.

There has been a significant drive in the past two decades to develop alternative theories of authoritarianism. Whilst much of the literature preceding the publication of the Adorno et al. (1950) study was concerned with addressing many of the methodological issues, there has been little departure from the original concept with regards to developing a more coherent theory. The question of authoritarian behaviour

being related to conformity however is not new. Fromm (1941) and Adorno et al. (1950) make explicit reference to the conventionalism that is prominent in the authoritarian's behaviour. A significant number of other researchers have also recognised this link (Crutchfield, 1955; Davis, 1975; Scodel & Mussen, 1953; Vaughan & White, 1966). Specifically, the situational determinants of authoritarianism have revealed the desire on behalf of authoritarians to adopt the predominant ideology. Cross-cultural examinations of authoritarianism have revealed it to be a relatively enduring feature in many such social investigations, although minor regional and international differences do occur (Christie & Garcia, 1951; Cohn & Carsch, 1954; Duckitt, 1983; Koomen, 1974; Meade, 1985; Ray, 1979; Rump, 1985; Stankov, 1977; Williams, 1966).

The ideas of Feldman (2003) also have applicability in defining this concept. In particular, the social conformity/autonomy dimension which he proposes. His analysis does become confusing, and is in part contradiction with the disdain that Feldman expressed for the 'data driven' theories that have signified the majority of research on authoritarianism for the last five decades. There are also some tenuous suppositions relating the concepts and the bearing that the results have on them. For example,

The social threat items have little or nothing to do with politics and make no reference to the threat from right-wing groups. In fact, people who score high on this scale are likely to be concerned about immigration and social change, just the sorts of issues a right-wing group would champion (Feldman, 2003, p.61).

A further example of the possible irrationality of this measurement is the specific focus on Black people in the measure of prejudice used. This subsequently requires that “Black respondents were excluded from this part of the analysis” (Feldman, 2003, p.61). It is therefore only to be assumed that this conformity-autonomy model does in fact adhere to a distinct form of authoritarianism. It is suggested that this could perhaps be the ‘white nationalist’ conservative.

One such example of the influence of conformity is in the studies of Ageyev and his colleagues (McFarland, Ageyev, & Abalakina, 1993) in post-communist Russia. If it can be assumed that authoritarianism exists in such a society as illustrated by scores on the F-scale, then it would be surprising that what was assumed to be a predominantly Fascist trait should also be present in another such culture. As argued in *Chapter Three*, the concept of authoritarianism is applicable to many styles of rule, not just those that are right-wing in ideology. Totalitarian or authoritarian regimes exist in many countries and not just in relation to government – many religions and activist groups are just as encompassing and restrictive over the behaviour of their members. If authoritarianism can be seen as a universal attribute in many organisations even though their aims and objectives may differ, then it is the conformity to this overall governance that is adhered to by its members that defines such a trait. Those who are overwhelmingly authoritarian are therefore more likely to conform to the general consensus. For example, it would seem innocuous to presume that two individuals placed into Communist and Fascist regimes would alter their political and psychological viewpoint to such disparaging lengths. It is the necessity to conform that becomes the central feature of authoritarianism.

Some support for the proposition of authoritarians conforming to majority rule comes from the post-Communist studies conducted in Russia. Whilst significant levels of authoritarianism were found amongst pro-Communist supporters, these levels were observed to decline considerably in the four years following Perestroika³². McFarland et al. (1996) discovered that correlations between the Russian version of the RWA-scale that they administered and the 'Beliefs in Communism' scale fell considerably, from .69 in 1989, to .45 in 1991. This had reduced further still to .38 in the final testing stage conducted in 1993. It was suggested that as predominantly Right-wing ideologies began to appear, the decline in support for Communism represented this shift in levels of authoritarianism, and was replaced by a new ideology.

Adorno et al. hypothesised that conventionality would be a major feature of the authoritarian personality and Feldman has indicated that conformity too is a defining aspect. Whilst similarities between these two ideas are apparent, the differences extend beyond the semantic level. Conventionality conjures images of traditionalist and conservative principles. In contrast, conformity indicates a submission to predominant rule and it is here that the subtleties of the two theories diverge. The idea of conformity suggests that adhering to authority is made through autonomous choice; conventionality implying almost unquestionable observance to established order. The issue of *causality* in authoritarianism is raised by Duckitt (1989), and in particular he defines the group situation as being the predominant force in creating such attitudes. Essentially, authoritarians are not born or created in the traditional sense, but rather their personalities are nurtured during interaction with authoritarian groups. It can therefore be assumed that anybody could be overwhelmed by an authoritarian

³² The Soviet economic and social policy of the late 1980s meaning 'restructuring', and was the attempts by Gorbachev to transform the stagnant and relatively inefficient command economy of the Soviet Union into a decentralized market-oriented economy, eclipsed by the fall of the CPSU in 1991.

situation, but it is individual differences in personality that differentiate those that conform and those which question and often reject such values. The respondents were virtually without exception exhibiting conformist tendencies that rose with levels of authoritarianism.

3.8 Conclusion.

Authoritarianism is proposed to consist of two major elements - conformity and obedience. These two concepts mirror much of the experimental research on authoritarianism with regards to rigidity and punitiveness. It is therefore hypothesised that authoritarianism can be calculated using a measure of social desirability (Marlowe-Crowne short version) and a morality measure (how people prefer the six stages of Kohlberg's moral stages – Lind's Moral Judgement Scale). These two measures fit into the rigidity (socially conformist) and punitive (punishment orientated) categories that have been supported by experimental evidence (see Christie, 1993). As a general indication of authoritarianism, Altemeyer's RWA-scale will also be included to provide some context to these other measures. Although the theorising of Altemeyer is likely to be skewed in relation to right-wing tendencies, there is still some validity in the many years of research conducted by Altemeyer and other researchers that have relied on his scale. As conformity and obedience were not essential and necessary components of his theory, the relationships between this measure and the MCSD and MJT will undoubtedly differ, but nevertheless provide a level of understanding for the way in which the current proposal differs from previous endeavours.

Chapter Four – Method and Results.

4.1 Introduction

Further to the disagreements concerning the theoretical and psychometric properties of authoritarianism, there exists a very real concern over the best way in which to actually measure this construct. Whereas the debates over left/right authoritarianism and the response-set issues have to some extent been addressed with a range of alternative instruments, and in particular Altemeyer's RWA-scale, others disagree over whether this is the most valid method to actually evaluate authoritarianism (see Brown, 1965; Rosier & Willig, 1995, 2002). The majority of studies in this field have utilised the Likert scale method with a range of statements to respond to, which is typical of attitude measurement in the wider social-psychological domain (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, 1990). It is also usual to correlate authoritarian scales with other measures to ascertain the relationships that those classified as 'high' or 'low' have with other attitudes and personality variables.

The previous chapter enabled a relatively new concept of authoritarianism to be proposed. This consisted of a proposition that the two interrelated features of conformity and obedience formed authoritarian personalities. Conformity required that the member of the social group adhere to the rules and norms of the collective; the obedience factor was the general acceptance of enforcing this conformity according to these rules. This was largely regardless of the circumstances in which they were breached. It was further hypothesised that for a true authoritarian to be identified, there would be a need for both of these to be present, correlating together in a positive direction.

4.2 Instruments.

In order to test the hypothesis of the influence conformity and obedience have on authoritarianism, a number of measuring instruments were selected through careful examination of previous literature. Each of these is detailed below and the suggested relationship with authoritarianism highlighted. As the study was somewhat exploratory – in that it was designed to test a theory – the relevance of each of these would necessitate that they be compared with the RWA-scale, as it is regarded to be a good indicator of general authoritarianism. Through detailed analysis of the findings, the results will inform a discussion as to the relevance of these two factors (conformity and obedience) in relation to authoritarianism.

1) Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD) - Crowne and Marlow (1960):

The very nature of possessing an authoritarian personality would in the majority of situations be regarded as being an undesirable trait. Exceptions to this might for example include military organisations, where authority is deemed an admirable and necessary quality. It is frequently the case that when administering the various measures that are commonly used in authoritarian research that they are in fact ‘disguised’ as a survey of social attitudes or political opinion. Deception in psychological research has been subjected to intense scrutiny and criticism in recent years from ethical committees. Although the intention in the case of authoritarianism is not to actively deceive the respondent but rather to conceal the true nature of the feature being measured; it is precisely for this reason that authoritarianism is (with some noted exceptions) regarded as a negative trait and people are therefore unwilling

to reveal such an aspect of their personality. From the early beginnings of Stagner (1936), such concealment of the true nature of a test has been a feature of such research. In the case of Stagner, not wanting to explicitly expose the fact that he was intending to measure a propensity for accepting the ideological features of Fascism was vital, such would be the negative connotations in doing so.

This phenomenon has been identified as a psychological variable in its own right and is commonly referred to as *Social Desirability* (Edwards, 1957). The voicing of negative opinions may have profound implications for the individual. In such cases, the result is an inaccurate recording of the personality feature under examination. Social desirability is of major concern to psychologists and is not exclusively a feature of authoritarianism. Indeed the relationship with racism is one such area where there have been similar concerns over whether it is possible to actually record an accurate score. The Multifactor Racial Attitude Inventory (Woodmansee and Cook, 1967) contained many explicit references to minority groups and attempts to update this with the Modern Racism Scale (McConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981) for example, have used non-reactive measures to capture a respondent's ambivalence for minorities. Although less transparent than earlier attempts, the social desirability variable is still significant in relation to how accurately and honestly people will reveal their true attitudes. Indeed it has been argued that people are now so aware of making or agreeing with statements that are not 'politically correct', that to attempt such measurement is largely futile (Leslie, Constantine and Fiske, 2003).

The *Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale* (MCSD) was originally developed to improve on Edwards (1957) SD-scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). They were to later

regard it more explicitly as more of a measure of the respondents need for approval, and then later as the avoidance of disapproval (Crowne, 1979). The format of the scale is in the response to a number of statements designed to measure two things. Firstly, behaviours that are desirable but relatively uncommon are assessed, e.g. “Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all candidates.” The second battery of items reflects upon those statements that tap the opposite, being undesirable but relatively common, e.g. “I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings.” The basis for item construction arose from the perceived ‘pathological’ nature that was supposedly a feature of the Edwards SD-scale. Crowne and Marlowe intended their items to be seemingly innocuous, so that only the most virtuous respondents could accurately respond in an honest fashion.

The importance of the selection of this particular scale over the many others that are available to measure social desirability lies in its motivational construct. The need for approval or more specifically, the desire to avoid disapproval is a central feature of the current research paradigm. Where measures such as the MMPI Lie (L) Scale (Edwards, 1957) may reflect specific orientations towards certain aspects of pro-social behaviours, the MCSD reflects specific attitudes towards social desirability. This fact is important, as what its inclusion is attempting to measure is not social desirability specifically, but rather the degree to which one *displays* conventional behaviour. Particular reference to the display aspect of conformity is imperative, in that it seeks to identify the willingness of the individual in this instance to avoid disapproval by the instigators and regulators of predominant norms. It is not to assume that the MCSD detects conformity in the strict sense of Asch’s definition (Asch, 1963), but rather the manner in which respondents display a desire to circumvent condemnation.

In the authoritarian paradigm, the need for this is vital if individuals are to be accepted as part of any in-group. It is also useful to recall that the individual does not explicitly need to agree with the predominant norms of the group with which they seemingly support through their behaviour, but only that they are *seen* to do so.

The original MCSD scale involved the use of 33-items to be responded to as true or false; 18 were in the true direction and 15 as false. Reliability of the scale has an alpha coefficient of between .73 and .88 and test-retest correlations of .88 with a one month break (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). The short version of the scale was employed in the current study to keep the length of the test procedure to a minimum. The short version has been reported as having comparable psychometric properties to its longer counterpart. Reynolds (1982) analysed 6 MCSD short forms, three of which were their own and three of which were identified by Strahan and Gerbasi (1972). They found that the two strongest forms, psychometrically, were the 13-item form which they created ($r=.76$) and Strahan and Gerbasi's 20-item form ($r=.79$)³³. Between the two, they recommend the 13-item because of its trade-off between length and the very slight drop in reliability. They specifically recommend the Reynolds 13-item short form. Fraboni and Cooper's (1989) concluded that both age and sex account for small but significant amounts of variability in the M-C scores. The M-C 1(10) developed by Strahan and Gerbasi (1972), which is least affected by age and socio-economic status, is recommended in situations where internal consistency reliability is less important than practical problems that are created by a longer survey.

³³ All reliability scores reported refer to Cronbach's Alpha (Cronbach, 1963) unless otherwise stated.

Experimental research with the MCSD has been supported by the work of Davis and Cowles (1989) and Paulhus (1984), where situational factors were shown to influence the level of social desirability as measured by the MCSD. In addition, a study by Paulhus compared this with many other measures and indicated it as tapping the second factor of social desirability – impression management – to good effect. McRae and Costa (1983) also indicated that the high scorers on the MCSD did in fact enjoy many of the features associated with the measure – essentially the ‘good’ qualities – according to interviews with the respondent’s spouses. However, it has been suggested that not only do high scorers amplify their better qualities, but that they are also to some extent suffering from a level of self-deception which can further impact on their scores (Millham & Kellogg, 1980). The MCSD is therefore regarded as an acceptable measure of socially desirable responding, and in particular of the ‘second factor’ of impression management.

2) Moral Judgement Test (MJT) – Lind (1985):

The concept of morality and the work of Jean Piaget and Laurence Kohlberg are a major feature in developmental psychology. The child is assumed to develop through stages where they progress from the selfishness of the infant to the ability to consider the rights of others and situations as a basis for moral judgement. Considerable effort has been extended to quantifying the development between what have become to be known as the *six stages of moral judgement* (Kohlberg, 1963). The most commonly regarded instrument is the *Defining Issues Test* (DIT) (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, & Anderson, 1974), which presents the subject with a series of ‘dilemmas’. The responses to these will subsequently place them within a stage of moral development.

Alternatives to the DIT have been attempted and one such development has been proposed by German psychologist Georg Lind – the *Moral Judgement Test* (MJT) (Lind, 1984). As with the DIT, the MJT is firmly related to Kohlberg's notions of stages of moral development and seeks to identify which of the stages is the most prominent in the definitive responses to similar dilemmas. However, one such distinction between these two measures is that beyond the assessment of stage preference, the MJT aims to measure the *consistency* with which these different stages are selected. It is the cognitive consistency that Lind (1985) believes is as important as the stage selected, and although the DIT contains controls for socially desirable responding, there is evidence that scores can indeed be 'faked' upwards (Lind, 1984; 2003). The *C-Index* according to Lind cannot be manipulated in such a fashion and therefore scores cannot be faked in the presumably more desirable direction towards the higher of the six stages.

The DIT and MJT begin in a similar way by presenting the participant with a series of moral judgements and then ask them to assess their most likely course of action. For example, they both use a case of euthanasia and pose the question of whether the doctor should supply the medicine that would end the life of the patient. To follow are a series of stage-prototypic questions designed to establish the subjects stage preference. The MJT's items are grouped into 6-pro and 6-con statements. The pro-questions follow the statement, "How acceptable do you find the doctor's behaviour? Suppose someone said the doctor acted rightly..." and are preceded by a statement that reflects each stage of moral judgement. For example, a stage one preference would elicit the response "the woman would have died anyway and, therefore, it was

not difficult for the doctor to comply with her wish.” Participants rate their desired response on a 7-point Likert-scale.

The *C-Score* is unique to the MJT and involves a computation of the consistency with which each of the four items from the same stage is selected. The basis for this analysis is from the idea that competency in moral judgement stems from the capacity to “appreciate a certain moral principle independently of the fact, whether or not it agrees with [one’s] opinion on a particular issue” (Lind, 1995, p.12). Lind further states that the DIT expresses only attitudes, and that the important element in assessing moral judgement is how the respondent uses their principles in making such decisions. The importance of the consistency is said to reflect how effectively they employ these principles – the more consistent therefore the more successfully utilised reasoning. This has an association with the *Einstellung* paradigm, which was identified by Luchins (1942) and was tested in relation to authoritarianism by Rokeach (1948). *Einstellung* represents mental rigidity in problem solving, and the rigid and conventional personality of the authoritarian is characterised by this (Rokeach, 1948). In particular, those who express rigidity in solving experimental problems will also demonstrate rigidity in solving social problems. A number of supplementary studies have also provided some evidence for the presence of this phenomenon, although the experimental situation is believed to be particularly influential (see Christie, 1993). Although the C-score does not provide an indication of mental rigidity in the spirit of previous research, it does according to Lind (1985) provide an indication of consistency in solving moral and social dilemmas.

The correlations between moral stage and the consistency in judging these have shown strong positive correlations (Lind, 1982). Hence those who reason at a higher level will not only be more consistent in this judgement, but also be utilising a different set of cognitive skills in achieving this judgment. *Figure 4.1* shows the correlations between the C-score and the preference for that stage in a Brazilian sample (Lind, 2003). Lind refers to this as *Affective-cognitive parallelism*:




Figure 4.1: C-Score and stage preference correlations (Lind, 2003).

The stage preferences should correlate in a predicted manner with the *MJT's* C-index of moral judgment competence, i.e. while the preference for the highest stages should correlate highly positively with the competence score. The preferences for the lowest stages should correlate highly negatively with that score, and the other *MJT* preference indices should show correlations in between these extremes (Lind, 2003). It is therefore suggested that there will be a difference in this consistency between low and high scorers in authoritarianism. Low scorers will be more likely to adopt a

stricter crime/punishment orientation, regardless of the moral or ethical situations of any deviant behaviour.

3) Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) - Altemeyer, (1988):

Dissatisfaction with many of the developments in the definition and measurement of authoritarianism led Altemeyer (1981) to painstakingly review and refine many of the previous research efforts. He was the to propose the *Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale* (RWA) in his book bearing the same name. A strong proponent of factor analysis, Altemeyer's dismay that even the majority of balanced scales were in fact not identifying the opposite pole in the reversed items, led to him creating a 'truly' balanced scale. For Altemeyer, the inadequate treatment of identifying the true reversal of an item by most was of paramount importance to his eventual conceptualisation of authoritarianism, and would therefore play a major role in any future developments. His main criterion was that the scales should have a unidimensional structure and indeed the RWA scale was discovered to have a "higher internal consistency than the other scales he compared it with" (Altemeyer, 1981, p.211). In addition to the careful reversal of the items, the factor structure itself must be of similar rigour in that there could only be as many factors identified in the analysis as there are predicted in the theory.

The RWA-scale is regarded by many to be the most valid and reliable measure of authoritarianism available to date, and is by far the most common instrument being used in modern authoritarian research efforts (Christie, 1990). Its factor structure shows the unidimensionality of the scale, and its alpha reliabilities have averaged

from .8 to .9. Although Meehan (1993) believes that the original Berkeley F-scale is more than adequate in identifying those predisposed to authoritarianism, Christie (1990) states that despite some theoretical considerations, that the RWA-scale is by far the most superior psychometric tool available to measure authoritarianism. Smith (1997) also heralds the improvement that the RWA-scale has added to authoritarian research, although is also in agreement with Christie that some of the richness in theory has been compromised for the sake of an improved and simplified measure. He concludes that the “good psychometrics that made the RWA unidimensional leave unresolved serious questions about the causal model assumed to underlie the authoritarian syndrome” (Smith, 1997, p.162). Again in agreement with the above authors, Martin (2001) believes the RWA-scale to be practical as a measure of general authoritarianism in research and above that of the F-scale. He also has reservations concerning the level of overall completeness of the theory.

It can therefore be assumed that the RWA-scale is a useful measurement instrument, which successfully taps some degree of authoritarianism. However, despite its good psychometric qualities it may not capture the full range of authoritarian features. For the current analysis the RWA-scale is to be regarded as a useful point of departure for at least identifying basic authoritarian attitudes. It can be assumed to also provide an indication of the distinction between those who may be regarded as ‘high’ authoritarian and ‘low’ authoritarian. Criticism of this categorical treatment of respondents however leads to the assumption that to simplify types in this way reduces the analytical possibilities significantly (Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954). Hence the reliance in this instance will be concerned with the use of scale scores on authoritarianism from the notion that it is a continuum upon which people may fall.

Subsequently, defining people as authoritarian or non-authoritarian will merely provide an indication of their likely personality and not a definitive categorisation.

Summary of Instruments and Hypotheses.

The overall aim of using the three instruments highlighted above is to identify the interplay between conformity and obedience, with particular reference to authoritarianism. It is hypothesised that conformity in particular will play a key role in explaining the authoritarian's behaviour. Using the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, a measure of how much influence is exerted upon the individual to provide appealing answers to statements presented to them will be ascertained. The MCSD is regarded as being one of the superior measures of identifying the influence that social desirability plays in psychometric testing. The short 10-item version selected here upholds the tradition of this instrument and has shown acceptable reliabilities in testing (Strahan and Gerbasi, 1972). Whilst social desirability and conformity are to some extent different entities, they do intersect on the notion of an individual's desire to alter their behaviour in relation to how they are perceived by others.

Development of the MJT follows from morality theory in psychological research, and in particular the stage theory of Kohlberg (1973). The aim of its inclusion here is to indicate the level of acceptance that subjects will assign to rules and punishment for their violation. Those subjects who possess a tendency to favour the lower stages of moral judgement will therefore be argued to possess more punitive tendencies than those who reason at the higher stages. The MJT is not specifically designed as a measure of punitiveness, but rather as an indication of the proficiency of moral

judgement. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the responses that the average individual will place upon the breach of law. Those who reason at the lower stages (lower consistency) will be seen as the most punitive and espouse strict punishment in the black-and-white sense – for them breaking a rule deserves retribution. In contrast, people who reason at the higher levels (high consistency) will more likely internalise a situation and see that the ‘punishment fits the crime’. They are less likely to propose punitive sanctions where there can be argued that rules were broken for altruistic purposes for instance.

Whilst the shortcomings of Altemeyer’s RWA-scale have been evaluated here and elsewhere (see Christie 1990), it is still regarded by many as the most psychometrically sound measure of authoritarianism available to-date (Christie, 1993). In regards to the validity of the RWA-scale, it can be argued that it does measure authoritarianism to some extent – specifically *right-wing* authoritarianism. It therefore largely ignores the whole area of political thought from the left. Despite these concerns it still possesses some utility in identifying those individuals who are prone to authoritarian behaviour. The MCSD and MJT will be analysed to provide an indication of the relationship that they have with *general* authoritarianism as measured by the RWA-scale and suggestions as to how this fits in with the proposed theory will be expanded upon.

4.3 Selecting a sample

The study of any psychological construct is often limited in its validity by access to a suitable sample. Significant criticism has fallen upon academics for their overuse of university students and the applicability and generalisability to a wider population that

the study of such groups provides (Sears, 1986). Others argue that the wide range of socio-economic backgrounds of students is ideally suited to social science research with the broadness of its members giving albeit an artificial snapshot of the wider population (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Each sample in the current analysis was selected for the hypothesised relationship to authoritarianism. These predictions were formed by analysis of studies with similar groups by other researchers and are detailed in the following sections. Each was assumed to possess different levels of authoritarianism mainly due to their group structure. By contrast, the student sample was to provide a comparison sample from the wider population and explicit assumptions were made regarding their levels of authoritarianism, again based on prior literature.

1) Mormons

Religion has had a tenuous relationship with authoritarianism. Aside from the proposed links with anti-Semitism³⁴, a number of researchers have attempted to identify how religion interacts with authoritarian attitudes. Allport & Ross (1967) specifically examined the relationship between religious orientation and prejudice, whilst Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) and Hunsberger (1995, 1996) examined the intensity of religious beliefs, authoritarianism and prejudice, as did Wylie and Forrest (1992). Rokeach (1956) in a paper that preceded *The Open and Closed Mind* linked his theory of Dogmatism to political *and* religious attitudes, as the two were seemingly so closely linked. Batson and Burris (1994) define the paradox of religion in that it

³⁴ It is acknowledged that anti-Semitism contains elements of ethnicity and culture beyond pure religious discrimination.

...functions not as a prophetic voice calling the faithful to shed their intolerance and bigotry, but as a mighty fortress of ingroup superiority, one that justifies elitism, ethnocentrism, oppression, and even destruction of those who are different (p.149).

In addition, they cite many studies where the more intense an individual's religious involvement, then the more likely they are to exhibit general prejudice.

Characteristics of the Mormon creed include the emphasis on revelation in the establishment of doctrines and rituals, the interdependence of temporal and spiritual life, tithing, and attention to community welfare. Mormons practice baptism for the dead and they believe that the deceased soul may receive salvation by proxy of a living believer. They also believe in "celestial marriage," whereby individuals marry for all eternity. Mormons carry out a campaign of vigorous proselytising, which has in the course of a century and a quarter, raised the church from a handful of followers to its present size³⁵. Religion plays an important part in the lives of many and the diversity of the different doctrines stands testament to the varying beliefs that can be encompassed by its aims.

For the purpose of this study, the participation in religious activities is anticipated to be prominent in the rules and standards of behaviour of the individual. The actual content of beliefs is largely unimportant in this respect; instead the level of involvement should be significant in the sense that the standards of behaviour

³⁵ D. H. Ludlow, ed., *Encyclopaedia of Mormonism* (vol. 5, 1992).

expected by its followers should be considerable. In addition, the membership of this group should also be a major feature in the lives of those who partake in its teachings. Fundamentalism or orthodoxy would be prime examples of this, whereby the individual sees himself or herself as part of collective that exerts a significant control over their daily lives. Further to these styles of belief are many other consuming institutions that play a significant part in the lives of their members. Beyond the requirement to attend the organisation, the beliefs and teachings should contain some intrusive element with regards to the conduct and judgment of its members.

As is the case with much social science research using human participants, access to such individuals can pose significant limitations upon the actual methodology employed. Many marginalized groups are suspicious of outside interest for a variety of reasons and even more so of researchers. Gaining access to such organisations can be an arduous task as levels of trust and cooperation are established. Initially a number of less mainstream religious groups were identified and the researcher began assessing both the suitability of each for the purpose of the research parameters and the likelihood that access could be gained to its members. One such avenue presented itself in the form of a relation of an acquaintance who was a member of a local division of a Mormon church. Initial contact consisted of informal communication over a period of approximately one month in which the project was explained in some detail. The contact with this member was also reciprocal in that a significant amount of detail about the organisation was learned and its suitability as an object of study identified. Following this period, the contact agreed to seek permission for the researcher to approach the leader of the group to arrange a formal meeting with the researcher to forward a research proposal.

Once permission was approved the researcher attempted contact by telephone. It eventually took some weeks and numerous calls to finally make contact and the researcher was invited to attend a meeting the following week to meet with the bishop and to explain the project in more detail. The researcher attended the groups 'service' although the initial meeting was unsuccessful and arrangements were made for the following week. Subsequent attendance of the gathering the following week was successful in that formal introduction was made with the heads of the church and the researcher was able to explain the nature of the project and submit copies of the instruments for review. Follow-up of this meeting some weeks later by telephone indicated that the project would be approved and a number of assurances about its ethical basis and questions regarding confidentiality were resolved. Data collection was conducted during the formal education session conducted during the groups meetings by the bishop and his assistants. Requests for supplementary questionnaires followed a further attendance of the groups meeting. A total of 26 questionnaire's - 22 of which were fully completed - were returned to the researcher in the following month by the participants from the Mormon Church.

2) Peace Protesters

The outbreak of the war in Iraq in February 2003 saw some of the highest opposition to military activity in recent years. A significant feature of this conflict was that it was largely pre-emptive rather than retaliatory in nature³⁶. In a similar way to the mass social protests over the war in Vietnam in the 1970's, it was argued by some that

³⁶ <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/21/1047749944836.html>

aggressive force was an inappropriate vehicle for addressing the concerns amounting in the middle-East.

The implications of authoritarian research in relation to conflict and war have been investigated by many researchers (Karabenick & Wilson, 1969; Bailes & Guller, 1970; Granberg & Corrigan, 1972; Doty, Winter, Peterson, & Kemmelmeier, 1997; Eckhardt & Alcock, 1970; Klugman, 1985). In summary, these studies have indicated that there appears less acceptance of physical force in the dispute of international disagreements amongst those who score at the lower end of the authoritarian scale. In contrast, the more authoritarian the subject the more likely they are to endorse such methods. The 'tough' nature of the authoritarian therefore is witnessed in their use of physical force to overcome social problems.

People who are opposed to war could in a sense be labelled as the authoritarian's alter-ego. Examination of these individuals to some extent gives us an indication of what the authoritarian is not. Karabenick & Wilson's (1969) study of attitudes towards the Vietnam War resulted in the labelling of two groups – the 'Hawks' and the 'Doves'. The Hawks were labelled as such for their pro-war attitudes and the Doves for their striving for peace. Each was to score high and low on the F-scale respectively. With the outbreak of the coalitions invasion of Iraq, the opportunity presented itself to somewhat replicate Karabenick & Wilson's study. It would be hypothesised that those opposed to the war in Iraq would therefore be less conformist, obedient and authoritarian.

The decision by the Australian government to commit troops to Iraq brought about some vehement opposition and protest from many sectors of the community. During the month that the conflict took place protests were organised in most large Australian cities, including one in Brisbane. The researcher learned of the gathering through a contacting the local newspaper, which suggested further contacting the students union at Griffith University's Brisbane campus. The time, date and location of the protest were received from this source.

The researcher attended the protest at 10am on the 13th of April 2003, making sure to arrive early and assess the situation. The protest appeared to be relatively well organised, and the main area of St. George's square was taken over by stalls erected by many high profile humanitarian groups, such as *Greenpeace* and *Amnesty International*. There was also a significant police presence. The format of the protest was given in a leaflet that was being handed out and included some speakers from many international agencies who had been involved in the humanitarian aspects of the conflict. The event culminated in a march around the streets of Brisbane along a predefined route. There were reported to be approximately 2000 people present on the march (The Courier Mail, 14/11/03).

The procedure employed was relatively informal and in fitting with the theme of the event. Throughout the day, the researcher approached various people who were present in St. George's Square and inquired as to the nature of their visit and their attitude towards the war in Iraq. This was done to ensure that the sample included only those people who had made a conscious decision to commit time and effort to voice their concerns over the conflict. A total of 13 questionnaires were handed out,

although only 7 of these were returned completed. The length and time needed to complete the three instruments may have been somewhat prohibitive for field research of this type³⁷. Hence interpretation of the results from this group of subjects would need to be interpreted cautiously, as the small sample would undoubtedly affect the statistical power of any analysis.

3) Security Guards

Many regulatory agencies such as the police and military have been identified as attracting authoritarian personalities. The hierarchal structure of these organisations is deemed to be particularly attractive to authoritarians, in addition to the regulatory nature of their conduct. These studies have examined such collectives with the aim of uncovering the relationship that authoritarianism has to members of these organisations (see Eckhardt & Newcombe, 1969; Smith, 1965; Colemand & Gorman, 1982; French & Ernest, 1955; Hollander, 1954). Again, access to such closed institutions is notoriously difficult. Of the handful of studies that have successfully sampled such people, there is the general consensus that their members are on average more authoritarian than the general population. In particular, Colemand and Gorman's (1982) investigation of British Police Officers was to reveal a generally higher level of authoritarianism compared to a matched control group.

Whether it is the authoritarian who is attracted to such professions or whether belonging to the group itself fosters authoritarianism, is open to some debate. However, Colemand and Gorman's (1982) study indicated that levels of authoritarianism for cadets actually reduced from before they were enlisted, but rose

³⁷ Karabenick & Wilson (1969) for example, only used the F-Scale which consisted of thirty questions.

again following their graduation. This supports the idea that it is in fact the authoritarian who is attracted to the institution originally, although the hierarchal structure of the establishment does bear upon the levels of authoritarianism experienced. The interplay between authoritarianism can be seen as a 'two-way street' that is influenced by both personality and situational factors (see Christie, 1952; Ray, 1976).

Access to a similar group of individuals presented itself through a liaison established during another research project at the university. As a social science graduate, the manager of a security team became interested in the current project and offered assistance in the gathering of data. A sample of questionnaires was left with the manager and he instructed members of his staff to complete them should they be interested in participating. A total of 8 were returned and 7 fully completed questionnaires were obtained from this group.

4) Freemasons

Institutions of a closed nature that require distinct rules to admit membership are of particular relevance to the study of authoritarianism. One such group are the Freemason's who represent a worldwide organisation. With approximately 5 million members worldwide, mostly in the United States and other English-speaking countries, in almost every nation where Freemasonry is not officially banned, it forms the largest 'secret' society in the world. There is no central Masonic authority and jurisdiction is divided among autonomous national authorities, called 'Grand Lodges'. Custom is the supreme authority of the order, and there are elaborate symbolic rites and ceremonies, most of which utilize the instruments of the stonemason - the plumb,

the square, the level, and compasses. The principles of Freemasonry have traditionally been liberal and democratic. Masons are expected to believe in a Supreme Being, use a holy book appropriate to the religion of the lodge's members, and maintain a vow of secrecy concerning the order's ceremonies.

Because of its identification with 19th-century bourgeois liberalism, there has been much opposition to Freemasonry. Freemasonry's anticlerical attitude has also led to strong opposition from the Roman Catholic Church, which first expressed its anti-Masonic attitude in a bull of Pope Clement XII (1738). The Catholic Church still discourages its members from joining the order. Totalitarian states have always suppressed Freemasonry; the lodges in Italy, Austria, and Germany were forcibly eradicated under fascism and Nazism, and there are now no lodges in China³⁸.

Access to this sample became available during a trip to the UK in August 2003. Through a family acquaintance that had been a member of the organisation for some years, the researcher enquired as to the possibility of being able to administer a sample of questionnaires during a weekly meeting. Permission from the head of the organisation was sought and the researcher attended the relatively informal gathering at the group's lodge. During the discussion of weekly news and information, an announcement was made regarding the presence of the researcher and that they would each be approached in-turn and asked for their participation.

Throughout the evening, the researcher made contact with each member and requested their assistance, making sure as to clearly state that they were under no

³⁸ A. F. L. Pick and G. N. Knight, *The Pocket History of Freemasonry* (4th ed. 1963) 1964); E. Bebe, *The Landmarks of Free Masonry* (1980); J. Ankerberg and J. Weldon, *The Facts on the Masonic Lodge* (1988).

pressure to participate and to also explain the nature of the project. This also enabled the researcher to spend some time with each subject to not only answer any questions but to also gain insight into their views on many of the issues that presented themselves during the completion of the questionnaire. It was also felt that this approach alleviated any suspicions that may have existed from the presence of a non-member. A total of 12 completed questionnaires were collected during this first session, and a further 10 were returned by post.

5) Bikers

Whilst many groups were selected because their affiliation with a particular group would show high levels of authoritarianism, there was another group that were hypothesised to be low in authoritarianism. The world of the ‘outlaw’ biker is often regarded as being the last bastion of the free world, where individual expression and rejection of rules is of cultural significance amongst the groups.

As Veno (2002) describes them, “We’ve all seen them. Scruffy, loud and mean, with strange images and words covering their clothes. Yet, not many people know them. In a world of few secrets, the outlaw motorcycle clubs are perhaps one of the last secret groups that exist in our society” (p.22). However, there are many other types of motorcycle enthusiasts, who could easily be mistaken for outlaw motorcycle club members. But what distinguishes the latter is that these clubs are “characterised by having a constitution, a rigid organisational structure and heavy levels of commitment to ensure their survival. They exist in their own world, cut off from mainstream society through a rigid system of rules and inherent belief system” (Veno, 2002, p.40).

The RCMP *Gazette*, quoting from the Provincial Court of Manitoba, defines Organised Motorcycle Groups (OMG's) as:

*"Any group of motorcycle enthusiasts who have voluntarily made a commitment to band together and abide by their organizations' rigorous rules enforced by violence, who engage in activities that bring them and their club into serious conflict with society and the law".*³⁹

Some members have diversified into legitimate businesses (e.g., bars, retail, restaurants, and strip clubs), but these operations tend to be tainted by illegal sources of funding. Many members attempt to improve their public image by engaging in community service and charitable drives.

An academic associate who has spent a considerable number of years studying one such group, placed the researcher in contact with an ex-member who had recently re-located into the area from another major Australian city. Initial contact was made by telephone and a meeting arranged for the following week. J was quite open to inquiry initially and displayed a reciprocal interest in the project and the whole educational environment. Early discussions centred on various topics, including crime, lifestyle and politics. At the end of the first meeting, J stated that he was willing to complete the questionnaire and took the forms away to do so at his leisure. He promised to get in touch in the following week and arrange the return of the completed questionnaire.

Approximately two weeks later, a second meeting was arranged at a local hotel and the researcher met with J. He returned the completed questionnaire and a number of hours were spent discussing various aspects of it. Whilst this gave a useful insight into

³⁹ http://www.psepc-sppcc.gc.ca/policing/organized_crime/FactSheets/omg_e.asp

the background of individuals involved in such groups, it had been previously hoped that J would be able to provide access to a wider sample also. Inquiry as to the possibility of this was made at the end of the meeting and J responded that it might be feasible in the future. Over the next two months, the researcher met with J on a number of occasions for informal discussions, which mainly centred on his past experiences with the group and a number of current news stories that he appeared to be interested in. He also requested some supplementary questionnaires, which he said he would take with him to a friend's re-union the following weekend, where some members of his group would be present. A fortnight later 3 completed forms were returned and J spent considerable time explaining each of the individuals' pasts and personalities.

Further meetings with J continued over the next couple of months until it was felt that the relationship had reached its usefulness from a research perspective, although a promise to keep in touch was made. A total of four fully completed questionnaires were gained from this sample. As with the Peace Protesters, the interpretation would need to be conducted with some care. However, the unique importance of the group in relation to their possible authoritarianism, the significant time expended upon gaining the data, and the more qualitative observations also collected, justified their inclusion.

6) Students

The use of university students has been the most used avenue for research in the social sciences. The main rationale for their inclusion in the current study was both of expediency and for providing a more general impression of authoritarianism in a wider population. Students have traditionally recorded relatively average scores on

authoritarian measures in past research (see Meloen, 1993) and the current sample was regarded as being typical of this group.

Access to the current student sample was made through BUHREC, who informed the researcher that it was acceptable to use students as long as no coercion to participate was made towards them. To ensure this, it was necessary for the class tutor to leave the room prior to the explanation of the project and not to return until all the forms had been collected. It was also imperative for them to be fully aware that participation was voluntary and confidential. The first samples were collected in January 2003 and consisted of students from Crime and Deviance, Criminal Profiling and Criminal Motivations classes. The structure of Bond University means that approximately 50% of students are from overseas, and that whilst many are taking criminology classes, a significant number of study-abroad students take the classes as electives so may major in an entirely different discipline. Whilst the use of students is far from ideal, the demographic constitution of Bond criminology students is considerably more varied than many of the samples that have been utilised in past research.

The protocol for collecting the questionnaires followed the ethics committee's guidelines. At the beginning of the class, the researcher was introduced by the lecturer who informed them of the research that was being conducted. The lecturer then left the room and the researcher explained in more detail the nature of the project (a survey of social attitudes following September 11th), along with instructions for filling out the questionnaire. The voluntary and confidential nature of participation was stressed and also that the researcher would be on hand to answer any questions. The forms were handed out to each student and they were instructed to place them in an

envelope at the front of the class when finished. A total of 47 completed questionnaires were collected from these three classes.

Similarly, the semester in September 2003 allowed the same procedure to be followed in criminology classes and a further 25 completed questionnaires were collected. Again in the January 2004 semester, another 42 completed questionnaires were received. The same procedure was diligently followed each time. The total sample of students was 114.

4.4 Statistical Analysis.

The analysis will consist of two main approaches; firstly in this chapter, the results of the quantitative data will be reported, and study secondly in the next chapter, the interpretation of the statistical analysis coupled with some observations made during the research, will elaborate further on the nature of authoritarianism. Complex multivariate analysis was considered inappropriate for the current study, which is to some extent exploratory in nature. Recommendations for future research and for further statistical analysis are made in the final chapter.

Scale Properties:

Reliability is a complex issue in personality research, with much disagreement between scholars and practitioners as to the preferred method and acceptable levels. But no matter how accurate a measure may be reported to be, there is still the question as to whether it is actually measuring what it purports to. Validity represents the level to which an instrument such as a personality scale, actually measures the variable it intends to assess. Eysenck (1954, p.71) gives the example of early psychologists

belief that reflex action was linked to IQ – a reliable but not valid as it has no real bearing on levels of intelligence.

The Cronbach alpha coefficients of the scales were computed using the Reliability Analysis feature on SPSS. The alpha reliability of the MCSD was computed to be .585. Whilst this is not particularly high, it should be recalled that it was the short version of the scale that was used in the current study. Short scales have been regarded by many as being a poor substitute for the original instruments (see Ray, 1984). However, correlations between long and short MCSD scales have been shown to be in the region of .76-.79 (Strahan & Gerbasi, 1972; Reynolds, 1982). The use of the MCSD with specific populations has also been addressed by O’Gorman (1974), who recorded alpha-levels of as low as .16 with samples of Australian Army personnel. However, as is often the case with certain types of field research, the use of short scales is often necessary to avoid the battery of instruments from becoming too long. Test fatigue can have a debilitating effect on reliabilities due to the inadequate attention being afforded to the items. The nature of the way in which the C-index is computed from the MJT does not lend itself to reliability analysis.

The alpha reliability of the RWA-scale was indicated to be .862. This level of scale reliability is regarded as high and the scale can be assumed to possess a high level of internal reliability. Altemeyer (1981,1988) has recorded alpha reliabilities of between .8 and .9. Other researchers have also recorded similar levels of internal reliability with the RWA-scale (see Altemeyer, 1996). The current figure would indicate that the scale is psychometrically sound and is consistent in its measurement. The two least

reliable items on the scale were numbers 7 and 13⁴⁰. Their exclusion would only have served to very marginally increase the alpha score to .866 and .867 respectively. Similarly, the two most reliable items were numbers 9 and 12⁴¹, their exclusion only reducing reliability by a negligible amount (.852 and .851 respectively).

The crux of the theory highlighted in *Chapter 3*, was based upon the hypothesis that authoritarianism could be defined by the inter-related concepts of obedience and conformity. These variables were measured using the Moral Judgement Test (MJT) (see Lind, 1984) and the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Test (MCSD) (see Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) respectively. In order to enable these to be validated as being features of authoritarianism, the third instrument that was administered to subjects was the Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWA) (see Altemeyer, 1981, 1988). Although it was argued in *Chapter 2* that the theoretical and methodological basis for this measure was largely invalid as a measure of authoritarianism, it still remains the most reliable measure of this construct available to-date (see Christie, 1990). It was therefore hypothesised that authoritarians would be both highly obedient and conformist. Negative correlations between the subjects preferred stage as measured by the MJT and the RWA would suggest the former. The positive correlation therefore with the MCSD and RWA would therefore be indicative of the latter. This examination will be made for the sample as a whole, and for each group that was surveyed.

⁴⁰ I-7: "The sooner we get rid of the traditional family structure, where the father is head of the family and the children are taught to obey authority automatically, the better. The old fashioned way has a lot wrong with it." I-13: "Rules about being 'well mannered' and respectable are chains of the past which we should question very thoroughly before accepting." Both are negatively worded items.

⁴¹ I-9: "The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are to save our moral standards and preserve law and order." I-12: "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn." Both are positively worded items.

The use of t-test's and ANOVA was deemed inappropriate for this analysis. Due to some of the individual groups only containing small sample sizes and scores that were not normally distributed, only non-parametric equivalents will be used. Although not of equivalent power, they are less sensitive to different sized and less homogenous samples (Daniel, 1990). Particular care was also taken to ensure the statistical assumptions of these tests were not violated. However the sample as a whole is unlikely to experience such limitations and interpretation in the statistical sense will bear upon this population wherever possible. For these reasons, more exhaustive statistical procedures, such as many of the multivariate techniques available, were considered inappropriate given the potential for error due to some of the group's small sample sizes. Suggestions for alternative analyses of the results of further studies of this kind are presented in the final chapter. Despite the use of non-parametric statistics, the mean scores and standard deviations will also be reported for each of the separate scores as they relate to the standard format in published literature. The mean ranks will also be included in reference to the statistical procedure employed.

4.5 Sample Descriptives.

The entire sample consisted of 176 participants and their descriptive characteristics are summarized in *Table 4.2*. There were a total of 96 males and 76 females who constituted 54.5% and 43.2% of the total respectively. There were 4 respondents who failed to indicate their gender on the questionnaire (2.3% of the total). Three of the groups – the Security Guards, the Bikers, and the Freemasons were composed entirely of males, although the other groups were fairly representative of both genders. The

mean age in years of the total sample was 28.7 (SD=15.4). Again 4 respondents failed to indicate their age. The oldest participant was aged 83 and the youngest 18. The highest mean age in years was for the Freemasons (M=62.5, SD=9.3) and the lowest the Mormons (M=21.36, SD=3.2).

Group	N	Gender		Age	
		Male	Female	Mean	SD
Total	176	96	76	28.7	15.4
Students	114	49	64	21.97	3.9
Peace Protesters	7	3	4	29.83	9.2
Security Guards	7	4	-	53.25	14.5
Mormons	22	14	8	21.36	3.2
Bikers	4	4	-	48.5	8.4
Freemasons	22	22	-	62.5	9.3

Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics of Sample.

Education level was also included in the demographic section of the questionnaire, and will be analysed in more detail in *Section 4.11* In summary, of the 172 complete responses regarding level of education, there were 125 educated to university level or attending university, 11 had or were taking technical training, 16 had or were attending college, 16 had completed high school only, and 4 stated 'none' as attainment in formal education. It is acknowledged that although one group is specifically labelled 'students' that there may indeed be people in education from the other groups. Likewise, there is a possibility that some of the students could also be members of some of the other categories. The difficulty in assessing mutually exclusive subjects of these types would have severely limited the analysis. Hence, this must be acknowledged during interpretation of the results.

The variation of the ages and education levels in the sample as a whole necessitates that the heterogeneous sample characteristics for some groups be recognised. In particular, some groups are male only, and in others the levels of education and age differ significantly. Hence analysis of this nature will not be conducted for all groups, and interpretation of results will account for this fact wherever possible.

4.6 Correlations of Instruments.

The initial analysis consists of presenting correlations between the scales, to assess if the hypothesised theory of authoritarianism was supported. For the sample as a whole Spearman's correlations were computed and are presented in *Table 4.6* below. As the normality of the data was questionable in the statistical sense, and the variety of scores on each measure unrelated, the use of Spearman's rank correlation method was deemed desirable⁴².

There were a total of 171 complete responses for the RWAxMCSD and RWAxMJT, and 172 for the MCSDxMJT. All correlations for the entire sample were statistically significant at the 0.01 level for a two-tailed test (see *Table 4.6*).

	RWA	MJT	MCSD
RWA	-	-.385	.571
MJT	-.385	-	-.359
MCSD	.571	-.379	-

Table 4.2: Scale correlations for whole sample.

⁴² To estimate effect size, Cohen's (1999) model of .3 or above = small; .5 or above= moderate; .7 or above = large will be used.

There were moderate positive correlations between RWA and MCSD ($r=.571$, $\text{sig}<0.05$), signifying that authoritarians responded in a desirable manner and therefore according to the theory, were decidedly more conformist. In addition, the small correlations between RWA and MJT ($r=-.385$, $p<.05$) indicated that the lower the stage of moral competence, the less authoritarian the subjects were liable to be. In accordance with the theory, it can therefore be assumed that high authoritarians are more obedient and more likely to follow the law rather than assess the situation on its moral merits when dealing with behaviour that requires punishment. Both these correlations were significant, and in particular the relationship between RWA and MCSD suggests that authoritarians are particularly aware of the social appeal of their responses. The correlations between the MJT and MCSD ($r=-.368$, $\text{sig}<0.05$) were shown to be negative, suggestive of the relationship between obedience and conformity⁴³. Those who were conformist were also likely to be obedient, and it was the inter-play between these two variables that was hypothesised to signify authoritarian behaviour. The results indicate that there was a higher level of conformity present in authoritarians in this sample than obedience.

For the Student vs. non-Student comparisons on each of these measures, it was revealed that there were some stronger correlations reported for the non-Student group.

⁴³ It should be noted that despite there being a negative correlation, that a high score on the MJT's C-Score is indicative of a higher competency in moral judgment. The direction of this relationship would therefore appear to be in the wrong direction; a positive coefficient in this instance would mean that when conformity was high, obedience would be low and vice versa. This would not provide support for the proposed theory. A negative correlation indicates that there is essentially a 'positive' relationship between these two variables – as social desirability (conformity) rises, so does moral competency (obedience).

	RWA	MJT	MCSD
RWA	-	-.279	.274
MJT	-.279	-	-.359
MCSD	.274	-.304	-

Table 4.3: Scale correlations for the students.

	RWA	MJT	MCSD
RWA	-	-.433	.669
MJT	-.433	-	-.359
MCSD	.669	-.370	-

Table 4.4: Scale correlations for the non-students.

In particular, correlation coefficients increased in the hypothesised direction for the RWAxMCSD and RWAxMJT. This suggests both variables have a bearing upon general authoritarianism.

Review of Scale Correlations: The main hypothesis that authoritarianism would be defined by the relationship between conformity and obedience was partially supported for the sample as a whole. As levels of conformity as implied by the MCSD rose, so did the amount of obedience as indicated by scores on the MJT. The strength of the main correlation was moderate, but significant ($p < .05$). The comparison between the student and non-student group give some indication that there are different levels of authoritarianism, conformity, and obedience for each group(s).

4.7 Comparisons between groups.

Authoritarianism was hypothesised as being defined by the two related, but largely independent factors of conformity and obedience. The correlations between the scales in the previous section provided some support for this theory and to further elaborate, each scale selected to tap these two elements was analysed independently and later compared with each other. In addition, Altemeyer's (1988) RWA-scale was included to establish a general level of authoritarianism. This is despite the theoretical differences between the two approaches, however it does provide some context with which to interpret the results.

MCSD Totals:

The descriptive statistics for the MCSD scores for the whole sample and each individual group are presented in Table 4.4. The range of scores on this instrument is between 10 and 20; with 10 showing the least socially desirable responding and 20 being the highest. The overall highest score obtained from this sample was 19 and the lowest was 10. The overall range of scores was 9 and skewness from the mean was a negligible (-.021). The highest scoring group were the Mormon's (\underline{M} =16.55, \underline{SD} =1.34) and the lowest the Bikers (\underline{M} =12.5, \underline{SD} =2.38). The mean score for the sample as a whole was 14.43 (\underline{SD} =2.11).

Group	N	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	Range
<i>Total</i>	173	14.43	2.11	10	19	9
<i>Students</i>	112	13.77	1.85	11	18	7
<i>Peace Protesters</i>	7	13.29	1.6	11	15	4
<i>Security Guards</i>	7	15.43	2.44	12	19	7
<i>Mormons</i>	22	16.55	1.34	15	19	4
<i>Bikers</i>	4	12.5	2.38	10	15	5

<i>Freemasons</i>	21	16.19	1.29	14	19	5
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Table 4.5: Descriptive table of MCSD totals.

Sample Total: In order to assess whether the differences between each group were statistically significant, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was calculated. The main effect was shown to be significant at the 0.005 level ($X^2=55.125$, $df=5$). The variance in scores between the different groups therefore represented a deviation from the total mean (ranked) score and warranted further examination.

Individual Groups: Mann-Whitney tests between individual groups were also calculated as part of the procedure to enable the comparison of each groups mean scores. Conducting this many tests may increase the risk of a Type I error, hence only the results with significance levels of .005 or higher are reported. All the statistical analyses and values for the Mann-Whitney tests can be found in *Appendix 2*, and for clarity only the significant results will be reported – all used the same test and were significant at the .005 level or higher.

Students: The student's scores ranged from 11-18 and had the joint highest range (with the Security Guards), suggesting they were not as homogenous as the other groups with their levels of socially desirable responding. The joint lowest score – the scale minimum of 10 – was also recorded by a student, and also the joint highest score of 19⁴⁴. The Students MCSD scores showed that they had significantly different scores than the Mormons ($z=-5.582$) and Freemasons ($z=-5.04$), with both groups recording higher social desirability scores ($p<.005$).

⁴⁴ No quartile scores will be reported for any of the groups on the MCSD as the total range of 10 makes these figures largely meaningless, although they can be found in *Appendix 2*.

Peace Protesters: The Peace Protesters recorded a mean score of 13 on the MCSD, a maximum score of 15 (joint lowest with the Bikers) and a minimum score of 11. The range of 4 was joint lowest with the Mormon group. As a group, the Peace Protesters had significantly lower scores than the Mormons ($z=-3.683$), and the Freemasons ($z=-3.567$) on the MCSD ($p<.005$).

Security Guards: The minimum score for this group was 12 and they share the highest maximum score of 19 with the Mormons and Freemasons. The range of 7 was also shared highest with the Students, indicating a high variance between these respondents on the MCSD. As a group they had no significantly higher scores than any of the other groups.

Mormons: The minimum score attained by this group was 15 and the highest 19. They recorded both the highest minimum (15) and shared highest maximum scores of 19, along with the joint lowest range of 4, indicating some congruence between subjects on this measure. The Mormons recorded significantly higher scores ($p<.005$), than the Students ($z=-5.582$), the Peace Protesters ($z=-3.683$) and the Bikers ($z=-2.971$).

Bikers: This group recorded the lowest individual score on this instrument (10 – the scale minimum) and the joint lowest maximum of 15; the range of MCSD scores being 5. Despite the small number of respondents, the Mann-Whitney tests for the Biker group showed that they scored significantly lower than both the Mormons ($z=-2.971$) and the Freemasons ($z=-2.908$).

Freemasons: Their maximum score on the MCSD was equal highest (19) and they also recorded a minimum score of 14, with a range of 5. The individual comparisons indicated that the Freemasons scored significantly higher than the Students ($z=-5.04$), the Peace Protesters ($z=-3.567$), and the Bikers ($z=-2.908$). As with all the other individual analyses, the level of significance was set at .005 or higher to limit the possibility of a Type I error.

Students vs. Non-Students: The final analysis for each section will be to compare the student group with the remainder of the sample. As previously highlighted, these actual groups may not be mutually exclusive, but do provide a useful comparison of levels of conformity, obedience, and authoritarianism amongst the general population and those from specific groups. The larger sample sizes also provide more statistical power to the analysis.

The Students recorded significantly lower scores ($p<.005$), than the non-Students ($z=-5.598$) on the MCSD. This suggests that they are as a group, less conformist than those who were members of the other organisations.

MCSD Summary:

In reviewing the analysis of the MCSD totals, it would appear that the assumed relationship with authoritarianism was partially supported. The groups were selected through the hypothesised relationship with authoritarianism and guided by past literature. As expected, the Bikers and Peace Protesters indicated that they were the

least conformist and the Mormons and Freemasons the highest. The students also scored significantly lower than the combined sample as a whole. Interpreting these scores in light of the scale correlations from the previous sections, would suggest that – for the conformity element – that the Mormons and Freemasons were the most authoritarian. However, these results must also be interpreted in tandem with the MJT scores.

MJT Totals:

The score on the MJT is referred to by Lind (1985) as the *C-Score*. The scores are computed using a scoring algorithm, which sums the stages of a number of moral dilemmas and is interpreted as the level of consistency in making these judgements (see Lind, 2003). The higher the C-score computed, the greater consistency in making such judgements. Past research has indicated that there is a strong correlation with this score and the individual's moral stage; those who reason at a higher stage also do so with greater consistency. Hence, the subjects C-score will indicate that they have higher levels of moral reasoning and are therefore less likely to be punitive towards the transgressors of rules. The score ranges from 0.0-1.0. The highest score obtained from this sample was 0.54, the lowest was 0 and the mean .2 (SD=.12). The highest scoring group were the Bikers (M=0.33, SD=0.15) and the lowest the Security Guards (M=0.13, SD=0.07).

Group	N	Mean	S.D.
<i>Total</i>	170	0.20	0.12
<i>Students</i>	113	0.22	0.13
<i>Peace Protesters</i>	7	0.25	0.12
<i>Security Guards</i>	7	0.13	0.07
<i>Mormons</i>	21	0.14	0.08
<i>Bikers</i>	4	0.33	0.15
<i>Freemasons</i>	21	0.15	0.08

Table 4.6: Means and Standard Deviations of MJT *C-Index*.

In order to assess whether the differences between each group were statistically significant, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was calculated. The main effect was shown to be significant ($X^2=16.003$, $df=5$, $p=.007$). The variance in scores between

the different groups therefore represented a deviation from the total mean (ranked) score. The level of significance is slightly outside the range selected, but individual contrasts were conducted, as this was negligible.

Following the same procedure as with the MCSD, a Mann-Whitney test was conducted on each group. The C-score of the MJT was only found to be significant between the Student and Mormon groups ($z=-5.582$) at the requisite ($p<.005$) level of significance.

Students vs. Non-Students: The Students recorded significantly higher scores ($p<.05$), than the non-Students ($z=-2.340$) on the MJT. This suggests that they are as a group, less obedient than those who were members of the other organisations. Coupled with the results from the MCSD, this suggests that they are therefore more authoritarian.

MJT Summary:

Whilst the results of the correlations between the scales suggested that obedience as indicated by the MJT would have a bearing on authoritarianism, only one significant result was recorded. In light of previous research, this was in accordance with the suggested relationship. The students were less obedient than the Mormons and their judgement of moral issues was at a higher stage, and also from the non-student category as a whole.

RWA Totals:

The RWA-scale was included to provide a general measure of authoritarianism and some perspective to the results from the other two measures. The means and standard deviations for the RWA scores for the whole sample and each individual group are presented in Table 4.3. The highest scoring group were the Mormons (\underline{M} =184.82, \underline{SD} =15.21), and the lowest the Peace Protesters (\underline{M} =108.14, \underline{SD} =21.92). The mean score for the sample as a whole was 148.52 (\underline{SD} =31.91). The maximum possible score obtainable on this instrument is 270 (high authoritarian), and the lowest 30 (low authoritarian). The theoretical mid-point is 150. The scale is scored on an 8-point Likert format, with a range of scores from 1-9 and includes a hypothetical 5 as its average. Half of the items are reversed scored also. The overall individual highest score was 216 and the lowest 76. The range of scores was 140, and they were very negligibly negatively skewed (-.021).

Group	N	Mean	S.D.	Min.	Max.	Range
<i>Total</i>	174	148.52	31.91	76	216	76
<i>Students</i>	112	137.21	27.39	78	201	123
<i>Peace Protesters</i>	7	108.14	21.92	76	134	58
<i>Security Guards</i>	7	169.86	26.83	132	216	84
<i>Mormons</i>	22	184.82	15.21	157	206	49
<i>Bikers</i>	4	146.75	6.89	138	154	16
<i>Freemasons</i>	22	176.18	16.78	141	205	64

Table 4.7: Descriptive analysis of RWA totals.

Sample Total: In order to assess whether the differences between each group were statistically significant, a Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was calculated. Levene's test for homogeneity of variance was indicated to be significant, and hence justified

the use of a non-parametric test. The main effect was shown to be significant at the .001 level ($X^2=78.237$, $df=5$). The variance in scores between the different groups therefore represented a deviation from the total mean score.

Individual Groups: Mann-Whitney⁴⁵ tests between individual groups were also calculated, and again to reduce the chance of a Type I error, only differences with a significance level of $p<.005$ or over are reported.

Students: The highest RWA score for the students was 201 and the lowest 78. The range of scores was 123. This was the highest of all the groups suggesting they were the least homogenous in their levels of authoritarianism.

The Mann-Whitney tests showed that the Students recorded RWA scores that had significant differences in levels of authoritarianism (as measured by the RWA-scale), with the Peace Protesters ($z=-.278$) scoring lower, and the Mormons ($z=-.6516$) and Freemasons ($z=-5.765$) scoring higher than the Students⁴⁶.

Peace Protesters: The lowest RWA score for this group was 76, which was the lowest score overall. The highest score was 134, which was the lowest maximum score of all groups, and they also recorded the lowest mean score. The range of scores was 58. Comparisons between the Peace Protesters and the other groups using the Mann-Whitney procedure revealed that they scored significantly lower than the

⁴⁵ Mean Ranks for each group on the MCSD were: Students=71.47; Peace Protesters=25; Security Guards=107.86; Mormons=136.27; Bikers=44.13; Freemasons=129.36.

⁴⁶ The Mean Rank's for each group where: Students=68.83; Peace Protesters=25; Security Guards=118.21; Mormons=146.82; Bikers=83; Freemasons=134.18.

Students ($z=-2.780$), Security Guards ($z=-3.003$), Mormons ($z=-3.926$), and Freemasons ($z=-3.928$) ($p<.005$ level or higher).

Security Guards: The highest score recorded for the Security Guards was 216, which was the highest for the whole sample. The lowest score was 132, giving a range of 84. Mann-Whitney tests for the Security Guards showed that they scored significantly higher than only the Peace Protesters ($z=-3.003$).

Mormons: The highest score was recorded to be 206, the lowest 157 (which was the highest minimum score), and the range 49. For the Mormon group, it was shown that they scored significantly higher on the RWA-scale than the Students ($z=-6.516$), Bikers ($z=-3.129$), and Peace Protesters ($z=-3.926$) using the Mann-Whitney test ($p<.005$).

Freemasons: Their highest score was indicated to be 205 and the lowest to be 141, giving a range of 64. Mann-Whitney tests showed that the Freemasons scored significantly higher ($p<.005$) than the Students ($z=-5.765$), the Bikers ($z=-2.775$), and Peace Protesters ($z=-3.928$).

Bikers: The highest score was 154, and the lowest 138. The range of 16 was the lowest of all groups suggesting the greatest similarity in their levels of authoritarianism. Despite the very small sample size, the Bikers did record a significantly lower score than the Freemason's ($z=-2.775$) and Mormon's ($z=-3.129$), using the Mann-Whitney test ($p<.005$).

Students vs. Non-Students: The Students recorded significantly higher scores ($p < .005$), than the non-Students ($z = -6.574$) on the RWA-scale. This suggests that they are as a group, more authoritarian than those who were members of the other organisations.

RWA Summary:

The RWA scale was included in the test battery in order to provide some context to the other scales in the hope that the proposed relationship with authoritarianism would emerge. Following the group comparisons for the MCSD and MJT, the RWA-scale scores were again compared for each group. Again and in accordance with the hypothesis and past literature, the Peace Protesters scored lowest on the RWA, and the Mormons and Freemasons the highest. Whilst the bikes scored lower than these two high scoring groups, they had initially been expected to be the lowest scoring group. Comparisons between the students and non-students also indicated that they are as a whole, lower in levels of general authoritarianism than the remainder of the sample.

Review of Group Comparisons –

There was considerable variance on each group's scores on the three instruments. The Security Guards had the lowest levels of moral competency and the Bikers the highest. The Mormon's were the most socially desirable in their responding, and the Bikers the least. Finally, the Mormon's were also the most authoritarian, and the Peace Protesters the least. Although the range of scores was relatively limited for some of the groups and no extremely high authoritarians emerged in any group, they

did show differences in their constitution. It also justified the inclusion of each group, as they indicated that the relationship between each of the instruments differed as a function of this. Hence the levels of each could be subject to how authoritarian each group was.

The final comparisons in each section – the Students vs. the non-Students indicated that the hypothesised relationship between conformity and obedience was supported. Using Altemeyer's RWA-scale to provide a general indication of authoritarianism, the students also scored much lower on this measure.

4.9 High vs. Low Authoritarians

In order to establish if there are significant differences between the levels of authoritarianism recorded, the subjects were then divided into separate groups on account of their scores. It is often the norm to compare 'high' and 'low' scorers on whichever scale has been operationalized. Whilst this method has been criticised for omitting a significant amount of rich data that could be gleaned from the 'middle' scorers (see Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954; Christie, 1993), it is nevertheless a respected tradition in authoritarian research. The original Berkeley study in particular made extensive use of such comparisons, both quantitatively and qualitatively in the cases of Mack and Larry (see Adorno et al., 1950). Where correlations may provide misleading indications as to relationships between variables, the comparison between separate groups provides a much more stringent statistical result (Hail, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).

The feature that is especially problematic for authoritarian research concerns the range of the scores that have been recorded. It is seldom that any group records a score that is significantly higher than the scale mean. Very few actual high scoring groups have been reported. Meloen (1993) conducted an extensive survey of authoritarian studies and compared the mean item scores for a number of instruments⁴⁷. Whilst the main emphasis was to ascertain the validity of the F-scale, it was also reported that there was a ‘restriction of range’ in much authoritarian research. Meloen specifically related this to the use of students⁴⁸, and in particular social science students, for the low mean scores on the various measures he investigated. Therefore the ‘high’s’ identified in these groups are not ‘high’s’ in the tradition of the subject, and that “one may wonder how one can study authoritarian behaviour by investigating low authoritarians. The highs within these groups may still not be representative of truly high-scoring groups” (Meloen, 1993, p.63). The highest scoring groups on the F-scale have been the ‘super-patriots’ (Sherwood, 1966a) and the pro-war students (Kohn, 1972). The lowest scorers have been the objectors to the loyalty oath at the University of California (Mantell, 1974).

The quartile scores on the RWA-scale for the current sample were computed and participants categorised as high, medium and low. The overall span of RWA-scores was from 76 up to 216, giving a range of 140. The possible range on the scale was from 30 to 270 (low through to high). The overall mean was 148.52 (SD=31.91). This would indicate that the group had fairly heterogeneous scores on the RWA, and the mean score being slightly skewed to be higher than the hypothetical scale mean. The

⁴⁷ As different scales use different numbers of items and different scoring techniques the most common comparison method is to standardize the range by recomputing the mid-score and then to divide the total mean by the number of items (see Meloen, 1993, p.49).

⁴⁸ 69% of samples using the F-Scale post-Adorno et al., used student samples.

lower-quartile scores (lowest 25% - $n=44$) were 76-131, the medium scorers (25-75% - $n=83$) 132-173, and the upper-quartile (highest 25% - $n=45$) were 174-216.

To assess the differences between the two groups (*High* and *Low*) on the MCSD, a Mann-Whitney test showed that the High's scored significantly higher than the Low's on the MCSD ($z=-6.5$, $p<.001$).

To measure the differences between the three groups on the MJT, a Mann-Whitney tests showed that the High's scored significantly lower than the Low's, at the 0.001 level ($z=-5.25$, $p<.001$).

The inclusion of the MJT was to indicate moral judgement and more specifically, the desire to pass more severe punitive sanctions upon lawbreakers. Enforcement of the law in this way was determined to indicate the level of obedience exhibited by an individual. Comparison's between the high and low authoritarians on this measure, showed that the High's were more likely to reason at the lower level of moral judgement as determined by the C-Score than the Low's. Hence those who were more authoritarian were more likely to accept the law as the basis of morality and subsequently would be more obedient to enforcing prevailing rules.

The results of the comparisons between the groups categorised by their RWA scores show a significant difference in levels of social desirability. Comparisons between the high and low authoritarians indicated that the high scorers were significantly more likely to respond in a socially desirable manner. Interpretation of this indicates that

those who are high scorers in authoritarianism are distinctly more socially conformist than the low scorers.

Summary of High's and Low's:

By comparing the high scorers on the RWA with the low scorers, a number of assumptions can be made by comparing these two group's scores on the other instruments. It should be reiterated that the RWA-scale is used in this instance as a general indication of authoritarianism from which further theoretical assumptions can be gained. High scorers were more socially desirable in their responding, and accordingly more conformist in their nature as they attempt to portray a 'good' image in line with what they perceive to be the correct way of behaving. The high scorers were also more likely to morally judge at lower levels, and therefore being more liable to accept the law as a basis of morality. Hence, they are regarded as being more obedient as they submit to both the rule of law and its enforcement. These comparisons fit the model of authoritarianism proposed in *Chapter 3*. Authoritarians are both more conformist and obedient than non-authoritarians. However, care should always be taken when comparing 'high and low' authoritarians, where there are no significantly high scorers in the sample and the RWA-scale is suggested to only provide an broad indication of authoritarianism. Whilst relatively high scores were recorded and the relationship remained as hypothesised, the possibility that this may not hold true for very high scorers remains.

4.13 Item Analyses – RWA validity.

One question that remains regarding the future of authoritarian research is whether there is any utility in the various scales that have been developed to measure this construct. It has been argued that although instruments such as Altemeyer's RWA-scale have excellent psychometric properties, they are not necessarily valid measures of authoritarianism. Whereas each author has added to the growing research effort, new ideas about authoritarianism are beginning to emerge. Whilst they may still be in their infancy and largely unproven, they nevertheless represent a reform in authoritarianism theory. Subsequently new methods of measuring these theories will need to be developed and tested.

The most popular and highly regarded measure of authoritarianism to-date is Altemeyer's RWA-scale (Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996) ⁴⁹. There are significant problems with using this scale as a measure of authoritarianism, although it does at the very least provide a general indication. Analyses of the RWA-items with the other scales, provides some indication of the statements that are likely to indicate authoritarianism. A number of statements correlated in the hypothesised direction with the MCSD and the MJT. Subsequently, the respondents who agreed with these items were the most conformist and obedient. It would therefore make a useful starting place to construct a rudimentary 'scale' from these items that correlate the highest in the hypothesised directions. For example, item 3 from Altemeyer's (1988) RWA-scale – "It is always better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy troublemakers in our society who

⁴⁹ The evolution of the RWA scale has seen modifications to various items, although Altemeyer (1996, p.16) believes any of the permutations on the original is suitable for measuring right-wing authoritarianism.

are trying to create doubt in people's minds" correlated .412 with the MCSD and -.239 with the MJT. It also correlated .759 with the RWA total and all of these correlations proved significant at the .001 level. Authoritarian subjects scoring highly on this item were also likely to be conformist and obedient as measured by the MCSD and MJT respectively.

A number of other statements also showed a similar relationship:

- 1) *RWA 3* – "It is always better to trust the judgement of the proper authorities in government and religion than to listen to the noisy troublemakers in our society who are trying to create doubt in people's minds". Correlations⁵⁰: MCSD=.412*; MJT=-.239.
- 2) *RWA 5* – "It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines and movies to keep unsuitable material away from the youth". Correlations: MCSD=.462*; MJT=-.278*.
- 3) *RWA 8* – "There is nothing wrong with pre-marital sexual intercourse". Correlations: MCSD=.487*; MJT=-.268.
- 4) *RWA 9* – "The facts on crime, sexual immorality, and the recent public disorders all show we have to crack down harder on deviant groups and troublemakers if we are going to save our moral standards and preserve law and order". Correlations: MCSD=.304; MJT=-.388*.
- 5) *RWA 12* – "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn"⁵¹. Correlations: MCSD=.462*; MJT=-.269.

⁵⁰ * $p < .05$.

⁵¹ This statement has shown the highest levels of discriminatory ability over time (Altemeyer, 1996)

- 6) *RWA 14* – “Once our government leaders and the authorities condemn the dangerous elements in our society, it will be the duty of every patriotic citizen to stomp out the rot that is poisoning our country from within”. Correlations: $MCSD=.344^*$; $MJT=-.182$.
- 7) *RWA 15* – “Free speech means that people should even be allowed to make speeches and write books urging the overthrow the government”. Correlations: $MCSD=.466^*$; $MJT=-.154$.
- 8) *RWA 21* – “The courts are right on being easy on drug users as punishment would not do any good in cases like these”. Correlations: $MCSD=.361^*$; $MJT=-.176$.
- 9) *RWA 23* – “In the end, established authorities, like parents and our national leaders, generally turn out to be right about things, and all the protesters don’t know what they are talking about”. Correlations: $MCSD=.205$; $MJT=-.264^*$.
- 10) *RWA 26* – “The real keys to the good life are obedience, discipline and sticking to the straight and narrow”. Correlations: $MCSD=.413^*$; $MJT=-.238$.

These ten items represent the best examples of where the RWA statements conform to the theory of authoritarianism proposed. It was argued that the original theory of authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950) was to some extent incorrect, and that its influence upon subsequent research still persisted. Whilst Altemeyer’s RWA-scale (Altemeyer, 1981; 1988; 1996) has answered many of the methodological concerns raised in the original study (see Hyman and Sheatsley, 1954), it has also been criticised for its lack of richness in theory (Christie, 1993). The psychometric properties of the RWA-scale are proven to be sound and replicable and it demonstrates good levels of reliability and a uni-dimensional structure. However, this

has been at the detriment of its validity. The measure was included here to give an indication of general levels of authoritarianism.

The current analysis theorised that authoritarianism was a function of both conformity and obedience. The results indicated that this relationship was largely confirmed. Validating this theory necessitated that there be an inclusion of a measure of authoritarianism to standardise the scores obtained on the other instruments and provide some level of perspective in their interpretation. The RWA-scale provided this, but as was discussed, the theory of authoritarianism guiding this measure was less than representative of authoritarianism. Indeed, the evolution of the scale indicated that it was firmly attached to the Fascist example of the authoritarian. Examination of these ten items indicated that there is no distinct ideological bias present in authoritarianism and that the majority of the statements made reference to censorship and punishment/control. Future research would be useful in further exploring these elements of authoritarianism.

4.10 Summary of Results.

To summarise the results in line with the hypotheses about the nature of authoritarianism, enables the proposal that authoritarians are more conformist and obedient. However, this prediction is for the sample as a whole and more detailed examination of the results for the individual groups and demographics suggested that there are other forces that influence authoritarianism. A more detailed discussion of these findings will follow in *Chapter 5*.

Overall, it was discovered that authoritarians (i.e. those who scored at the higher end of the RWA-scale) were more socially desirable in their responding and less competent in their moral judgements. They could be described as being more likely to conform to social norms than low authoritarians and be less objective in their behaviour. Their lower competency in moral judgements would indicate that they are also more likely to be accepting of the prevailing law as a basis for morality and hence more prone to punitive behaviour and therefore more obedient. However, the strength of these relationships was not always significant for each group and for the sample overall. Results are therefore merely suggestive of a relationship and warrant further replication and clarification before they can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon observed here. More sophisticated statistical analysis may also provide illustration of many of the relationships between the variables. In particular, factor analysis of the MCSD and MJT items together may be beneficial in establishing the nature of these variables in relation to authoritarianism. Such techniques were not employed here as the study was partly exploratory in nature and the composition of the samples did not suit such analysis.

The individual groups do indicate that there are differing levels in the strengths of the relationships between each measure. With few exceptions, it was only the intensity of the correlation that changed and not the direction, and provides support for the idea that there were differences in authoritarianism for each of the groups. The Mormons and Freemasons in particular, epitomised the relationships expected; they had been expected to be the most authoritarian groups in the sample. There were various differences amongst the individual groups on demographic variables also, so the sample biases no doubt influenced any results. The inclusion of them was to assess

their impact on levels of authoritarianism as they had previously been identified as important covariates of authoritarianism (see Altemeyer, 1996).

4.11 Conclusion

The methodology and analysis employed to test the conformity/obedience feature of authoritarianism, provided some support for this theory. The specific measures of these aspects indicated that there was a relationship with general authoritarianism, as measured by the RWA-scale. The RWA-scale was specifically included to provide some context to the research domain and although it is regarded as a general indicator of authoritarianism, there was disagreement over its theoretical underpinnings. The analysis revealed that the revised concept provided a richer and more valid understanding of authoritarianism and further elaboration on its features and development will be expanded upon in the following chapter.

Chapter Five – Discussion.

5.1 Introduction

If the Adorno et al. study is seen as setting the foundations for the study of the authoritarian personality, the concept is now over fifty years old. Yet there is still considerable debate over its acquisition, its definition, and its measurement. How it has weathered such intense scrutiny and still remained relevant to modern psychology is surprising. Its endurance being perhaps one of its endearing qualities, and as was remarked by Brown (1965), there are many occasions where the authoritarian identifies himself through speech or behaviour that keeps the topic from being relegated into the realms of obscurity.

However its preoccupation with Fascism has long since been refuted, and likewise the tenuous links with psychodynamic theory have also received much discord. Alternative theories have also been met with mixed reception and there has yet to be any vastly superior theory and measuring instrument developed in combination, that offers significant gains in identifying authoritarian personalities since the F-scale. Reviews following its 50th anniversary call for a new and fresh outlook on the field and to throw off many of the ‘shackles’ of the past (Smith, 1997; Martin, 2001; Rosier & Willig, 2002). The concluding chapter will therefore assess the extent to which the proposed theory of authoritarianism was supported, and the limitations upon which the method of inquiry imposes upon this interpretation. The second part will attempt a broader interpretation of authoritarianism in a contemporary context and in light of the findings of the current analysis.

Part One – The Current Study

5.2 Interpretation of results

The results section produced a vast amount of data, which can be analysed both in light of the proposed theory of authoritarianism and other research in the field. Aside from the number of measures that were administered and the relationships observed between them, there were some diverse groups of subjects who were selected in order to provide an illustration of potential authoritarianism. Overall, the results supported the hypothesised relationship between conformity and obedience as features of authoritarianism. The higher the level of authoritarianism, the more conformist and obedient the subjects were. The converse of this relationship also held true, in that those who were relatively low in authoritarianism were more autonomous and less punitive in their judgements.

In addition, those classed as being authoritarian exhibited stronger levels of these relationships. When comparing those who were classified as high authoritarian with those classified as low, the strengths of the correlations between the measures increased significantly in the hypothesised direction. Indeed the strength of the relationships between the instruments was negligible for those who were classified as being low in authoritarianism. These differences provide support for the concept that authoritarianism is formed by conformity and obedience, and that low authoritarians lack significant levels of either trait. There were also differences between the two groups on each of the separate measures (MCSD and MJT), with the high's recording significantly higher scores on each. This was again in the hypothesised direction.

It was hypothesised that religious groups would follow a very strict moral code and that the rules advocated would need to be followed obstinately. Therefore, moral reasoning with such individuals might feasibly not develop past a particular level due to the fact that they already have a set of moral guidelines that they adhere to. For example, during one of the sermons attended, a minister recounted a story involving one of his children who had stolen a small toy from a shop. The theft had been discovered on return from a shopping trip, and despite the half-hour journey from the shop itself, the parent felt it important to return with the child so that he may admit his actions to the shopkeeper. The reason for this was that without spending the time to teach the child the errors of their ways, they were unlikely to learn. Rather than simply administering a punishment, instead the child was forced to confront his actions not just from an ethical perspective, but also from the point of view of the others involved. This undoubtedly gives the child a firm understanding of moral behaviour, in that it is important to respect the rights of others and corresponds to the post-conventional stages proposed by Kohlberg (1963). One of the principles of 'restorative justice' (Zehr and Mika, 2003) attempts to address criminal behaviour in this way, by forcing the offender to confront the victim and appreciate the consequences of their behaviour. Such a principle is often seen as being less punitive and liberally minded with regards to dealing with offenders. So in this example, it was witnessed that conformity (and authoritarianism) existed largely independently of obedience.

The Mormons as a group were decidedly authoritarian and conformist, but the actual correlation between conformity and obedience was slight. As a religious group, this finding was surprising, although a number of explanations could account for such

behaviour. Firstly, during preliminary discussions about the possibility of conducting research with the church many accounts of what occurred there ensued. One such report related to a member of the church who had recently become separated from her husband and was in the process of seeking a divorce – something that is largely against the doctrine of this particular religion. During the weekly gatherings, there is time devoted to religious studies in between the sermons and it is here that groups are separated according to their similarity - in particular the married people - the children and those who are single. Subsequently the member who became estranged from her husband found herself somewhat isolated from all the groups, as she no longer fit into the ‘expected’ mould. Whilst in the wider confines of the church she was not discriminated against, there would however appear some acrimony towards her with regard to the smaller in-groups that were formed. This provides an example that although a non-conformist is not ‘punished’ *per se*, they are subject to some prejudice from other members. The Mormons were highly conformist, but not especially punitive towards those who do not conform. Rather the repercussions of non-conformity were exclusion from the group.

What is surprising is that the Mormon group had the lowest mean age of all the groups, yet the highest RWA scores. Both in this sample and authoritarian research in general, levels of authoritarian have been shown to increase with age (see Altemeyer, 1996). As a group they were somewhat different to the remainder of this and wider research samples, in that they showed high levels of authoritarianism at a younger age. It is possible that the effects of religion make the onset of authoritarian attitudes, and in particular conformity, a comprehensive element of their lives.

The Freemason's as a group were the second highest scorers on the RWA scale and for such a 'clandestine' organisation this was not unexpected. The cohesiveness of the group is assured by its selection criteria, whereby all new members must be introduced and vouched for, before a committee decides upon their suitability. This creates a very strong in-group/out-group distinction between the members and society at large. Duckitt (1989) proposed that the higher the demands of in-group cohesion, the higher the level of authoritarianism. Hence an organisation like the Freemason's would be expected to contain highly authoritarian members⁵². In addition to their relatively high levels of authoritarianism, the Freemason's were also the second highest scorers on the MCSD and recorded the third lowest score on the MJT. The overall interpretation of their scores suggested that they were highly conformist and also comparatively obedient. This to some extent epitomised the model of authoritarianism being proposed. Their behaviour showed that they altered their behaviour in line with social standards and that they were more likely to accept the law as a basis of morality.

What was interesting about the Freemason's as a sample was their willingness to participate in the study. The investigator was introduced at the beginning of the meeting, and in line with the ethical principle of voluntary participation, all members were clearly informed that there was no demands to complete the questionnaires should they not desire to. However, when the questionnaires were collected at no time did any of the participants show the slightest inclination that they did not want to participate. It could be likened to obedience on behalf of the members to the master of the lodge. Freemasonry is often regarded as a highly secretive group, characterised by

⁵² The question of whether authoritarian groups *attract* authoritarian personalities or whether they become this way whilst in the group is discussed by Duckitt (1989).

tradition and ritual. It is also relatively unique in modern westernised societies for such formal organisations of this kind to exist. And whilst their aims may have digressed from the secretive images of the past, there is still a highly cohesive and covertly ran group present. Membership is tightly controlled and with few exceptions, the activities of the group are relatively arcane. For the study of authoritarianism, the hierarchical structure, traditionally conservative, and highly selective membership somewhat epitomise the archetype authoritarian organisation. Although not linked to any real political ideology, the discovery of authoritarian personalities in this group is not surprising and provides a wealth of support for the current theory of authoritarianism under examination.

For such a seemingly uncensored group, the world of the outlaw motorcycle member is surprisingly regulated. Veno (2002) epitomises the commonly held belief about bikers and the actual reality of their existence, suggesting:

The outlaw motorcycle clubs consider themselves to be among the last bastions of free people, free from the straight world. Yet, even they need rules to survive. While the clubs try to keep the rules to a minimum, they loom large over everything the club does...It's the greatest anomaly of the clubs. Many club members see themselves as modern cowboys, the outlaw heroes of the Wild West. Yet still they require the structure and coordination of the group to achieve that individual lifestyle. With that comes the politics inherent in any structured gathering of people. It's the fundamental paradigm or conundrum that I face with the clubs. I keep hearing the terms *individuality* and *freedom of expression* when bikies

describe their way of life, but invariably their conversations are full of rules, politics, and drama. These are completely opposite. It's irreconcilable. (p.86-87)

Aspiring members of these groups and outsiders may consider the life of an outlaw motorcycle group to provide an existence beyond the laws with which the majority of us are required to adhere to in wider society. However as Veno suggests, this could not be further from the truth. Rather, it is the rejection and of one set of rules and the replacement of others that characterise the membership of an official motorcycle club. The pressure to conform and the obedience with which rules are enforced indicate that the motorcycle club members may be anti-establishment, but are far from being anti-authoritarian.

Such experiences were reinforced during the interviews conducted with J. Several accounts of members who had strayed from the clubs rules being dealt with severely were recalled. The form of punishment for seemingly minor infractions would most usually be expulsion or suspension from the club. However, where a member had seemingly sinned against the 'spirit' of the organisation, violent retribution was seemingly not uncommon. There was also a strong sense of 'us' and 'them' portrayed, not only with the police and authorities, but also to members of society in general. J made several remarks about 'straights', which referred to almost anyone who was not a member of an outlaw motorcycle club. Whilst other groups may also regard themselves as being a law unto themselves, the outlaw motorcycle members would appear to regard themselves as the epitome of this genre.

In any discussion on authoritarianism, it would perhaps be the most common assumption that members of a motorcycle gang would be amongst the least authoritarian examples one would expect to find in modern societies. Reference to the word 'outlaw' conjures images of those who ardently oppose the rules of mainstream society. However, examination and interpretation of the results may offer an alternative to such a conjecture. The Bikers mean RWA-score of 146, was marginally below the sample mean (and also the scales theoretical mean of 150). Whilst this score does not make the Bikers authoritarians, it does not indicate them to be un-authoritarian⁵³ either. The bikers also had the lowest range in their scores, suggesting the greatest uniformity as a group on this measure. The small sample size (n=4) could have confounded this. Nevertheless, this is not as would be expected from a group who are seemingly committed to being free and individual. Such a result illustrates the paradox that Veno (2002) refers to with reference to the aims of the organisation, and the inevitability of a substantial code of regulation in order to maintain its structure. Although the Bikers consider themselves as individuals, it would appear that by committing themselves to the club, that they are distinctly part of a collective where individuality is not a major feature. As an individual in wider society this premise may hold true, but within the confines of the group they are expected to adopt a strict format of behaviour which is sacrament to their otherwise espoused beliefs.

Indeed the level of adherence expected of members is all encompassing. One member stated,

I guess I was about six months into being a full member when I noticed
that I really didn't have friends from outside the club anymore...It's like

⁵³ Altemeyer (1981) did not explicitly define his concept of a low scorer on RWA, save for them being regarded as relatively liberal in their political outlook.

the club takes on complete ownership over your time and life...we are not supposed to speak about club business with 'cits' [citizens]. (Veno, 2002, p.105)

As J was to recount, one of the only excuses for missing club business was if you were in jail. Being a club member requires not only significant time, but with that also comes a specific physical identity. Aside from the obligatory motorcycle⁵⁴, particular styles of dress are expected. Identification with the particular gang is also important; "Another piece of the membership jigsaw puzzle is the tattoo. The full member is permitted to have the club logo and motto tattooed on their body...In most clubs, a full member is expected to acquire a club tattoo within a year of joining the club" (p.57). The club colours and tattoo essentially become a uniform, which identifies them as belonging to a particular group.

During consideration as to which groups could confirm or refute the hypothesised theory of authoritarianism, a decisively 'left-wing' – in the liberal sense – was required. If authoritarianism and conformity/obedience were to be linked together in the hypothesised relationship the presence of a non-authoritarian sample could refute this covariance. The Biker's it was imagined would represent this. Their rejection of the law, and demands of individuality were seen as anti-establishment and bordering on almost anarchistic. However, whilst their levels of authoritarianism were average, they were low social conformists and possessed a higher level (in this sample) of moral competence. To some extent they refute the hypothesised model of authoritarianism by recording higher levels of authoritarianism than was expected and

⁵⁴ Contrary to common belief, not all Bikers ride Harley Davidson motorcycles. It is the style of the biker that is important, with Japanese 'sport bikes' being the most revered (see Veno, 2003).

the other measures would suggest. However, a more tentative explanation could draw on the presence of political ideology in the RWA-scale. Altemeyer admits his scale measures right-wing authoritarianism, and its development relies on considerable reference to political persuasion. What is interesting in the current context is the distinct *lack* of political discussion that was offered by J. Reference to political events aside, no particular preference for any political party can be recalled. The life of an outlaw motorcycle club member places them somewhat outside of the political and social arena in this respect. The mean scores of the biker group being around the scale mean indicate that there is no political persuasion present in this group according to Altemeyer's definition. Yet the Bikers did show themselves to be low in conformity and obedience, and whilst they do not provide distinct support for the current model of authoritarianism, much of this discrepancy may be due to the validity of the RWA-scale as a predictive measure.

The use of student samples in authoritarian research raise significant questions regarding the generalisability of the findings. The inclusion of a student sample in the current analysis was for justified on two main grounds. Firstly, and as is often the case with the majority of academic research, they provided a convenient and relatively heterogeneous sample with which to test a theory. Secondly, whilst being relatively heterogeneous with regards to background variables, for example socio-economic status, age, and intelligence, there exists a wide range of personality characteristics present in the sample. Regional and cultural variations are also apparent. The students in this sample were relatively low scorers on the RWA-scale, and were similar to the many other student samples that have been measured in past research in that their scores are usually slightly below the scale mean of 150 (Meloan, 1993; Altemeyer,

1996). They did however possess the largest range of scores, which indicated that there was a relatively large variation of authoritarian attitudes present in the sample. Their scores on the MCSD were below the mean also indicating that they were not a particularly conformist group. MJT scores indicate some level of moral competence, which is not surprising given their supposed levels of education. The main rationale for the inclusion of the student sample was to assist in testing the overall model of authoritarianism, and the results were in line with the hypothesised relationship of the variables. Indeed more than any of the groups (except the Freemasons), the high scoring authoritarians were the most conformist and obedient.

The sample of Peace Protesters had the lowest RWA-scores of the entire sample. Their RWA scores were significantly lower than all of the other groups in the sample, including the students. One of the lowest recorded authoritarian scores in past research was Karabenick & Wilson's (1969) 'doves', which were similarly protesting against another politically motivated war in Vietnam. The purpose of the demonstration this group were attending was against the invasion of Iraq, a conflict that had raised much debate over the legitimacy with which the coalition forces had any 'democratic' right to become involved in⁵⁵. Both in Australia and overseas, the authorities were being considerably chastised by the public and the media for their continued involvement in the conflict. Public opinion indicated that there was a majority against such an invasion. Hence, while a similar group of protesters may be advocating pacifism in the general sense and encourage universal peace, the demonstrators in this instance had an additional political element to their campaign.

⁵⁵ It should be recalled that one of the primary purposes of the invasion of Iraq was the removal of the states dictator, Saddam Hussein, and to establish a democracy in this principality. Concern over the possession of 'weapons of mass destruction' provided additional mandate to this offensive.

Whether they can be regarded as anti-authoritarian is unclear, but they were certainly not authoritarian in their attitudes.

The Peace Protesters were the second lowest scorers on the MCSD also; only the Bikers recorded lower scores on this instrument. This score is a typically low for this measure of social desirability and suggests that the desire to provide appealing responses was not a prominent feature of these individuals. They were also the second highest scorers on the MJT, which indicated that there was a higher level of moral competence; again only the Bikers recorded a higher score. They were less likely therefore to accept the law as a basis of morality. Taken together, these totals on these instruments would suggest that the Peace Protesters were neither conformist nor obedient. The level of authoritarianism as measured by the RWA would further indicate that there was some validity to this proposed theory.

During the data collection with the Peace Protesters, there was considerable time to observe their behaviour and to interact with the participants. Whereas the Freemason's had diligently completed the questionnaire's, the Peace Protesters were by large more inquisitive about the items they were responding to. A number of items could be open to interpretation and these subjects were the most likely to question their interpretation. It is sometimes a curious feature of psychological testing, that questionnaire's will be returned with comments written on them. All but one of the questionnaire's returned by this group, had some remark written on them. For example, one subject stated that it depended upon whose authority a child should obey (*RWA 12* – "Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues that children should learn"). Another such instance stated that he believed there to be too

much censorship (RWA 5 – “It would be best for everyone if the proper authorities censored magazines and movies to keep unsuitable material away from the youth”). If reference is made to the proposition that authoritarians are ‘yea-sayer’s’ then it could be argued that low authoritarians are indeed the opposite. Not only are they unwilling to endorse any statement that is presented to them, but they will actively question its meaning.

The Peace Protesters provide support for the model of authoritarianism currently under examination. Whereas the Freemason’s and Mormon’s indicated that authoritarians were social conformist and obedient, the data recorded from the Peace Protesters bear upon the opposite premise, namely that non-authoritarians are less conformist and obedient in the social milieu. Not being able to provide an adequate explanation of non-authoritarians or even of authoritarians of the left has been a characteristic of much authoritarian research. And where those who have recorded low scores on the measures of authoritarianism previously employed, seldom has much revelation been afforded to these individuals. For example, the low scorer on the F-scale is described as being *not* anti-democratic and therefore *not* susceptible to Fascist tendencies. Little explanation has therefore been extended to such groups; rather their interpretation merely provides support for the presence of people who are simply not authoritarian in nature. Such a shortcoming highlights the lack of coherence in many theories of authoritarianism.

As a group the security guards were relatively authoritarian, recording the third highest score of the sample. However this is only 20 points more than the scale mean, and the standard deviation for such a small sample (n=7) indicates that there was

considerable variance between the subjects from this sample. They were also to record the third highest social desirability scores, suggesting that their authoritarianism was confounded by their conformist nature. In contrast to the Bikers, the security guards exemplify the hypothesised authoritarian model. They are higher on authoritarianism and social conformity, but possess a lower level of reasoning over social issues.

As hypothesised, levels of moral competence as measured by the MJT were the lowest for the whole sample. As a group the security guards indicated that they were the most likely to accept the law as a basis for moral judgement; they were therefore the most obedient of the sample⁵⁶. It is not surprising that as a group who were employed to impose rules that they would perhaps reason in this way. By comparison, the police in Colemand and Gorman's (1982) sample were also relatively authoritarian. If the correlations discovered in the current study were generalisable to a wider population, they would also be more accepting of the law as a basis of morality. As enforcers of the law, they are the least likely to question their purpose. That is not to suggest that law enforcement personnel do not possess any autonomy of judgement over their decisions, but they are nevertheless expected to identify and respond to transgressions of the law.

Due to the method of data collection with the Security Guards, little observational comment can be used to elaborate upon their scores on the three measures. They do however belong to a hierarchically structured organisation, one that requires group identification in the form of a uniform and the adherence to certain social standards of conduct. It is also feasible that the many rules and regulations that they are required to

⁵⁶ The Security Guards MJT score was only marginally lower than the Mormon's and Freemason's however.

enforce and maintain are a 'feature' of the personality of these individuals. Whilst their actions may require some element of professional discretion that they acquire during their training, it is conceivable that certain character traits be especially prominent in those who acquire such roles. Although no ideological constraints present themselves to security work in general, their authoritarian structure is omnipresent. As Milgram (1974) noted, there must be some level of regulation and control in all collective societies or else possible anarchy would likely ensue. Seemingly, the Security Guards provide such a presence.

Overall, the correlations between the MJT and MCSD were intended to indicate the relationship between obedience and conformity. It was hypothesised that the authoritarian would show increasing levels of obedience and conformity. In agreement with Feldman (2003) and many other authors in the field (Crutchfield, 1955; Davis, 1975; Scodel & Mussen, 1953; Vaughan & White, 1966), the issue of conforming to predominating norms and values is seen as a fundamental and central feature of authoritarianism. Whereas Adorno et al. (1950) and Altemeyer (1981) defined this aspect more in terms of conventionalism, the highly ideological and domination of right-wing reflection undoubtedly influenced this variation.

5.3 Limitations and Implications.

In reiterating the concerns over the original Berkeley study voiced by Hyman and Sheatsley, they pass comment that "no work of social research is perfect. Human beings, scientists no less than critics, are fallible. Practical limitations impose themselves on every empirical investigation and force departures from the ideal" (Hyman & Sheatsley, 1954, p.51). The same confines still apply over half-a-century

later, and although not exclusive to authoritarian research, are confounded by the sensitive and subversive nature of the construct. The limitations and any inferences that can be drawn from the findings can be attributed and/or interpreted in accord with three separate entities – the sample used, the measuring instruments, and future directions for subsequent investigation.

The sample.

The original Berkeley study utilised a vast array of respondents who were hypothesised to display different levels of authoritarianism. Groups as diverse as women from public speaking classes to men from the United Seaman's Service were examined in relation to the perceived level of authoritarianism in their personality. Comparisons between these groups also provided interpretive value to the scores on the various measures that were administered to them. These samples were less than ideal, and even the work of Eysenck and Coulter (1972) in the comparison between British Communists and Fascists was distorted by accusations of carelessness and/or impropriety by the authors.

It is also an artefact of the complexity and practicalities of conducting authoritarian research that the majority of research has focused on student samples. Meloen (1993) computed the total number of student and non-student respondents to various permutations of authoritarian scales. From 1945 to 1980, there were 136 studies exclusively employing some 18,161 students. By comparison, the same period witnessed 73 studies containing a total of 8,035 non-student populations. Telephone surveys and even student's parents can often form such research samples. As most research is naturally conducted in a university environment, student populations

provide readily accessible samples with which to test scale developments and comparisons with other instruments. In addition, of the 73 studies with non-student respondents there were – according to Meehan's criteria for support of right-wing groups – only some nine that met this requirement. A similar proportion was found for those expected to be representative of low-scorers and upholders of democratic values. Hence, of the 2,341 publications listed in the psychological abstracts between 1950 and 1989, there were perhaps only 20 that actively sought out groups representative of the syndrome – less than 1%. The very nature of the authoritarian, being naturally suspicious and deeply instilled in the in-group means that access to such samples is notoriously difficult. Aside from the final groups selected, attempts were made to gain cooperation from several similar organisations without success.

But whilst student and other homogenous samples have been condemned for their lack of generalisability to wider populations, the opposite has been argued for the testing of some research designs. Kerlinger, Middendorp, and Amon (1976) conducted analysis of social attitudes with reference to their overriding structure and discovered surprising similarity between them in three different countries. Attitudes are seen as being relatively universal amongst people of all cultures (Levy & Hefner, 1964). From a methodological viewpoint, Kerlinger et al. were to develop on arguments proposed by Thurstone, which for any analysis of latent dimensions of values and attitudes the less random the sample the more utility in providing evidence for such a theory. The restricted variance of responses would more likely support any findings further than an especially diverse sample. Whilst examples of a stratified sample are included in the current analysis, their main inclusion is for one of illustration rather than statistical power. The primary emphasis is to demonstrate a

theory and generalisations to a wider population are tenuously made in light of these explorations.

The current study aimed to address some of the problems that have been raised with regards to the representativeness of samples in authoritarian research. As was discussed, the initial intention was to specifically examine right-wing groups to enable such interpretations to be forthcoming. However, the problem that arose was not access to such a sample *per se*, but establishing criteria with which to select a group to approach. The obvious choice was a 'hate group' of which the Internet is littered with examples of. Further exploration into the theory cast doubt on this assumption that a group of individuals who pledged allegiance to an abhorrent and thankfully extinct ideology, were indeed the quintessential modern authoritarians. Rather, as the theory developed groups that appeared to have a less obvious link with authoritarianism began to emerge. The Mormon's and Freemason's might not appear at first glance to engage their members in austere practices, but were shown to possess some highly authoritarian associates. Hence in the true nature of scientific inquiry, the groups that were examined here were to provide not only confirmatory evidence for the proposed theory, but in addition allow sufficient scope for it to be falsified.

Sample size again is an issue that must be addressed. Despite gaining access to many groups, the relative marginality of them restricted the numbers who were willing to participate. It could also be a possibility that the number of questionnaire's returned were merely to placate the researcher and avoid further intrusion. The size of a sample can seemingly never be too large for a piece of social science research, but where statistical methods are employed in data analysis there are strict assumptions that must

be met when utilising many techniques. Some of the calculations therefore are not to be assumed as evidentiary in the strictest sense, but rather illustrative of the phenomenon that was observed. In some instances, larger samples from each group were simply not possible and therefore the effort that was extended to gaining the limited number of questionnaires would have been wasted, as the entire group would have to be rejected. As an overall sample, these limitations do not apply. But in some of the individual comparisons, the statistical interpretation is somewhat restricted and meaningless without elaboration using the observations gained during the study also. It is somewhat an irony of authoritarian research that those groups who would be the most definitive of the syndrome may also be as a result of authoritarianism, the most difficult to access.

The instruments

Each of the measures had been carefully selected from a whole wealth of literature on authoritarianism and each of the relevant disciplines to determine the most appropriate. The rationale for each is expanded in *Chapter Four*. The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSD) (Crowne & Marlow, 1964) was selected as it was felt it tapped both internal and external levels of social desirability and was general enough to reason from. The short-item scale was used in this instance to aid in field research. The second measure was where propensity to obedience was based upon the moral judgements of the individual respondent. Acceptance of the law as a basis of morality was hypothesised to indicate a desire to punish wrongdoers regardless of the moral considerations for their actions and hence indicate a propensity to obedient behaviour. The Moral Judgement Test (MJT) (Lind, 1984) was selected, as not only did it indicate moral stage preference in the Kohlbergian

tradition, but also provided a level of consistency to these judgements. The closed and rigid mindset of the authoritarian was hypothesised to perhaps be a function of this. Whilst the measures are not ideal they are all developed independently of each other and allow generalisations to be made. Essentially the most reliable and least ideological authoritarianism measure available to-date is Altemeyer's (1988) Right-wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale. Although not ideal in that its theory is open to some criticism, it does at least provide a suitable indication of *general* levels of authoritarianism.

Whether the measure of social desirability can be judged to indicate conformity is open to some interpretation. There are many different facets of the 'response set' in personality research (see 2.3). The question also remains of whether this is a conscious or unconscious decision on behalf of the individual responding to the questions. Does the individual actively alter their response to an item in a deliberate attempt to deceive, or else is it an unwitting process of avoidance in assigning to themselves a negative trait (Edwards, 1957). Edwards further argues that,

It is possible that the traits or items which are judged socially desirable are those that are fairly common or dominant among the members of a group. If a characteristic is prevalent or dominant in a group, it will perhaps be judged desirable. If this is the case, we might expect statements relating to desirable traits to be endorsed more frequently than those relating to undesirable traits. (Edwards, 1957, p.86)

Edwards postulates in his concluding comments on the nature of social desirability upon the presence of anxiety in the socially desirable responders. Social desirability could therefore be a conscious decision to deceive the self and the wider population.

Of all the measures, the MJT was disappointing. Although the range of scores obtained was small – and could be peculiar to this particular sample – there was nowhere near the variation recorded by Lind (2003). The only possible explanation could be test fatigue, as the MJT was the second measure in the test battery and is usually administered in isolation. Criticism of the MJT overall is not significant, largely due to the fact that Lind is one of the only active researchers in the field at the present time. Research efforts in morality have generally proposed alternatives rather than development of Kohlberg's stage theory. The completeness of the DIT with regards to theory and psychometric properties is also universally accepted and highly regarded. Lind's explorations into the cognitive (consistency) importance of determining moral judgements are one of the few recent alternatives in this area. Actual comparisons between stage preference and stage consistency have been examined by Rest, Thoma, and Edwards (1997). Whilst support was forthcoming for Lind's cognitive basis for assessing moral competency – the stage preference measure – the DIT was concluded to be a superior instrument. However, the MJT was not rejected as being invalid. Rest et al. were concerned more with the guiding theory of moral cognition and in particular how this related to Kohlberg's stages. In addition, the C-Index was regarded as an inappropriate vehicle for assessing any cognitive basis of moral evaluation. Even by computing 'C' scores from DIT data, it did not provide convincing evidence of cognitive consistency. Regardless, there is some evidence that

the C-Index may be more use as a supplementary measure to the traditional stage theory approach.

Altemeyer's RWA scale did perform as expected, and although no extremely high authoritarians were recorded, it did allow the comparison of RWA high and low scorers. As authoritarianism and social desirability correlate significantly, we may never be able to accurately record a high authoritarian score. As authoritarianism rises, the less likely people are to validly respond to a statement. The conforming nature of the authoritarian recognises the need to somewhat conceal their true feelings. Seemingly, the undesirable nature of the authoritarian personality restricts even those most prone to this syndrome from accurately reflecting and recording their actual score. The use of other measures of social desirability and social conformity in conjunction with authoritarianism scales may allow the development of a more refined theory.

The measures employed here were selected to provide support for a theory of authoritarianism. Further research may confirm such relationships and the use of other measures may allow more concrete conclusions to be formed and elaborated upon. Although the MCSD and MJT do not explicitly indicate conformity and obedience they were selected as being representative of these domains. Each gave an indication of the importance of these variables and was provided some context in relation to general authoritarianism by the RWA-scale. It is unfortunate that in over 50 years of research, no adequate measure of authoritarianism – both theoretically and methodologically - has been developed. Much of the blame can be laid upon the poor theory that began this tradition in research and its highly ideological biases. The

emerging theories of Duckitt (1989), Feldman (2003), and the model proposed here, have sought to address such shortcomings. However, they are all in their relative infancy, and cannot seemingly ignore the whole wealth of authoritarian research that has advanced the concept to its current position.

Future research

The final section of the previous chapter was concerned with the review of the items from the RWA-scale, which provided some measure of authoritarianism in line with the proposed conformity and obedience theory. Examination of these statements indicated that there were specific items that epitomised this theory of authoritarianism. Interestingly, these did not include any specific reference to any political ideology. Rather they reflected ideas about censorship and dealing with deviant behaviour. As was argued, such groups need not necessarily ascribe to any particular ideology. More importantly they should demonstrate strong group membership, which requires high levels of conformity. In addition, for a group to be categorised as truly authoritarian it should also impart sanctions upon those who deviate from the norm. These items and others of a similar nature now provide a new avenue of research to be pursued. This study was partly exploratory in nature in that it was intended to define and test a theory.

In addition, Altemeyer (1988) has voiced his dismay over the lack of empirical examination of the theoretical and psychometric properties of those who have proposed new and alternative measurements of authoritarianism. Hence, there remains a significant task in exploring this theory of authoritarianism and producing a scale with which to measure it. The method of analysis utilised in the present study was

purposely simple, in that it was attempting to illustrate some concepts of authoritarianism. Future research should make use of multivariate techniques and in particular the factor structure of the three measures in combination.

In the more general sense, a review of the literature revealed there to be many anomalies associated with authoritarian research. In particular there is still significant debate over the left- and right-wing orientation of the authoritarian. New measures such as *Social Dominance Orientation* (Sidanius, 1993) and *System Justification Theory* (Jost & Banaji, 1994) have broken away from this tradition to some degree, but essentially aim to provide the same answers and their use of conservative ideology is apparent (Greenberg & Jonas, 2003). Further still to being able to adequately define and measure authoritarianism, comes the understanding of just how such personality features are firstly acquired, and secondly, the psychological functions which they serve. Adorno et al. anticipated that there were numerous features that characterised the authoritarian, many of which have remained unproven. In addition, the developmental aspects are equally ambiguous, hence the major task of future research is to amalgamate these two and gain a coherent and logical grasp on the authoritarian syndrome.

Section Two – The Future of Authoritarianism

5.4 Introduction

The second part of the discussion focuses upon the implications of the proposed theory to the understanding of authoritarianism and also provides some indication of the meaning of authoritarianism to modern society. Recent political events have questioned the relationship between the individual and society. Many different groups of people are not only forced to coexist, but to maintain some level of etiquette in their dealings with each other. Furthermore, even in the most democratic of nations, the struggle for power and control is a seemingly endless pursuit.

5.5 Social Conformity and Obedience as Authoritarianism.

The current examination illustrated the relationship between authoritarianism and conformity and obedience. As an artefact of previous research, the researcher is compelled to acknowledge the endeavours of others in the field and incorporate their theorising and research within the current paradigm. The autonomy-conformity model proposed by Feldman (2003) also emphasises this apparent difficulty in defining any new theory of authoritarianism. Whilst Feldman regards his conceptualisation as ‘new’ and arising from a different set of propositions, he is also however, indebted to both Adorno et al. and Altemeyer in particular in the occurrence of the concepts of ‘authoritarian aggression’ and ‘authoritarian submission’.

In relation to conformity and obedience, Feldman (2003) also regards these two aspects of authoritarianism as of paramount importance in understanding such

personalities, but instead relies on the traditional labels of authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission,

Authoritarian submission is a result of the desire of those who value social conformity to have everyone defer to authorities to ensure the maintenance of common norms and values and social cohesion. From this perspective, political authorities need to have the respect and obedience of the public. Authoritarian aggression is the hostility directed at those who are seen to threaten social order. Because the goal of those high in social conformity is to defend common norms and values, they will want the authorities to take actions that punish nonconformists and restrict their ability to challenge those norms. (Feldman, 2003, p.67)

Whilst authoritarian aggression/submission and obedience/conformity may appear interchangeable, the distinctly psychodynamic background to the two former labels should be recalled. In particular, the use of terms such as ‘hostility’ in regards to the punishment of non-conformists echoes the psychodynamic paradigm in which authoritarian research has been connected to since Adorno et al. (1950). Care is needed to adequately explain these terms in light of the theoretical background upon which a theory is based. In this instance social-cognitive.

Milgram (1974) also makes the explicit distinction between conformity and obedience as two separate entities. Milgram regarded obedience as being restricted to the “action of the subject who complies with authority” (p.113). In contrast, conformity was seen as “the action of a subject of a when he goes along with his peers, people of his own

status, who have no special right to direct his behaviour” (p.113). To illustrate this point, Milgram uses the analogy of recruit in the military service. Whilst the soldier is required to carry out the orders of his superiors, he is also in tandem assuming the habits, routines and discourse of his or her peers. The first behaviour is obedience, and the second being conformity. Also using the experiments of Asch for further clarification, Milgram states “Asch’s subjects *conform* to the group. The subjects in the present experiment *obey* the experimenter. Obedience and conformity both refer to the abdication of initiative to an external source”⁵⁷ (p.114). The subtle differences between the two lay in the psychological processes that trigger such behaviours.

Essentially, the presence of a group or social interaction is of paramount importance in distinguishing these two features. A person can therefore conform in some situations, and at the same time not be obedient. Likewise the reverse premise is also valid. All social situations demand some level of both, and indeed society would become chaotic without the presence of each. Explicitly, there must be some level of universal behaviour and standards, and in addition there must also be a process by which these are enforced. Whilst the majority of people do conform to these common values, whether for the sake of a distinct belief in them or else through the desire for harmony or otherwise, there will always be violators of these rules. When people cease to conform, then they must be imposed to do so by other means. The example of criminality highlights this point. The lawbreaker ceases to conform to the established rules of conduct and is therefore punished for such a transgression. The lawbreaker is essentially forced to conform, regardless of the practicality of any given rule. Hence for the current discussion, it would appear that it is in fact conformity that has the

⁵⁷ Emphasis in original.

strongest bearing upon authoritarianism, as it is likely to be the primary feature of such behaviour. Obedience will essentially follow, should the regime possess the relative authority to sanction such action.

The French sociologist Emile Durkheim's classic writing the 'society of saints' (Durkheim, 1938), exemplifies the intensity that rules and the adherence to them can pose on any given collective. To Durkheim, crime was essentially normal and even essential for the advancement of society:

Imagine a society of saints, a perfect cloister of exemplary individuals. Crimes, properly so called, will there be unknown; but faults which appear venial to the layman will create there the same scandal that the ordinary offence does consciousness. If, then, this society has the power to judge and punish, it will define these acts as criminal and will treat them as such. For the same reason, the perfect and upright man judges his smallest failings with a severity that the majority reserve for acts more truly in the nature of the offence. Formerly, acts of violence against persons were more frequent than they are today, because respect for individual dignity was less strong. As this has increased, these crimes have become more rare; and also, many acts violating this sentiment have been introduced into the penal law which were not included in these primitive times. (Durkheim, 1938)

Laws and rules are very specific – they are very situationally dependent and have the propensity to change over time also. What was once considered a crime may no

longer be and vice versa. Homosexuality and the use of some drugs are contemporary examples of this. Durkheim cites the case of Socrates, who according to Athenian law was considered deviant for his independence of thought, a virtue that is often applauded in modern times. In addition, Durkheim's concept of *anomie* has been referenced in studies of authoritarianism (McDill, 1961; Roberts, Rokeach, & McKittrick, 1952; Roberts & Rokeach, 1956). Rule breakers as non-conformists are a threat to the authoritarian's social harmony. The punitive nature of the authoritarian is therefore a by-product of the requirement or desire for the authoritarian to maintain the status quo.

As well as being a correlate of authoritarianism, education has been identified as playing a significant role in the advancement of moral reasoning. Speicher (1994) discovered that adults who complete college education reason in a much more complex fashion than those who do not receive any further education. Rest & Thoma (1985) also encountered this relationship and were able to stipulate that each successive year of schooling contributed further to these differences. They hypothesised that this was due to two main factors – increased cognitive growth and exposure to more diverse moral perspectives and situations. But to simply assign education the task of explaining authoritarian behaviour ignores many of the complexities that are involved during the interplay between these variables.

In addition to the function that education plays in the nature of one's moral reasoning, many cultural effects have also been identified. In particular, merely belonging to a complex democratic society stimulates this development significantly. The more diverse a society the more the individual actor is required to internalise the needs and

opinions of others, and the laws that reflect upon the people as a whole rather than the needs of one dominant group. More specifically, people from non-Western rural communities were shown to possess little evidence of post-conventional reasoning (Harkness, Edwards, & Super, 1981). Little or no exposure to political conflict does not present the individual with the need to develop higher levels of moral reasoning. Such collectivist cultures emphasise cooperation and loyalty to the dominant rule and hence seldom progress beyond third (conventional) stage. The majority of the current samples were drawn from Western societies where political turmoil is relatively benign. Other samples from less 'stable' environments may produce greater variation.

Whilst educational programs designed to reduce prejudice for example, may be heralded as a vital step in promoting a tolerant society, Allport (1954) is sceptical about whether there is any practical utility in these due to the overriding and dominant influence of the family in dictating prejudicial attitudes. This does not mean that there should not be efforts at teaching democratic values. Accordingly they may provide a "secondary model for the child to follow. If they succeed in making him question his system of values, the chances for a mature resolution of the conflict are greater than if such questioning never took place" (Allport, 1954, p.296). Authoritarianism may follow a similar vein and the role of the family and other developmental factors was explored in detail by Adorno et al. (1950). Whereas the child is required to conform to a predominant rule, e.g. the father as head of the family, they may question such authority as they encounter new figures of influence. Where a younger child may not possess the strength to oppose the prejudicial values of the parents, so they might not also be able to object to conforming to more general rules. The obedience element of

this is vital for understanding such behaviour. Without some level of punitive sanction, the pressure on the child to conform is questionable.

Research into disciplinary techniques and their relationship to morality began with Hoffman (1970) and his examination of three major approaches to moral development – *love withdrawal*, *power assertion* and *induction*. A meta-analysis by Brody & Shaffer (1982) on the relationships between these methods and moral development led to the conclusion that neither love withdrawal nor power assertion had any positive affect upon moral maturity. The method of induction, whereby the inappropriateness of the behaviour is explained to the child was shown to notably promote three aspects of morality – moral emotions, moral reasoning and moral behaviour. In particular, the use of power assertion techniques such as physical punishment, were shown to increase non-compliance, general disobedience and foster a lack of concern for others⁵⁸. A highly punitive upbringing is therefore identified as limiting to moral development, and by implication the fostering of the internalisation of the rights of others. The punitive stance of the authoritarian family could be a reflection on this principle. Adorno et al. (1950) proposed a similar theory that incorporated a punitive upbringing upon acquiring authoritarian tendencies.

In particular, the inhibition of progression to higher levels of moral reasoning in such individuals, places them firmly beyond the ability to understand human rights as a guiding principle of justice. For such people it is the benefit of the whole and the adherence to the laws that govern it, that is of paramount importance. Severe sanctions imposed upon violators of these laws are therefore more forthcoming and

⁵⁸ It is seldom that punishment is used in isolation and likewise the most inductive of parents were also shown to resort to mild physical discipline to support their explanatory efforts. Also it has been recognized that different levels of each style may be more effective with different children.

inevitable. The current sample showed relatively low levels of moral reasoning, despite the generally higher levels of education recorded for the majority. Although correlations with authoritarianism and education were as a whole negative, there is scope to assume that education is not the only major aspect of moral reasoning. Indeed the Biker group, who stated no formal education level, recorded the highest mean levels of moral competency. Larger samples and more reliable instruments may confirm these findings.

In the epilogue to Milgram's 1974 text, he offers a warning against becoming too complacent over the role of authority even in the most democratic societies. He states, "in democracies, men are placed in office through popular elections. Yet, once installed, they are no less in authority than those who get there by other means" (Milgram, 1974, p.179). Essentially this portrays the democratic process as not being the safeguard that many believe it to be with regards to freedom and individual rights. It is not the process by which the authority is selected, but the authority itself that needs to be scrutinized. Listing a number of such conflicts originating in a democratically elected authority, and in particular the war in Vietnam, Milgram contends that even though "voices of morality were raised against the action in question, but the typical response of the common man was to obey orders" (Milgram, 1974, p.180). The role of authority is so strong in Milgram's eyes that he believes that a "substantial proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate authority" (Milgram, 1974, p.189). Conforming and obeying are two aspects of the psychological make-up that manifests itself in various social situations. Experimentally they have provided evidence that

strong adherence to either be present in a majority of the subjects, and was found to be evident in the current sample with few exceptions.

5.6 Prejudice and Authoritarianism.

As highlighted in *Chapter 1*, the irrationality of anti-Semitism is important in the study of prejudice and that this behaviour towards Jewish people is that such prejudice “cannot be classified exclusively as racial, ethnic, national, religious, or as any other single sociological type” (Allport, 1954, p.119). Whereas Adorno et al. (1950) believed anti-Semitism to be a ‘special’ case of more general ethnocentrism, they may have been misguided about its cause. It would appear that the authoritarian is not especially selective with regards to minimal or ‘out-groups’ which they choose to discriminate against. Anti-Semitism may have no exclusive relationship with authoritarianism, save for the fact that it was a feature in at least one such authoritarian regime.

Without minimising these atrocities, it should also be recalled that the same genocidal tendencies were extended to other groups during the holocaust, such as Gypsies and the physically handicapped. When Altemeyer (1994) refers to authoritarians as ‘equal opportunity’ bigots, he is highlighting this very point. The authoritarian as a staunch proponent of the in-group is by default prejudiced against the out-group – and indeed any out-group member. Whilst prejudice can be a function of processes other than inter-group relations, it is this kind of behaviour which is an important facet of the authoritarian syndrome. But where it can become commonplace for many texts on prejudice to make reference to *The Authoritarian Personality*, to perceive this as one

possible explanation is incorrect. Whilst authoritarians may be prejudiced, this is a distinct function of authoritarianism. Not all people who hold strong prejudices are authoritarian (see Duckitt, 1989). There is often confusion between correlation and causation with regards to prejudice and authoritarianism. Nevertheless, the two concepts do diverge to some extent and there is therefore a whole wealth of shared literature upon which to seek clarification.

Prejudice can be defined as a “personal disposition or response orientation toward a particular social group or its symbolic representation” (Brewer, 1994, p.317). The study of prejudice is a major feature of psychological research and many studies have served to further our understanding of the different forms it can take and the situations where it is likely to arise. The difficulty arises when the *macro* explanations of the inter-group context conflict with the *micro* theories of individual differences and personality. Brewer (1994) sees the study of prejudice as being divided along these lines:

Whereas the study of stereotypes and prejudice is undertaken primarily with the individual as the unit of analysis, research on discrimination and inter-group relations is likely to be concerned with aggregate behaviours, with the independent group as the unit of analysis. (p.318)

Brewer identifies Allport's (1954) *The Nature of Prejudice* as the defining moment where different aspect of social psychological research on inter-group behaviour became more isolated.

Brewer (1994) further postulates the various theories that have attempted to draw together these different schools of thought termed by Social Identity theorists as *interpersonal* and *inter-group* orientations (Tajfel, 1979). The disparity between ones group and personal beliefs can be evidenced in the inconsistencies observed between public (overt) and private (covert) expressions of prejudice. Hence,

Under conditions where social identity is salient, the expression or inhibition of prejudice is a joint function of group identification and perceived group norms. On the other hand, when social identity is not salient, expression of prejudice is unrelated to group norms and predicted instead by personal values. (Brewer, 1994, p.323)

Authoritarian theories that stress strong components of social conformity echo these sentiments. Altemeyer's (1994) explorations with the value-confrontation methods developed by Rokeach (1973) also attempt to address this pattern. The feedback situation necessitated a personalized situation, as the collective condition served only to further reinforce values as normative. Brewer summarises the effectiveness of such value change strategies directed towards ego-defensive functions, as likely to be context specific. Essentially:

Reducing the personal threat associated with an out-group category may well be effective in decreasing negative beliefs about that social group when personal identity concerns are particularly salient, but it remains an open question whether the same methods are effective when group identity is threatened. (Brewer, 1994, p.324)

Again the relationship between authoritarianism and prejudice is made explicit. Threat to the social order from out-groups, necessitates that prejudice be made more salient towards this perceived target. These targets can then become a relative scapegoat for many of societies failings. Minorities and their perceived differences traditionally become the aim of out-group bias, due to the seemingly latent inability to conform. Without strict conformity, they cannot be assimilated into the in-group, nor can their presence be tolerated as they signify a potential threat. Prejudice and authoritarianism are undoubtedly linked, but it is the direction of any causation which requires clarification – neither can fully explain the presence and intensity of the other, and other variables must therefore be relevant.

5.7 The Resurgence of Authoritarian Explanation.

In their reviews of modern hate crimes, Levin (2002) and Gerstenfeld (2004) both make explicit reference to *The Authoritarian Personality* in their explanations of how people acquire negative and prejudicial stereotypes. Similar references to the relationship between hate crimes and authoritarianism are made by Craig (2003), and the symbolic or distinctiveness of these aggressive acts over other violent behaviour. Specifically, Levin argues that it is the dominant and ethnocentric personality of the authoritarian that stimulate prejudicial behaviour and that this begins in early childhood. Levin's interpretation of the authoritarian family structure surmises that it is not the bigoted attitudes that cause the authoritarian personality to develop, but the development of a psychological need for prejudice. This then results in authoritarianism. Specifically, it is argued,

The young child in an authoritarian family is rigidly relegated to the role of dependent and submissive underling. The child is subjected to severe, even brutal, discipline. Because of being maltreated at an early age, the bigoted youngster grows up feeling a profound sense of powerlessness. As an adult, in order to compensate, he or she identifies with powerful elements of society and seeks to distance himself or herself from groups stereotyped as inferior, weak, and powerless. (Levin, 2002, p.61)

Levin regards the transition from subordinate family member to authoritarian adult as being a compensatory act that fills a void in the individuals psychological needs.

Similarly, Gerstenfeld also related the concept of authoritarianism back to parenting styles. Citing the work of Ezekiel (1995; 2002), the link between ones upbringing and hate crimes is made explicit,

The young men who joined a Detroit neo-Nazi group were from poor neighbourhoods, had fathers who left or died during their sons childhoods, had experienced a series of cold or abusive stepfathers or mother's boyfriends, and had histories of alcoholism or violence. (Gerstenfeld, 2004, p.84)

Whilst neither account can be regarded as a conclusive claim as to the role of the family in nurturing the authoritarian personality, it nevertheless points to a return to some of the original theory about the causes of authoritarianism that has been

distinctly missing from current research, overwhelmed with ideological and methodological complications.

Although Levin recognises the ideological basis of authoritarianism, he is not misinformed as to the background and subsequent developments in the field, unlike Gerstenfeld who provides only a scant appraisal of authoritarian research. However, both authors are not so naïve as to place the cause of hate crimes into the authoritarian parental structure. Both acknowledge that the role of situational factors is paramount to understanding how prejudicial thought and behaviour is cultivated. Gerstenfeld refers to the data collected on hate crime perpetrators as support for the situational influence of prejudice. The fact that the majority of hate crimes are committed by groups of young males with no explicit connection to any hate group, is indicative of the role peer pressure plays on their behaviour. In addition, the fact that only 25% of hate crime offenders possess any connection to a hate group, act alone or possess any hate paraphernalia adds further strength to this argument (Gerstenfeld, 2004). This leads to what is termed 'the influence of the group' and in particular the relationship between conformity, obedience and groupthink.

Both Gerstenfeld and Levin also cite the works of Asch and Milgram in their respective analyses of how the presence of group influence can be a cause of prejudicial behaviour. Both authors refer to the infamous Stanford prison experiment of Zimbardo and his colleagues, which also has implications for authoritarianism. The central tenet of their arguments is relatively identical, in that they seek to attribute the majority of hate crime to the influence that being a member of a group exerts over the individual. The presence of a social situation therefore, exercises a strong inclination

to conform to the acceptable and normal behaviour of those present, even if these actions were relatively alien to us beforehand. The quest for socially desirable behaviour can in some individuals be so powerful a motivator that they will behave in morally reprehensible way.

The desire to follow the activities of ones group can be so strong that the persecution of others may become acceptable behaviour. Despite the fact that many of the perpetrators of hate crime may target minority groups, they may not have any ideological or pathological reason for this. It is doubtful that the majority of the German military during WWII had a particular aversion to the Jewish race; nevertheless the dynamics of the group facilitated the actions of many. There are a number of specific processes that amplify the influence that being a group member exerts over the individual – identification, internalization, and deindividuation. The first process that can occur in a group situation is the development of identification with the group. Individuals can become involved with organisations that they have no particular allegiance to, aside from being attracted to its members and desiring to be like them. In order to gain their acceptance they must be perceived to be adopting the group's attitudes and behaviours.

The second such process, that of internalization, is where the individual adopts the beliefs of the group. Internalization is essentially the next step on from identification. They become almost permanent and enduring values and in addition, the way that they are internalized exerts so much influence over their being, that any information that would be contrary to this is incorrectly processed. Cognitive dissonance is one such theory that explains why such inconsistencies are not particularly influential in

curtailing beliefs, such as those of hate groups. Leo Festinger's participant observation of the semi-religious organisation in *When Prophecy Fails* (Festinger, 1964) showed how the presence of new information was assimilated into current thinking or else dismissed altogether. The faith in the 'prophecy' was so great that acceptance of its failure became more and more undesirable. When an individual internalises the beliefs of a group, they become committed to its cause and ideology and this further accentuates the original attitudes that caused their attraction to the group in the initial instance. Using the example of hate groups, Gerstenfeld (2004) believes that mild racist thoughts may lead people to join hate groups. The increased acceptance amongst these peers then becomes self-perpetuating and the concept of racism then becomes a core value.

The final and most relevant in relation to authoritarianism concerns the deindividuating aspect that being a member of a group permits. The presence of others has the effect of providing a level of anonymity to the person. Gerstenfeld (2004) highlights the role that the wearing of distinctive uniforms has in perpetuating this by specific reference to neo-Nazis and Klan members. The protective cloak of the group serves as a facilitating element in the committing of deviant acts. By adopting the majority rule, the person is afforded relative exclusion from the responsibility of the individual actor. Freud was to develop on the writings of Binet in his theories of crowd behaviour (Freud, 1921) in explaining such a process. He was to believe that the collective takes on its *own* morality, and in particular the presence of a charismatic leader was important in developing this.

The theories of Allport and Adorno et al. for example, are heavily based within a psychodynamic perspective, which has somewhat lost its appeal in much of modern psychology. The concepts of 'ego-defence' and 'repression' may possess some validity, but they are not assessable in the scientific sense. They also are unable to provide answers to how prejudice can extend to entire societies, for example, Nazi Germany (Duckitt, 1992; Nelson, 2002). Social learning and cognitive processes for the acquisition of prejudice have somewhat become more useful in explaining these behaviours. Just as the psychodynamic style of Adorno et al. gave way to the social learning perspective of Altemeyer, so have the more general ideas about behaviour. Prejudice however is but a very small part of the authoritarian's personality and whilst the origins of the Berkeley study may have relied upon the concept quite heavily, there would not appear to be a particular relevance for it in the current analysis. Prejudice is instead a reflection of contempt for those who do not conform to the dominant norms of society or group. An individual can be prejudiced for reasons beyond authoritarianism and these personality theories are incomplete in explaining prejudice in general. The in-group/out-group orientation of the authoritarian is the basis for prejudice in this respect.

There is no particular exclusion however in the majority of cases where an individual cannot attempt conformity. One highly illustrative example is the Jewish police in the Warsaw ghetto during WWII⁵⁹. In exchange for their assistance in collecting people for deportation and other duties, they and their families were exempt from such exile. Although these privileges were later rescinded once they had served their usefulness, they enjoyed a period as honorary members of the in-group. Whilst their ethnic

⁵⁹ Known as the Judischer Ordnungsdienst. Organised by the 'Judenrat' they were initially a group set-up to alleviate conditions by complying with the German's demands.

background may have excluded them from total membership and was incongruent with the Nazi doctrine, their conformity to the overriding rule enabled them to largely escape being the focus of discrimination.

However, any group still requires motivation and rationalisation to commit acts and hate crime offenders in particular are often expert propagandists. Economic and social ills are often apportioned to the presence of minorities. The correlation between the price of cotton and the lynching of blacks in Southern states of America, was identified by Hovland and Sears (1940). Despite some contradictory re-evaluation (see Green, Glaser, & Rich, 1998), apportioning blame onto a particular minority has been well documented in a variety of situations. From a more contemporary perspective, the fear over immigration and influx of asylum seekers in many Western countries has been suggested to be infringing upon the very fabric of many of these societies. This is despite any real concrete evidence to support such notions. However, hate groups often use these fears to promote their cause and further increase the support for their prejudices. The existence of economic and social infringements due to these perceived minorities' physical presence provides the hate group with some 'tangible' legitimacy to their claims.

Although formally this current analysis began post-September 11th, its original inception began sometime prior to the events of 2001. Such was the magnitude of the terrorist attacks of that date many analyses of social and political attitudes can seldom avoid reference to it. Following the September 11th attacks and the subsequent terrorist activities since then, there has begun a rise once again in right-wing politics. Muslim people in particular have recently become the subject of much discrimination.

Their perceived links with suicide bomb attacks and terrorist cells make them targets for prejudice. A recent survey in the UK revealed that 'stop and search' figures for Asian people in England and Wales in 2002/2003 had risen 300% (Home Office, 2003). Whilst such activities by the police had also risen considerably overall following the implementation of anti-terror legislation, Asians as a group had been particularly victimised. Procedures such as 'stop and search' are heralded as part of intelligence led policing and do not amount to harassment. Nevertheless many minority organisations see it as victimisation.

For the authoritarian, the presence of fear has been identified as a primary drive in their behaviour. The presence of a threatening out-group to the stability of their present surrounding can be sufficient to accept many of the debilitating rules imposed upon them. Prejudice could result from this, and there are undoubtedly other situations that influence the fear-provoking behaviour in authoritarians. In order to control these fears, authoritarians will seemingly and unquestionably accept legislation, which is heralded to curb the rise of, for example, dangerous groups of minorities. Group safety would appear more important than individual liberty to the authoritarian.

5.9 Reducing Authoritarianism.

Although any collective requires an element of authority to maintain its direction and status quo, the more general trait of an authoritarian personality is somewhat regarded as being undesirable. The liberalisation of society and the emergence of democratic views have no doubt furthered the negativism that surrounds authoritarianism. In addition, world events that have displayed mass followings under the 'authority' of a

despotic leader produce revulsion against those involved. The notion of being authoritarian also conjures images of being under control and conforming against one's will. It is not that some levels of this trait are necessarily deficient to the individual, but particularly in the 21st Century, possessing an authoritarian personality is seen as largely undesirable.

Altemeyer (1994) provides a number of correlations with authoritarianism in an attempt to both understand the nature of the authoritarian's prejudiced behaviour and subsequently reduce its level. Altemeyer cites his previous studies whereby various measures of ethnocentrism have correlated between .3 and .5 with the RWA-scale. Scales assessing hostility towards specific groups such as homosexuals and Blacks have even higher correlations (between .5 and .65). This prejudice is explained by way of reference to Tajfel's (1981) social identity theory whereby people appear "to divide the world rather automatically into favoured ingroups and less favoured outgroups" (Altemeyer, 1994, p.136). It is therefore not the specific target of prejudice that is important, but merely the fact that minorities in particular are representative of an out-group. Altemeyer labels the right-wing authoritarian an 'equal opportunity bigot'. The minimal group effect described by Tajfel is more pronounced in high right-wing authoritarians.

The defensive nature of the authoritarian however, can also have an inhibiting affect on their ability to self-analyse their behaviour. The results of a disguised experiment by Altemeyer in 1989, showed that high authoritarians possessed an "*I don't want to know* attitude"⁶⁰ (Altemeyer, 1994, p.138). Such beliefs therefore make it much more

⁶⁰ Emphasis in original.

difficult to change authoritarian's prejudicial behaviour through methods such as self-insight. However one such example of this – Rokeach's (1973) *Value Confrontation* technique – is regarded as a possible avenue of exploration by Altemeyer. By presenting subjects with a composite score of how much they value their own personal freedom, the discrepancy between this and their own evaluations has been reported to bring about significant attitudinal and behavioural changes (Rokeach, 1973). Those who were distressed by this self-dissatisfaction were more likely to join civil rights groups and give money to charity. The effect was not universal however, and led Altemeyer to conduct his own explorations into freedom and equality and RWA using a similar procedure to Rokeach. In a similar manner, some support was found for the reduction in prejudice although this could also have conceivably been a function of the sample size and constitution than individual value confrontation. Nevertheless, Altemeyer does believe that this technique has some merit and that at the very least it is worthy of more study. For the natural 'ego-defensive' tendencies of the authoritarian to be challenged, this insight must conceivably come from within. Their self-belief in societal terms often remains unchallenged and becomes the source of much of their prejudice when threat does emerge.

In summary, Altemeyer makes a number of significant comments regarding those scoring high on authoritarianism. He states that:

Most Highs do not realise that they are unusually submissive, conventional, and aggressive. When they learn they are, they usually express some willingness to change. The right-wing authoritarians I study are not irredeemable Nazi-types as a rule, but fearful people whose

circumstances have kept them in those tight circles. They would never expect that they are enemies of *freedom* or *equality* ⁶¹. But if one can get past the defences they have thrown up to protect their vulnerabilities, as Rokeach's procedure might, Highs may be remarkably capable of change (Altemeyer, 1994, p.147).

Whilst the emphasis is on specifically reducing prejudice, Altemeyer believes that the nature of such intolerance in authoritarians is a function of this. Further reference to Tajfel's minimal group experiments is hypothesised to be particularly relevant. How far such a reduction in prejudice would go towards reducing authoritarianism remains to be clarified. There are in Altemeyer's definition of the authoritarian personality, many different facets and each needs to be addressed. Levels of authoritarianism do show a propensity to rise and fall, and the presence of conflict can be one such independent variable that could influence such levels of this trait.

One largely unexplored area that concerns the re-emergence of totalitarian or semi-totalitarian states is related to fundamentalist religions and Islamism in particular. Whine (2001) draws on the similarities and differences between Islamism and totalitarianism in linking the former with the emergence of repressive states. It should be noted that Whine's analysis was written pre-September 11th which makes his opinion all the more pertinent in light of further events invoked by the enactment of *Jihads* ⁶² by Islamic fundamentalists upon nations from the West. Not all Islamic faiths conform to such strict principles of holy wars however, and it is the distinctly the

⁶¹ Emphasis in original.

⁶² A Jihad or 'holy struggle' has two main features: the act of sacrifice guided by devotion to a cause, and the larger struggle for the implementation of an Islamic state. Such an action can be acted outside of the territory and to modern Islamist it constitutes an separate addition to the faiths Five Pillars, essentially interpreted in its revised form as an "armed struggle against the declared enemy" (Whine, 2001, p.71).

Islamic fundamentalists who are of most concern. Whine cites evidence that suggests the commonalities between the two concepts make Islamism a form of totalitarian ideology. In addition, the similarities between such a political religion and other legitimised forms of totalitarian experiments such as Fascism and Communism are apparent. Specifically, Kramer (1996; in Whine 2001, p.56) identifies that “in such an [Islamist] state no-one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private. Considered from this aspect the Islamic State bears kind of resemblance to the Fascist and Communist states”. Such is the intrusive and all-encompassing nature of Islamism that it’s bearing upon the citizen is absolute. Whilst there may be some important points identified by Whine and the relationship between Islam and totalitarianism, this fact is not exclusive to any one religion. There are undoubtedly other examples where religion plays a significant role in regulating the individual to this degree. The link between religion and authoritarianism has been explored by many researchers (see Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) and has been suggested to feature in the principles of many faiths.

What separates Islamism from other religions however, is that it is composed of an all-encompassing doctrine, which includes both the law and the state within its wider religious practice. Seemingly, Islamic ideology and its historical writings are to the fundamental Islamist, what Marxist-Leninism is to the hard-line Communist. It provides the justification and rationale to wage jihads against the western capitalists. By failing to act upon the encroachment on their states by foreign countries and ideologies, it symbolised the weakness of the Muslim man whose only alternative destiny was elimination (Whine, 2001). This is despite the lack of a centralised governance or overall leader.

But whilst this provides adequate justification for the enactment of holy jihads by Islamic fundamentalists to protect their faith, such progress comes at a price. It becomes necessary to make more intense the commitment to their cause in the hope of reaching such enlightenment. Where in previous examples of totalitarian societies, religion was an insignificant part of the overall ideology it was nevertheless utilised in mobilising the masses to promote the cause (Whine, 2001). This was particularly prominent in Nazi Germany where earlier persecution of the Church was relented in order to exert greater influence upon the numerical majority. Ultimately the concept of religion was largely replaced by the status of the party in providing a fresh belief system. Therefore in order to have any chance of success, a totalitarian movement must embrace all aspects of the member's life. Accordingly,

This aspect of parallel institutions is also found in contemporary fundamentalist and Islamist regimes, where the religious authorities monitor the effort and responsibilities of states' institutions and the populace, and intercede where they believe religion or moral precepts are in danger of being compromised. Such a system leads inexorably to an ever-swelling bureaucracy in which more and more people are dependent on the patronage of the state, the party or the establishment. (Whine, 2003, p.66).

Islamism, whilst not viewed explicitly as a totalitarian movement, has many of the features that have been previously used to describe previous attempts to create such

societies. Other religious and marginal political movements undoubtedly share these characteristics.

5.9 Conclusion

The study of authoritarianism has been dominated over its definition and measurement. Recent developments have addressed many of these concerns and a move towards a less ideological theory has been suggested. There has been a resurgence of interest in authoritarianism in seeking explanation of behaviours such as hate crimes and extremism. The ability for authoritarianism to illuminate the causes of these actions is tenuously explored however, and the task remains to be able to assimilate emerging theories into a coherent explanation. Subsequently, addressing the developmental aspects of authoritarian personalities still remains.

Concepts such as authoritarianism are as important in modern times as they were in 1950 when Adorno et al. published their original study. The complexities over explanation and assessment aside, its enduring quality are perhaps its observable patterns in behaviour and the relevance it has for understanding a wide range of social conduct.

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